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ADJUDICATIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Christopher J. Peters

*

While political speech-speech intended to influence political decisions-is
afforded the highest protection under the First Amendment, adjudicative
speech-speech intended to influence court decisions-is regularly and
systematically constrained by rules of evidence, canons of professional ethics,
judicial gag orders, and similar devices. Yet court decisions can be as important,
both to the litigants and to society at large, as political decisions. How then can
our practice of severely constraining adjudicative speech be justified as consistent
with First Amendment principles?
This Article attempts to answer that question in a way that is informative
about both the adjudicative process and the nature of free speech under the First
Amendment. The author first explores, and rejects, a number of possible
theoretical justifications for the relative lack of protection afforded adjudi~
cative speech. He then offers a more satisfactory explanation that relies in part
on the connection between participation and political legitimacy . Restrictions on
adjudicative speech, he argues, are necessary to preserve the opportunity for all
litigants to fully and fairly participate in the decisionmaking process, and to
maintain judicial subservience to general policies generated by processes
(legislation, constitutional lawmaking, the common law) that are more politically
legitimate than ad hoc judicial policymaking.
The author then applies this justification of adjudicative speech restrictions
to several recent controversies involving adjudicative speech. He contends that
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
congressional ban on the use of Legal Services Corporation funds to challenge
state welfare laws, was correctly decided; that court rules prohibiting the citation
of unpublished opinions are unconstitutional; and that the Court was wrong to
strike down Minnesota's regulation of judicial campaign speech in Republican
Party v. White.

* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law
School. For their comments on earlier versions of this Article and discussions with me of the
underlying issues, I thank Matt Adler, Tony Dillof, Chris Eisgruber, Peter Henning, Tim Iglesias,
Linda Meyer, Brad Roth, John Rothchild, Bob Sedler, the participants in workshops at the
law schools of the University of Michigan and Wayne State University, and the discussants at the
First Annual Constitutional Theory Conference at Vanderbilt University Law School. I
am especially grateful to Richard Primus and David Moran for organizing tbe respective
workshops and to Matt Adler, Rebecca Brown, and Barry Friedman for organizing the
conference and inviting me to present a precursor of this paper. For generous research
support, I thank Dean Joan Mahoney and The David Adamany Endowment at Wayne State
University Law School. For support that is less quantifiable but no less valuable, I thank my wife,
Trish Webster.
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Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting that the constraints regularly
imposed on adjudicative speech, designed to preserve the political legitimacy of
adjudication, imply the propriety of similar constraints on political speech where
necessary to preserve the legitimacy of democratic politics. Thus the author suggests that the regulation of campaign funding, mass media, and hate speech might
be justifiable as means of promoting full and fair participation in political life .
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[F]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our
civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them.

-Justice Hugo Black, Bridges v. California!
INTRODUCfrON: FOUR CASES

At its core, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendmene connects freedom of speech with legitimate government decisionmaking. The clause,
according to the U.S. Supreme Coun, "was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people,") and so the Coun protects "political" speech by applying
"strict scrutiny" to measures infringing it. 4 It probably is no exaggeration to say
that speech directed to processes of government decisionmaking is the most
highly protected category of speech in the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence.
Consider, then, the following four cases, asking yourself which of them
involves the kind of "political" speech that should be protected by strict scrutiny:
Case 1. An editorial writer accuses the President of the United States of
attempting to assume "dictatorial powers." The writer is prosecuted and
convicted under a federal statute that prohibits the publication of "false,
scandalous and malicious ... writings against the government of the
United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame ... or to bring
them ... into contempt or disrepute.,,5
Case 2. A candidate for election to a state's supreme court distributes
campaign literature critical of some of the court's prior decisions. The
candidate is brought before the state's attorney disciplinary board and
charged with violating provisions of the state's codes of judicial and attorney conduct that forbid a "candidate for a judicial office" to "announce his
or her views on disputed legal or political issues.,,6
Case 3. Members of the press seek to report details of a grisly multiple
murder, including an alleged confession and other evidence that implicates the defendant in custody. The judge presiding over the pending
murder trial enters a "restrictive order" that prohibits the press, under

1.
314 U.S. 252, 260(1941).
2.
"Omgressshall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ...." u.s. CoNST. amend. 1.
3.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
4.
See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002).
5.
Alien and Sedition Act of1798, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
6.
White, 536 U.s. at 768; see MINN. CoDE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUer Canon 5(A)(3)(d)G)
(1993); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUerR. 8.2(b) (1993).
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penalty of contempt, from publicly disclosing those facts before or during
7
the tria1.
Case 4. An attorney believes certain evidence may convince a federal jury
to rule in her client's favor and attempts to present that evidence during
trial. The judge, after ruling that the evidence is not "relevant" pursuant
to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 401,8 prohibits the attorney from presenting the evidence or referring to it in her arguments on the strength of
FRE 402, which provides that "[elvidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.,,9

In all four cases, someone is being prohibited from or punished for engaging
in speech; and in all four cases, the basis for the prohibition or punishment is that
the attempted speech may have an undesirable influence upon a government
decisionmaking procedure. The editorial writer in Case 1 is being punished
because his speech might "bring [the President] ... into contempt or disrepute,"
thus impairing the President's chances for reelection or the effectiveness of his
administration. The judicial candidate in Case 2 is being punished because his
campaign speech threatens "the impartiality of the state judiciary"IO by potentially "precommitting" him to particular decisions in cases he will hear if elected.
The members of the press in Case 3 are being prohibited from speaking, under
threat of contempt, because their speech might engender predisposition or bias
among jurors or prospective jurors in a pending criminal case. The attorney in
Case 4 is being prohibited from speaking, also under threat of contempt, because
her speech might mislead the jury into deciding her client's case based on
"irrelevant" facts.
Given the similarities in structure of each of the four cases, the proverbial
visitor from Mars, assuming he or she {or it?} is generally familiar with the importance of political speech in our First Amendment jurisprudence, probably would
assume that all four cases involve specially protected "political" speech-that is,
speech that has the potential to influence a government decisionmaking process.
But the visitor from Mars would be wrong. While the Supreme Court has
indicated that Cases 1, 2, and 3 involve protected political speech, it has never
even suggested that Case 4 might do so {and has often assumed, mostly implicitly,
that it does not}.
Case 1 presents such an obvious infringement of political speech that one
must go back to 1798 to find it, in the form of the notorious Alien and Sedition

7.
Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,542 (1976).
8.
FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.").
9.
FED. R. EVID. 402.
10.
White, 536 U.S. at 775.
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Acts. While the Supreme Court never ruled on the constitutionality of those
Acts before they were repealed, it has since rather resoundingly condemned
ll
them. Much more recently, the Court has invalidated an "announce clause"
provision like the one at issue in Case 2 on the ground that it did not survive the
strict scrutiny applicable to content,based restrictions on political speech.12 And
the Court has unanimously overturned a "gag order" like the one at issue in Case
13
3 as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.
But the Court has never even entertained, much less upheld, a challenge to
FRE 401 or 402, or indeed to any evidentiary rule, on the ground that such rules
14
impermissibly restrict speech in violation of the First Amendment.
This First Amendment blind spot regarding evidentiary rules is, on
reflection, quite baffling. Evidentiary rules seem to fit the classic paradigm of
restrictions-indeed, prior restraints--on political speech. A litigant arguing
before a court is, in so doing, seeking to influence the decision of a branch of
government that will directly affect him or her, no less than classic
5
beneficiaries of political speech protections-the street comer pamphleteer/
l7
the editorial writer,16 the stumping political candidate -are seeking by their
speech to influence government decisions that will affect them. IS Indeed, the
11.

See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) ("Although the Sedition Act
has carried the day in the court of history."

was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity

(footnote omitted)).

12.
13.
14.

See White, 536 U.S. at 774-88; see also infra Part IY.B.
See Stuart, 427 U.S. at 570.

Nor have commentators paid much heed to the issue. A notable exception is Frederick
Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L REv. 687 (1997). Schauer takes restrictions
on speech in adjudication as a First Amendment given (although he briefly mentions some reasons why
those restrictions make sense, see id. at 695) and proceeds from that premise to some more general points,
including: (a) that out-okourt speech by trial participants might present the same dangers as in-court
speech, see id. at 692-94; and (b) that free speech is in fact restricted in many contexts in our society
without our thinking that it presents a major First Amendment ptoblem, see id. at 696-97. Myapptoach
here will be a bit different: I will try to explain in some theoretical detail why we can take restrictions on
adjudicative speech as a First Amendment given. In doing so, I will focus, as Schauer does not, on the fact
that adjudication-unlike many other contexts in which speech is heavily restricted-is a government
decisionmaking process, like legislation or administration. Having done that, I will, among other things,
expand a bit on Schauer's observation that in-court and out-of-court speech often present similar
dangers, see infra Part IY.B.l., and on his suggestion that restrictions on speech in adjudication imply the
legitimacy of restrictions on speech in other contexts as well, see infra Part IV, and the Conclusion.
15.
See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating the convictions of
protest organizers under an ordinance prohibiting distribution ofleaflets on the street).
16.
See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (invalidating the contempt conviction
of a newspaper for publication of editorials commenting on a pending criminal case).
17.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating federal statutory limitations on
campaign expenditures by political candidates); White, 536 U.S. 765 (invalidating state restrictions on the
content of candidates' speech during judicial campaigns).
18.
Of course, unless the litigant is appearing pro se, he or she "speaks" in court mostly through his
or her attorney. This fact is related, I think, to the most convincing justification for restricting adjudicative
speech, as I explain infra Part IlI.D.
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litigants in a court case, criminal or civil, are quite likely to be affected by the
resulting decision more profoundly than most citizens ever will be affected by
an act of one of the political branches of government. The losing litigant may
be sent to jail, or forced to pay a large amount of damages, or denied custody of
a child, or compelled to grant a right-of-way on her property, or made to swallow
some other rather nasty medicine.
Of course, each litigant has a chance to directly influence the court's
decision-through the presentation of "proofs and reasoned arguments,,19-that
is, correspondingly, considerably greater than a typical citizen's opportunity to
directly influence the policies of government. And that is what makes the
existence of evidentiary rules especially mysterious from a First Amendment
perspective. To censor the content of the litigants' proofs and arguments--and
censorship is precisely what evidentiary rules accomplish-is to dictate the terms
on which litigants (through their lawyers) can participate in adjudicative
decisionmaking that will bind them. Government attempts to dictate the
terms of participation in other government decisionmaking contexts are uniformly subjected to strict First Amendment scrutiny and almost as uniformly
20
stricken down. Why should rules of evidence in adjudication be any different?
Why doesn't the First Amendment dog bark in the courtroom?21
This Article attempts, from the point of view of political theory, to answer
that question in a way that is informative about both the value of political speech
and the nature of the adjudicative process. More precisely, it attempts to answer
the normative question of why adjudicative and political speech are treated so
differently from each other, not the corresponding question of positive First
Amendment law. 22 The outcome of an actual First Amendment challenge to
evidentiary rules seems a foregone conclusion: Such rules would be summarily
upheld, probably on the ground that a long tradition of restrictions on courtroom
speech, together with the incompatibility between unrestricted speech and a
19.

20.

Lon L. Fuller, The Farms and Umits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 369 (1978).
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("Government action that

stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government, contravenes this essential [First Amendment) right."); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95 (1972) ("(A)bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content."); see generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSfllUfIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.2.1, at 902-03 (2d ed. 2002).
21.
Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexud Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment
Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP. Cr. REv. 1,2 (citing Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of Silver
Blaze, STRAND MAG. (Dec. 1892)) (discussing the absence of First Amendment analysis in hostile work
environment claims).
22.
In this respect my small project proceeds in the same spirit as the much more comprehensive
one undertaken by Frederick Schauer in his book Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry: It "adopts a
philosophical rather than a legal approach." FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY ix-x (1982).
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courtroom's function, makes a courtroom a "nonpublic forum" in which govern2J
ment may impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral constraints on speech.
But my query here is theoretical, not doctrinal: I want to know whether
there is any convincing normative justification for the seemingly obvious outcome of a hypothetical First Amendment challenge to evidentiary rules. That is,
I want to interrogate our legal assumptions about speech to courts--which I will
refer to generally as adjudicative speech-and justify those assumptions normatively, if I can. Why is the imposition of severe restrictions on adjudicative
speech a matter of long-standing tradition? How is unfettered speech by litigants
incompatible with the function of a court? My hope is that asking and attempting to answer these questions in a systematic way will help us to understand both
freedom of speech and adjudication a bit better.
I begin in Part I by suggesting that Anglo-American adjudication is more
like Anglo-American politics than is often acknowledged: Each requires for its
legitimacy the meaningful participation of the affected parties. And, as I
explain, freedom of speech is a necessary condition of meaningful political
participation. Given the centrality of participation to both political and
adjudicative legitimacy, and the centrality of free speech to meaningful participation, it seems especially anomalous that the First Amendment applies vigorously in politics but hardly at all in adjudication.24 And despite our reflexive
familiarity with this incongruity, it cannot easily be explained away, as I
demonstrate in Part II by assessing (and rejecting) five ways of attempting to do
precisely that.
In Part III, I offer a more satisfactory explanation for the otherwise curious
distinction between (mostly unfettered) political speech and (tightly
constrained) adjudicative speech. The very need to preserve the meaningfulness
23.
Cf. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 6n, 680 (1992) (holding that
public airports are nonpublic fora); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.
730 (1990) (holding that post
office property is a nonpublic forum); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that military
bases are nonpublic fora); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) (holding that the areas outside
prisons and jails are nonpublic fora).
Much of the argument in Part I derives from several prior articles. I first compared
24.
adjudication and democratic (Xllitics, from the perspective of political legitimacy, in Adjw:l.ication as
Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1997) [hereinafter Peters, AdjuLlication], in which I argued that
Anglo-American adjudication contains the democratic elements of participation and representation. In
Assessing the New}uJidal Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000) [hereinafter Peters, Minimalism], I
contended that the desirability of preserving the representative legitimacy of adjudication provides a reason
in favor of narrow, "minimalist" court decisions. In Persuasion: A Model of Majaritarianism as
AdjuLlication, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Peters, Persuasion], I argued that majoritarian
politics can be understcxxl as a type of adjudication the legitimacy of which depends, like actual
adjudication, on the degree to which decisionmakers are responsive to the arguments of those affected by
decisions. And in Participation, Representation, and Principled Adjudication, 8 LEGAL THEORY 185 (2002)
[hereinafter Peters, Participation], I contended that a judge's res(Xlnsibility to the litigants generally
precludes her from deciding cases based u(Xln prospective policy rather than retrospective principle.

no,
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of participation in adjudication, I contend, partly explains the existence of
evidentiary rules and other restrictions on adjudicative speech. The rest of the
explanation derives from the limits of the legitimacy that participation lends
to adjudication, and from the need to maintain judicial subservience to more
legitimate modes of policymaking.
In Part IV, I tum to some contemporary issues involving the interaction
between free speech norms and adjudication, asking whether those issues might
be illuminated by the explanation of adjudicative speech restrictions that I offer.
Specifically, I assess the validity of recent congressional attempts to prevent
federally funded attorneys from challenging state welfare systems; of court rules
prohibiting the citation of unpublished judicial opinions; and of attempts to
regulate the speech of candidates in state judicial campaigns.
Finally, I conclude by suggesting that the justification for evidentiary rules
and other restrictions on adjudicative speech tells us something valuable not only
about speech in adjudication, but also about speech in politics: It tells us that
political speech itself, the paradigm of specially protected speech, might permissibly be restricted when necessary to preserve the participatory legitimacy of
democratic politics.

I.

PARTICIPATION AND SPEECH, POLITICS AND ADJUDICATION

Adjudication and politics are alike in at least two obvious ways: Both produce decisions that bind people, and both, at least paradigmatically, are processes
2S
of government. Courts are institutions of government no less than legislatures
and administrations; judges, like legislators and chief executives, are
. dgments, 27 court procedures, 28 and'JUd'lCta
. I
government actors. 26 So court JU
25.
This is not to say that all adjudication is run by government, or that everything that might
be called "politics" is aimed at producing government decisions. Types of alternative dispute resolution,
such as arbitration and mediation, often proceed without government intervention. And interactions
in nongovernmental contexts-families, workplaces, law faculties-frequently are considered
"political."
26.
This obvious premise underlies Supreme Court decisions that have held a court's enforcement
of common law principles to be state action in the constitutionally relevant sense. See, e.g., N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (holding that judicial enforcement of common law libel was
state action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 19 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant in private contracts was state action).
27.
See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254; Shelley, 334 U.S. at 1.
28.
See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabarna, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (invalidating a civil litigant's use of
peremptory challenges to strike jurors based on gender as a violation of equal protection); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (invalidating a civil litigant's use of peremptory
challenges to strike jurors based on race as a Violation of equal protection); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79,89 (1986) (invalidating the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in a criminal trial to strike jurors
based on race as a violation of equal protection). Of course court procedures are subject to constitutional
norms that are directed specifically to courts, such as most provisions of the Fifth Amendment, the Due
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orders29 are subject to constitutional limitations just as the actions of the political branches are.
Because adjudication is a process of coercive government decisionmaking, it
is subject not only to the limitations of positive constitutional law, but also to
even more fundamental standards of political legitimacy. We may ask not only
the familiar question of whether, and under what conditions, politics is politically
legitimate, but also the question, perhaps somewhat less familiar, of whether and
under what conditions adjudication is politically legitimate.
When directed to adjudication, this question in practice tends to be asked
primarily in the particular public-law contexts of judicial review and statutory
interpretation---contexts in which courts interpret and evaluate the work of the
political branches and thus provoke worries about comparative legitimacy. So
30
commentators fret about the "countermajoritarian difficulty" of judicial review
and about the degree of deference courts owe to legislatures in constitutional and
31
statutory interpretation. But the question of the political legitimacy of adjudication as a general matter is rarely put.
A careful consideration of that question reveals a deeper similarity between
adjudication and political decisionmaking. This fact shouldn't be surprising;
both adjudication and political decisionmaking in our democracy rely on the
same democratic value-participation-to provide legitimacy. It would in fact
be a bit surprising if this were not the case; if participation is central to
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the provisions of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments
and Article III.
29.
See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding the First
Amendment validity of protective orders limiting public access to information produced during discovery);
Neb. Press Ass'n v. Sruart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating a judicial restrictive order against press
coverage of a criminal trial as violative of the First Amendment); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941) (invalidating a contempt citation for a newspaper editorial referring to a pending court case as
violative of the First Amendment).
30.
Examples here are too numerous to cite without being arbitrary; nonetheless, see, for example,
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986) (1962) (coining the phrase
"counter-majoritarian difficulty"); Symposium, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 843
(2001) (discussing the difficulty). For an historical account of the development of the countermajoritarian
difficulty in constirutional theory, see Barry Friedman's ambitious and informative series of articles: Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajaritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajaritarianDifficulty, Part Three: The
Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971 (2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic
Obsession: The History of the Countermajaritarian DifficuI.r:y, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter
Friedman, Part Five). Part Two of Friedman's series is, apparently, as yet unpublished. See Friedman, Part
Five, supra, at 157 n.l2.
31.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BaRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW (1990) (defending an "originalist" approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation);
WILLIAM N. EsKRlDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (defending a "dynamic,"
nonoriginalist approach to statutory interpretation); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
(I 994) (defending a "textualist" approach to starutory and constitutional interpretation).
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democratic legitimacy (as I will argue in a moment), why shouldn't all
significant government institutions, the courts included, meaningfully incorporate that value?

A.

Participation and Democratic Legitimacy

"0emocracy".1S, 0 f course, a term 0 f contested mean mg.
. ) 2 0 ne can 't get
very far in an argument about "democratic" legitimacy without at least describing, and preferably defending, the particular conception of democracy that forms
the basis for one's argument. In my view, the most attractive understanding of
democratic legitimacy, from both a descriptive and a normative perspective,
has participation as its central value. By participation I mean the participation
in government of those bound by government decisions.
Consider participation's main competitor as a foundational democratic
value: consent.)) As a bedrock principle of democracy, consent is both descriptively and normatively problematic. As a descriptive matter, it is difficult to
assert honestly that most of us have meaningfully "consented" either to our
general system of government-what reasonable choices do we have?---or,
perhaps more to the point, to those specific actions of that government with
which we disagree. 14 As a normative matter, consent is rather severely underde32.
This point has recently been made quite effectively by several commentators. See RONALD
DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONsrmmON 15-35 (1996);
Offi.ISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITlITIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 18-20, 46-108 (2001); LoUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSEITLEDCONSTITlITION 69 (2001).
33.
Some commentators treat government by "consent" and government by "participation" as
functionally the same thing, without making any conceptual distinction between them. See, e.g.,
ALExANDER MEIKLEJOHN, Free Speech and Its Relation to Se/f-GOIIe7nment, in POLITICAL FREEDOM 1,9-16
(1960). If one's definition of political consent in fact tums on the value of political parricipatian, as I believe
Meiklejohn's does, then any competition between consent and panicipation for the status of core
democratic value is merely a matter of semantics: By consent one really means panicipation.
34.
Locke and Rousseau both attempted to justify majority tule as the product of an original act of
consent, a unanimous "compact" or agreement by which all members of society agreed to be tuled
thereafter by a majority. See JOHN LocKE, TWo ThEATISES OF GoVERNMENT 348-58 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SCx::IAL CONTRACT 116-21
(Wilmoore Kendall trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1954) (1762). But of course such an original social contract
would, and could, bind only those who actually agreed to it, not their descendants. Locke tried to solve this
ptoblem with a rather tenuous argument that subsequent members of society "tacitly" consent to the
compact through "Possession, or Enjoyment, of any pan of the Dominions of ... Government." LocKE,
supra, at 366. Rousseau's attempted solution at first seems even more tenuous, but in fact amounts to the
same thing: He held that "[tlo reside within the state after its actual establishment ... is to consent to it,"
including to the principle of majority rule on matters of ordinary legislation. ROUSSEAU, supra, at 168. Of
course it is difficult to "reside within" a state without also "possessing or enjoying any pan of the dominions
of government" of that state.
The vulnerability of both Locke's and Rousseau's solutions is suggested by Rousseau's qualification that
consent by residence applies only "to a state that is free. Where this condition is not fulfilled, a resident
may be prevented from leaving, despite a wish to do so, by family ties, property, lack of a place of refuge,
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terminative as a justification of democratic government, for a society might
consent to rule by oligarchy or by dictatorship.J5
The value of participation, on the other hand, fares reasonably well both
descriptively and normatively as a justification of American democracy. Descriptively, govemment-by-participation is a roughly accurate characterization of our
system, at least if participation is understood to include not only actual participa36
tion but also the opportunity to participate. Every adult citizen in the United
States has the opportunity to influence policy by participating in the election
of those who directly make it (or who appoint and supervise those who directly
make it). In many states, citizens also have the occasional chance-steadily
becoming less occasional-to make policy directly by voting on ballot referenda
J7
or initiatives. In some places citizens directly make local policy by participating
in town meetings. The notice-and-comment process allows for direct participaJ8
tion in administrative rulemaking. Then, of course, there is the ubiquitous
power of political speech in its many forms-not least by way of public opinion
polls---which constitutes a sort of direct citizen participation in government
between elections.

poverty, or coercion." Id. (emphasis altered). In the real world, of course, such deterrents to exit are nearly
ubiquitous. And Rousseau neglects to mention that, even if exit is possible and relatively cost-free, there
may not be a suitable alternative state to exit to.
35.
Indeed, Thomas Hobbes grounded his case for absolute monarchy in consent theory. See
ThOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 262-88 (Herbert W. Schneider ed., 1958) (1651).
36.
Many or most of us do not regularly actually participate in politics, even in the fonn of voting.
For example:
In the midtenn congressional elections of 1998, only 41.9% of the [voting age population, or
YAP) bothered to vote, giving the country its worst turnout in modem history. The 1998
elections, however, were only the culmination of a trend forty years in the making. In the
congressional elections held throughout the 1960s, the average turnout was 54.6%; by the 1990s,
it had dropped nine points to 45.7% .
... Throughout the 1990s, on average, Congress has been elected by less than a majority
of the YAP.... [N)ot since 1970 has the turnout been over fifty percent in a midtenn election.
Even in presidential election years, fifty percent of the YAP has not voted regularly for
Congress. In fact, 1992 was the first and last time in twenty years that the congressional vote
in a presidential election year did sunnount the fifty-percent mark.
Daniel]. Schwartz, Note, The Potential Effects of Nandeferential Review em Interest Group Incentives and Voter
Turnout, 77 N.Y.U. L REV. 1845, 1852-53 (2002) (citations omirted).
37.
"Over the last few decades, there has been a sea change in the lawmaking process in this
country. By initiative and by referendum, American voters in a significant number of states are participating directly in state and local governments." Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent

State and Lxal Fiscal Policy at tile Intersecticm of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a
Case in Point, 35 U. MICH.].L REFORM 511, 512 (2002) (citations omirred).
38.
See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.s.c. § 553 (2000) (requiring federal agencies to
provide "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making" and to allow "interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments").

716

51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 705 (2004)

"Of course," Learned Hand remarked, "I know how illusory would be the
belief that my vote determined anything.,,39 ("Hardly altogether," Alexander
Bickel replied. 40 ) But if Hand's problem is a problem, it is a problem oflarge-scale
41
democracy, not of democracy itself. Even on a massive scale, democracy is more
participatory than dictatorship or oligarchy on any scale.
Normatively, the value of participation unites a broad spectrum of theoretical justifications of democracy. In thinking about normative arguments for
democracy, we might divide the universe between proceduralist and functionalist
justifications. Proceduralist justifications value the procedures of democracy
themselves, while functionalist justifications value the outcomes of those procedures. Proceduralist justifications might be further divided into deontological
and consequentialist forms, with deontological arguments locating inherent value
in democratic procedures and consequentialist arguments placing value in certain
ancillary effects of democratic procedures.
The value of participation is central to all of these ways of justifying democracy. One who justifies democracy on deontological proceduralist grounds---who
believes that democratic procedures are valuable for their own sake-is likely
to focus, like Immanuel Kant, on the ideals of individual autonomy and
antipaternalism,42 each of which is given substance when citizens participate in
the government that binds them.
Participation in government
decisionmaking, the theory goes, transforms government decisions from
43
instances of coercion to expressions of self-government. Likewise, one who
justifies democracy on consequentialist proceduralist grounds---believing that
democratic procedures produce valuable ancillary benefits, good decisions
aside-is likely to value participation in government as a means of individual
character
development,

39.
40.

LEARNEOHANO, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 {1958}.
BICKEL, supra note 30, at 20.
41.
See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY ANO ITS CRmes 225-31 {1989} {discussing problems of
participation in large-scale democracy}; EISGRUBER, supra note 32, at ~2 {same}. And it has not been
considered a problem by every democratic theorist. James Madison, for example, saw the attenuation of
individual influence in a large-scale democracy as a good thing because it impeded the formation of
majority factions. See THE FEOERALISTNo. 10 (James Madison).
42.
See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: "This May Be True in Theory, but It Does
Not Apply in Practice," reprinted in KANT: POLmCAL WRITINGS 61, 74-87 {Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet
trans., 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1991} {1793}. For Kant, it was an "a priori principle" that "[nlo-one
can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek
his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to
pursue a similar end." Id. at 74.
43.
This idea also animates Locke's justification of civil society and Rousseau's concept of the
general will. See, e.g., LocKE, supra note 34; ROUSSEAU, supra note 34.
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like John Start Mill (following Aristotle),+! or, like Alexis de Tocqueville, as an
45
impetus to general social dynamism.
And one who justifies democracy on functionalist grounds-believing that
it tends to produce better decisions than other forms of government-almost
inevitably relies on the value of participation. The functionalist, for example,
may believe that broad participation, by bringing those directly affected by
decisions into the process of governance, increases the likelihood that the
resulting decisions will serve the interests of a majority of society.46 Or the
functionalist might focus on the diversity of experiences and opinions that
broad participation injects into government decisionmaking,47 or on the related
idea that broad participation triggers the need for reasoned deliberation in poli48
tics. The value of participation, unlike the value of consent, is capable of
44.
See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(Currin V. Shields ed., Library Arts Press 1958) (1861) [hereinafter MILL, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 69
(Geraint Williams ed., J.M. Dent 1993); see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 3-80 (Roger
Crisp trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (describing a theory of moral virtue).
45.
See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 231-45 (George Lawrence trans.,
J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., Harper & Row 1966) (1835); see also Stephen Holmes, TocqueviUe and
Democracy, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 23 (David Copp et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993)
(discussing Tocqueville's theory of democracy).
J.S. Mill's utilitarian philosophy, not surprisingly, produced such a view, see, e.g., MILL,
46.
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, supra note 44, at 17-23,43-46, as did Herbert Spencer's market-based
social Darwinism, see HERBERT SPENCER, RetJresentacive Government-What Is It Good For? (1857),
reprinted in THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE WITH SIX EssAYS ON GOVERNMENT, SOCIETY, AND FREEDOM
331,375 (Liberty Classics 1981), and John Dewey's pragmatism, see, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, INTELLIGENCE
AND MORALS (1910), reprinted in JOHN DEWEY, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS 66,69 (Debra Morris & Ian
Shapiro eds., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1993) [hereinafter DEWEY, POLITICAL WRITINGS); JOHN DEWEY, THE
ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY (1888), reprinted in DEWEY, POLITICAL WRITINGS, sutJra, at 59-61; JOHN
DEWEY, THE PuBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 206-fJ7 (Swallow Press 1991) (1927). Cf. ARISTOTLE, supra
note 44, at 5 ("Each person judges well what he knows, and is a good judge.").
47.
This was part of Madison's point in Federalist No. 10. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison) (contending that "a greater variety of parties and interests" makes the formation of a majority
faction less likely). J.S. Mill made the point somewhat more affirmatively. See MILL, REPRESENTATIVE
GoVERNMENT, sutJra note 44, at 82-83 (defending representative assemblies as "place[s) where every
interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded").
48.
Contemporary work in "deliberative democracy" exemplifies this view. Cass Sunstein, for
example, contends that "a large point of the system [of representative democracy) is to ensure discussion
and debate among people who are genuinely different in their perspectives and position, in the interest
of creating a process through which reflection will encourage the emergence of general truths." CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 241 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, FREE
SPEECH); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITIJTIONS Do 8-9
(2001) (arguing that a diversity of perspectives and interests is vital to effective deliberation and that
democratic constitutions are centrally concerned with preserving and promoting such diversity). Sunstein
invokes similar views held by the American Framers and John Dewey. See SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH,
supra, at 242 (discussing the Framers' views); ill. at 248 & n.l7 (citing Dewey); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20-24 (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITIJTION) (discussing
the Framers' views); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 10

51 UCLA LAW REVIEW 705 (2004)

718

grounding functionalist arguments for democracy because it has an obvious rela,
tionship to the quality of political outcomes.
If we are looking for Lincoln's "sheet anchor of American republican,
ism,,,49 therefore, we need to move beyond mere consent and focus on the value
of participation. The essence of our democracy is best understood as govern,
ment by the meaningful participation of the governed.
B.

Democratic Participation and Political Speech

On an understanding of democracy to which participation is essential, the
importance of political speech is rather obvious. Political speech by citizens is
both a form of participation in government and a facilitator of other forms of participation.
As a working conception of political speech, we can adopt Cass Sunstein's
definition: Speech is political "when it is both intended and received as a contri,
bution to public deliberation about some issue.,,5o The act of contributing to
public deliberation is a direct form of political participation because, in an ideally
functioning democracy, the outcome of deliberation-a political decision, such
as the election of a candidate or the enactment of a statute-will reflect the
51
reasonable arguments made by all the participants in the discussion. When
those who make political decisions (voters, legislators, etc.) take into account not
only the arguments of those who favor that particular decision, but also the
arguments of those who oppose it, then the decision has a claim to legitimacy as
a truly collective decision; members of the losing minority have participated in
5z
the decisionmaking process just as members of the winning majority have.
Political speech in fact constitutes political decisions to the extent those
(James Madison); JOHN DEWEY, Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us (1939), reprinted in DEWEY,
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 46, at 240, 243; JOHN DEWEY, Democracy and Human Nature (1939),
reprinted in DEWEY, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 46, at 219, 228; JOHN DEWEY, John Dewey
Responds (1950), reprinted in DEWEY, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 46, at 246, 248; JOHN DEWEY,
Uberalism and Social Action (1939), reprinted in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS 1925-1953, at 1,
50-51 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1987) (1935).
49.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, The Repeal af
Missouri Compromise and
Propriety af Irs Restoration:
Speech at Peoria, IUinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas October 16, 1854, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 283,304 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946). Lincoln's "sheet anchor" was the principle
"that no man is good enough to govern another man, without tluu orner's consent." Id. But Lincoln had a
panicipatory notion of "consent," as he demonstrated a few lines later: "Allow AIL the governed an equal
voice in the government, and that, and that only, is self-government." Id. Lincoln's target, of course, was
slavery, and more specifically the argument that prohibiting the spread of slavery into the territories denied
the (white) people of those territories the power of self-government.
50.
SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 130 (emphasis omitted).
51.
Here I follow the considerably more extensive argument in Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24,
which is itself inspired by the arguments of John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM ( 1993).
52.
See Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24, at 3-<5, 22-31, and sources cited therein.
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decisions are responsive to the content of the speech. ) Of course, democracy
in the real world seldom works quite this way; almost invariably some political
speech is unheard or ignored by other participants in the debate. But political
speech at least affords the potential to influence political decisions.
Political speech also facilitates other forms of participation, most saliently
the act of voting. Mere voting without the benefit of deliberation is likely to be
ill-informed and therefore to produce poor decisions, offending functionalist
justifications of democracy. Perhaps worse, nondeliberative voting is likely to
produce decisions that simply aggregate the individual voters' self-interests,54
and that result should offend those proceduralist justifications that are concerned with promoting individual autonomy and resisting paternalism. Purely
aggregative democracy allows no role in decisionmaking for the opinions and
interests of the members of the losing minority, who thus cannot be said to
55
have truly participated in the decisionmaking process at all. But freedom of
political speech allows for the participation in political deliberation of all the
affected parties, which in turn produces political decisions that are~r at least
are likely to be-both better-informed and more legitimate than decisions produced on a purely aggregative model.
It shouldn't be controversial, then, to say that political speech is central to
democratic participation. The Supreme Court has recognized as much by generally affording political speech the highest level of protection under the First
56
Amendment. And some of the most influential scholarly commentaries on
free speech have justified it in whole or in part by virtue of its connection to
57
political participation.
53.
"Moting is merely the external expression of a wide and diverse number of activities by means
of which citizens attempt to meet the responsibilities of making judgments, which ... freedom to govern
lays upon them." Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REv. 245,
255.
54.

For critiques of the idea that aggregation of the preferences, or self-interest, of individual voters
is sufficient for democratic legitimacy, see DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 15-19; Joshua OJhen, Procedure and
Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DENfCX.:RACY: EssAYS ON REASON AND PoLITICS
407 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 SrAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences].
55.
See Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24, at 22-3l.
56.
See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (invalidating restrictions on speech
in judicial campaigns pursuant to strict scrutiny); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447~8 (1969)
(invalidating restrictions on subversive speech where speech is not both directed to inciting imminent
lawlessness and likely to do so); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating restrictions on campaign
spending pursuant to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment); N.Y. Times OJ. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254,279-80 (1964) (imposing an "actual malice" requirement for defamation actions brought by public
officials) .
57.
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-16 (1980); MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 33, at 9-16; SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48; Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,23 (1971).
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Participation and Adjudicative Legitimacy

Political speech is central to citizen participation in government, and citizen participation is, on most views, central to democratic legitimacy; these
propositions are relatively familiar, if not entirely undisputed. What is perhaps
less familiar is the centrality of participation to the legitimacy of adjudication.
American adjudication is, paradigmatically, a participatory process, but that fairly
obvious fact tends to be taken for granted, even by lawyers. Instead it should be
celebrated, for participatory adjudication is, in its own way, a type of democratic
governance.
Lon Fuller described adjudication as "a form of decision that defines the
affected party's participation as that of offering proofs and reasoned arguments.,,58
Fuller's characterization was descriptive, not interpretive; he meant to define
the effective boundaries of adjudication, not to explore its normative foundations. But his positive account of adjudication hints at a more normative
understanding, one that connects litigant participation to political legitimacy.
Earlier, Edward Levi articulated the same hint when he noted that litigants who
are subjected to "new" common law rules "have participated in the law making.
They are bound by something they helped to make."59 But Levi, like Fuller, let
the suggestion drop there.
These hints provide a glimpse of a larger truth: American adjudication is
structured as a participatory enterprise, perhaps to an even greater extent than
American politics. A litigant's capacity to influence the outcome of a case to
which she is a party is likely to be much more extensive and direct than an
ordinary citizen's capacity-as a voter or a political speaker-to influence the
outcome of legislative or administrative policymaking. A litigant's influence on
a court decision, in fact, is likely to be greater even than the influence of an
60
individual legislator. This is mostly a matter of simple numbers: A typical
court decision reflects the contributions of two or, at most, a small handful of
actual participants, while most legislative decisions reflect the input of dozens
or hundreds of legislators, each of whom represents thousands or millions of con-

58.
Fuller, supra note 19, at 369.
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4 (1949).
59.
60.
Of course, in adjudication as in politics, a panicipant's ability to influence the outcome of
the process is likely to depend in pan upon that participant's economic resources. See Peters,
Minimalism, supra note 24, at 1489-90 n.17l. Restrictions on adjudicative speech sometimes can be
understood in pan as mechanisms for mitigating the effects of economic inequality in adjudication, see
infra note 222, and I suggest below that restrictions on speech outside adjudication, such as campaign
financing and spending limits and "fairness" requirements for mass media, might be justifiable as
mechanisms for mitigating the effects of economic inequality on political debate, see infra notes 330-338
and accompanying text.
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stituents. Adjudicative participation is therefore less attenuated than (most
instances of) political participation.
Of course it is true that the effectiveness of adjudicative participation-the
participation, by proofs and reasoned arguments, of the litigants {usually through
their attorneys in the decisionmaking process--depends to a large extent on
the good faith of the judge and, sometimes, the jury. In making legal rulings, the
judge must actually respond to the litigants' participation sincerely-must
actually rest her decision on the arguments offered by the parties, without
precommitment for or against one of those parties or one of those parties' argu62
ments -in order for that participation to have complete legitimating force.
The jury, likewise, must actually rest its decision on the proofs offered by the
litigants. To the extent that judges and jurors in the real world do not {indeed
cannot} live up to this ideal, the participatory element of adjudication may seem
like a sham, too much so to allow the process to be fairly characterized as
"democratic." Thus Martin Kotler objects:

t

Even if all the recognized trappings of the American judicial system
existed--even if the parties initiated the action, framed the legal and
factual issues, and participated in the resolution of the dispute by submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law-this would not
alter the fact that a fully participating litigant's essential position is still
that of supplicant. While such a form of decision making might
be legitimate in a society committed to a monarchy, it is not in a
63
democracy.

The suppliant nature of adjudication, for Kotler, "compels the conclusion of illegitimacy" in adjudicative decisionmaking. 64
But this surely is an overstatement, and not just because it is hard to swal65
low such a casual condemnation of a centuries-old, constitutionally enshrined
decisionmaking procedure. The question is not so much how adjudication
works, or doesn't work, in practice, but how adjudication is structured to work
in practice. And the structure of American adjudication, however much it may
be honored in the breach, clearly is designed to promote meaningful {indeed,

61.
In Part IIl.D., infra, I discuss the fact that litigants typically participate in adjudication
through the agency oflawyers and the connection between that fact and my underlying themes in this
Article.
62.
On the impermissibility of judicial precommitment, see the discussion infra Part IY.B.
63.
Martin A. Kotler, Social Norms arul]udicial Rulemaking: Commitment to Political Process arul the
Basis of Tort Law, 49U. KAN. L REv. 65, 82 (2000).

64.

Id.

65.

Article III, after all, creates "the judicial power." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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decisive) litigant participation. Consider the following facts about our judicial
66
system:
•

•

•

A court case in the United States is not supposed to come into existence at all unless and until one of the litigants brings it into existence
67
by means of a complaint.
Except in cases involving absent parties who will be directly bound by
the result, such as class actions, the judge typically must defer to a decision by the litigants to end a case prior to a final judgment on the
68
merits. (Many contemporary procedural statutes and court rules in
fact encourage litigants to resolve disputes without any substantive
intervention by the court at all. 69)
The litigants, not the judge or jury, locate relevant facts/o identify
1
relevant legal authorities/ and determine how to combine them into
coherent legal arguments. Judges, for their part, are expressly limited in
their ability to rely on facts not proven by the litigants,n are tradition-

66.
I focus here on procedures in civil cases. Criminal prosecutions differ because they detennine
whether the government may use its coercive power to punish someone. So, many procedures in criminal
cases are skewed in the direction of protecting the defendant from abuse of the government's power (such
as the requirement of a grand jury indictment for most federal prosecutions, see U.S. CONST. amend. V;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7). Procedures like the grand jury requirement seem to depart from the litigant-driven
mooel of American civil adjudication, but in fact they only depart from that mooel with respect to one of
the litigants-the government-and they do so for the purpose of protecting the other litigant (the
defendant) under the specially freighted circumstances of a criminal case. That said, I think my point here
aoout the participatory quality of American adjudication applies with as much force to criminal as to civil
cases, and I can't think of any reason why this Article's ultimate conclusions about the function and
justification of evidentiary rules would differ according to the nature of particular cases.
67.
See FED. R. CrV. P.3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").
68.
See, e.g., id. 41{a)(l) (allowing dismissal of an action without leave of the court by "stipulation
of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action"); c[. id. 23{e) (requiring court approval
for dismissal of a class action).
69.
See, e.g., 28 U.s.c. § 651{b) ("Each United States district court shall authorize, by local
rule ... , the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions .... "); id. § 654{a) (With
certain exceptions, "a district court may allow the referral to arbitration of any civil action ... pending
before it when the parties consent.").
70.
See, e.g., FED. R. CrV. P. 11{b){3) (requiring that papers presented to the court be based upon
factual contentions that "have evidentiary support or ... are likely to have evidentiary support"); id. 26-37
(providing for litigant-driven discovery).
71.
See, e.g., id. 8{a) (requiring pleadings that set forth claims to state the grounds of the claim
and of the court's jurisdiction); id. 11{b)(2) (requiring that litigants certify to the court that their
"claims, defenses, and other legal contentions" be "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for" a change in the law); id. 56{c) (requiring that a party seeking summary judgment
demonstrate an "entitle[ment) to a judgment as a matter of law").
Federal judges may take "judicial notice" of certain facts not in the record, see, e.g., FED. R.
EVID. 201, but only of facts "not subject to reasonable dispute," id. 201 (b). However, even the process
of taking judicial notice is largely litigant-driven. Under FRE 201, while a court "may take judicial
notice, whether requested or not," id. 201{c), the court "shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and
supplied with the necessary information," id. 201{d) (emphasis added), and "[a) party is entitled upon

n.
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ally discouraged from relying on legal arguments not made by the
parties,73 and often are required to write opinions in which they demon74
strate their responsiveness to the litigants' proofs and arguments.
If judges or jurors in practice sometimes deviate from these structural norms,
the result is not to render adjudication illegitimate on a wholesale basis, but
simply to demonstrate that adjudication done in bad faith can be corrupted into
illegitimacy.75
Which brings us to a second response to the cynicism expressed by Kotler,
which is that it is at least as applicable to democratic politics as to adjudication.
Participants in democratic politics, too, are supplicants to the whims of a "judge
and jury" in the form of the political majority.76 Those seeking political change
in a democracy must convince a majority of their fellow citizens (in an election
or referendum) or fellow legislators (in a legislative assembly) to vote in favor of
that change. Interestingly-and here is a point seemingly missed by Fuller-that
process of persuasion, like adjudication, also typically proceeds by means of proofs

timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed," id. 201(e).
73.
Such discouragement tends to be implicit, as in a recent Supreme Court decision in which the
Court reversed a court of appeals decision after noting-;;omewhat snidely, one might think-that "the
Court of Appeals based its decision entirely on a ground that was not relied upon below and that was
'virtually ignored by the parties and the amicus in their respective briefs.'" Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S.
564,572 (2002) (citation omitted).
74.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), for instance, require the court to "find the faCts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon" after a bench trial, a requirement typically
fulfilled by a written opinion. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a). Most state systems have similar requirements. See
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.2, at 539-43 (2d ed. 1993); FLEMINGjAMES,jR.
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6, at 399 (5th ed. 2001). Trial judges often invite counsel for the litigants
to submit proposed findings offact and conclusions oflaw. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra, § 12.2, at 541-42;
JAMES ET AL., supra, § 7.6, at 399.
75.
Admittedly I am glossing over some important complexities here. What if the litigants (or one
of them) or their attorneys are incompetent in presenting proofs and reasoned arguments? May the judge
then depart from the proofs and arguments, or at least the arguments, actually presented and supplement
them with the judge's own ideas about how the case should be argued? (Fuller asked this question and gave
a rather ambivalent answer. See Fuller, supra note 19, at 388-91.) May the judge, for example, base her
decision on a controlling case that the parties failed to argue? Surely that happens often, explicitly or
otherwise. And it seems right and fair that it should, despite the apparent cost to the value of participation.
We might draw an analogy here to john Hart Ely's "representation reinforcement" theoty of constitutional
judicial review. In that context, the "nondemocratic" intervention of judicial review might be thought
necessaty ro promote the proper "democratic" functioning of the political system. See ELY, supra note 57, at
73-104. In the incompetent counsel context, too, the nondemocratic intervention of the court might be
thought necessary to promote the proper democratic functioning of the adjudicative process, especially
where the skill or resources of one participant in that process are being greatly outmatched by those of the
other. Of course it sometimes will be di...'ficult for a judge to know where to draw the line on these matters.
76.
Here I follow my more extensive arguments in Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24.
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.
and reasone d arguments. 77 R el'lance on "naked prelerences
not usua11y
enough to win the day in American political debate.
Of course there is nothing to stop citizens or legislators from relying on
naked preferences when they actually vote; indeed there is less institutional protection, and perhaps less ethical stigma, against voters or legislators doing so than
against judges and juries doing so when they make their decisions. (Judges must
write opinions explaining their decisions in non-self-interested terms; voters and
legislators need not. And jury verdicts that a judge determines to be against the
79
manifest weight of the evidence can be overturned in favor of a new trial. ) Yet
somehow the suppliant position in which we as citizens find ourselves with
respect to a majority of our fellow citizens does not generally trigger charges that
our supposedly democratic political system is in fact democratically illegitimate.
The fact that the same dynamic of supplication exists in adjudication shouldn't
prompt such charges there, either.
D.

Democratic Participation and Adjudicative Speech

All of this simply underscores the strangeness of a regime in which restrictions on the speech necessary for meaningful participation in politics are presumptively unconstitutional, while restrictions on the speech necessary for
meaningful participation in adjudication don't draw a constitutional second
glance. Both politics and adjudication in America are structured to be participatory in a democratic sense; neither of them is perfectly so in practice, for
essentially the same reasons. The potential whims of the majority don't
convince us that generally unfettered speech in the political realm is a useless
exercise, so why should the potential whims of the judge or jury convince us of
this in the adjudicative context?

77.

Fuller contrasted adjudication with two other "fonns of social ordering": contract and elections.

See Fuller, supra note 19, at 36~. Interestingly, in describing the "modes of participation" in each form,
Fuller focused rather holistically on adjudication and contract but quite narrowly on elections; he described
the "mode of participation" in contract as "negotiation," in adjudication as "presentation of proofs and
reasoned arguments," but in elections simply as "voting." Id. at 363. Surely there is much more to elections
than the final act of voting, just as there is much more to contracts than the final act of executing them
and much more to adjudication than the judge's ultimate decision. But aside from a passing reference to
the "optimum conditions" of elections--including "an intelligent and fully informed electorate, an active
interest by the electorate in the issues, land) candor in discussing those issues by those participating in
public debate," id. at 364--Fuller ignored the complex set of participatory dynamics that contributes to
political decisions. Indeed it is somewhat strange that he fixated only on "elections" rather than on the
entire political process of which elections are only a part. Had Fuller paid more attention to those dynamics, he might not have drawn such a sharp contrast between adjudicative participation on the one hand and
"electoral" participation on the other.
Cass Sunstein's perfectly evocative term. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 54.
78.
79.
See FED. R. aVo P. 59; JAMES IT AL., supra note 74, § 7.24, at 462-63.
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Yet adjudicative speech in our system is routinely and severely limited by
rules of evidence and procedure, by judicial rulings pursuant to those rules, and
by canons of professional ethics and judicial "gag orders" that stifle the speech
of litigants and attorneys outside the courtroom. In the Introduction, I rather
casually described adjudicative speech as "speech to COUrts,,;80 let me now be a bit
more precise and define it, adapting Cass Sunstein's definition of political speech,
as speech that "is both intended and received as a contribution to [a court's]
deliberation about some issue.,,81 So defined, adjudicative speech is regularly,
indeed almost casually, restricted inside and outside American courts of law.
Frederick Schauer describes our prevailing treatment of adjudicative speech this
way:
Trials, of course, are highly structured affairs, in which there appears to be
quite little free speech. There are elaborate rules about who goes when,
about who speaks, and about who does not speak. There are rules about
how to speak, and there are rules about what not to say. All of that part
of the law of evidence that deals with relevance and materiality can be
thought of as a prohibition on speech, a prohibition on saying what (a
judge believes) is irrelevant to the particular matter at hand. Those who
persist in saying irrelevant things after a ruling by the judge risk punishment for contempt, and thus it is no exaggeration to describe a trial as a
place in which people run the risk of imprisonment for saying things that
a government official, a judge, believes to be unrelated to the matter at
hand.
. . . If we were to move our thinking about what happens at a trial
away from the category "trials" and into the category "free speech," it
would appear that the very institution we call a trial exists by virtue of an
elaborate system of restrictions on the freedom of speech, restrictions
whose willful violation carry the ultimate threat of imprisonment for
contempt of court. The rules that constitute the trial process thus tell
people what to say and tell them when to say it, and the trial that is both
created and regulated by prohibitions on speech is thereby among the most
82
constrained of all communicative environments.

But courts have never found restrictions on adjudicative speech to be constitutionally controversial except when judges reach outside their courtrooms
to stifle litigant or attorney speech. And even in those cases the courts have
allowed much more constraint on speech than would be tolerated in the
80.
See supra text accompanying note 21.
81.
SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, at 130 (emphasis omitted). "A court's deliberation"
might include the deliberations of both jUly and judge, or of either of them. I will bend the edges of this
definition a bit in the discussion that follows, especially in Part IY.B., when I discuss in more detail the
distinction between political and adjudicative speech; but this description should suffice as I layout the
basic arguments of this Article.
82.
Schauer, supra note 14, at 689-90.
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seemingly analogous political context. Put simply, adjudicative speech in our
system is substantially less free than "pure" political speech. A quick look at
evidentiary rules, and at a few of the rare judicial decisions that have applied
the First Amendment to adjudicative speech, will illustrate the point.
1.

Rules

In illustrating the ubiquity and severity of formal restrictions on adjudicative speech in our courts, I will focus on rules of evidence as opposed to rules of
s3
procedure. By rules of evidence, I mean rules like the FRE that govern the
content and form of proofs and arguments presented to the trier of fact and the
manner of presenting them. I focus here on rules of evidence rather than rules of
procedure because, while most procedural rules impose only content-neutral
restrictions on speech,s4 most rules of evidence are classic examples of contentbased speech restrictions.
Consider some illustrations from the FRE:
Relevancy. Under FRE 402, "[elvidence which is not relevant is not
admissible." Evidence is "relevant" under FRE 401 if it has "any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." FRE 403, moreover, allows the exclusion even of
relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." When combined with FRE 104, which requires
the court to determine whether evidence is admissible pursuant to the
Rules, the relevancy provisions of the FRE allow a judge to prohibit
adjudicative speech that she concludes is not relevant to the action or,
even if relevant, is simply not worth the cost of allowing it to be heard.

83.
For examples of restrictions on adjudicative speech that apply outside the courtroom, see infra
Panl.D.2.
84.
Many, perhaps most, rules of procedure do not really regulate speech at all, at least not in a way
that limits it. The discovery provisions of the FRCP, for instance, do not limit speech so much as they
compel it. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26-37. The rules regarding service of process do not regulate speech at all in
any meaningful sense, see ill. 4,4.1; the rules governing joinder of panies and claims regulate speech only
incidentally to what are probably better understood as regulations of conduct, see ill. 17-25. And most of
those procedural rules that do regulate speech in a meaningful sense do so in a content-neutral, not a
content-based, way, serving simply as "time, place, and manner" restrictions. For example, FRCP 7
specifies the form in which claims and defenses may be presented to the coutt, but not the content of those
claims or defenses. See ill. 7. Not all rules of procedure are content-neutral, however. Pleading rules often
require a particular rype (or at least a panicular quality) of speech, see, e.g., ill. 8,9, and "ethical" rules like
FRCP Rule 11 require litigants and attorneys to certify that their speech meets certain content
requirements, see ill. 11.
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Character evidence, other crimes, and post sexual behavior. The FRE presumptively prohibit the use of character evidence, evidence of other
crimes, or evidence of the past sexual behavior of alleged victims in order
8s
to prove the likelihood of conforming or similar conduct. This prohibition applies regardless of the possibility that such evidence will in fact be
relevant to an issue in the case.
Witness competency and hearsay. FRE 602 prohibits a witness from testifying "unless ... the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." FRE
701 limits the ability of lay witnesses to give opinion or inferential testimony; FRE 702 imposes conditions that must be met in order for expert
witnesses to testify; and FRE 704 prohibits experts from testifying "as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto." FRE
802 prohibits the use of hearsay evidence, which is defined in FRE 801,
subject to exceptions catalogued in FRE 803 through 807. The upshot
of these rules is that some would-be witnesses cannot speak at all during
trial, while those who can testify may speak only on certain subjects.
Authenticity of evidence. The FRE prohibit the use of evidence that does
not pass certain tests of authenticity. FRE 901 generally requires that
evidence be supported by proof "that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims"-for example, testimony as to the genuineness of a
person's alleged handwriting by someone familiar with it. FRE 1002
requires the use of originals to prove the content of writings, recordings,
86
and photographs.
Miscellaneous categories of inadmissible evidence. In the service of policy
goals ancillary to the main issues in a lawsuit, the FRE exclude certain
types of potentially relevant evidence, including evidence of subsequent
remedial measures in a tort or product defect case (FRE 407), evidence
of settlement offers in civil cases (FRE 408), evidence that a defendant
has paid medical expenses of a plaintiff (FRE 409), evidence of plea negotiations in criminal cases (FRE 410), and evidence of a defendant's liability
insurance (FRE 411). FRE 501 incorporates evidentiary privileges recognized either by principles of federal common law (with respect to substantive federal questions) or by state law (with respect to substantive state law
questions). Many evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege, and the spousal privilege, prohibit the

85.
See FED. R. EVID. 404 (evidence of character and other crimes); id. 412 (evidence of a victim's
past sexual behavior). There are exceptions laid out in these and other rules. See, e.g., id. 413,414,415
(providing exceptions to prohibitions on evidence of other crimes); id. 6(J) (allowing evidence of certain
other crimes to impeach a witness).
86.
Exceptions appear in FRE 1003 and 1004.
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introouction of evidence in order to encourage, or not to discourage,
87
certain types of out-of-court communications deemed important.

These evidentiary rules impose content-based restrictions on adjudicative
speech; they limit the substance of what litigants and their lawyers may say in
court in an attempt to persuade the judge or jury to make a particular decision.
And the theory behind these limitations is that the prohibited evidence may
influence that decision (which is, after all, a government decision) in a way that
society deems undesirable. The rules therefore seem precisely analogous to
content-based restrictions on political speech. If restrictions like these were
in fact imposed on participants in politics proper---on street-comer pamphleteers, op-ed writers, political candidates, or politicians-they would, with
scarcely a moment's thought, be stricken down under strict scrutiny. "Contentbased regulations are presumptively invalid,,;88 "[t]o allow a government the
choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow the government control over the search for political truth.,,89 PoUtical truth, apparently, but
not adjudicative truth.
Moreover, evidentiary rulings are prior restraints-supposedly "the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.,,90
Judicial rulings enforcing evidentiary rules are essentially "judicial orders forbidding certain communications [that are] issued in advance of the time that such
91
communications are to occur," which is the classic example of a prior restraint.
Violations of evidentiary rulings---that is, attempts to introduce evidence that a
court has prohibited-can result in contempt citations,92 and convictions for
contempt are constitutional even if the conduct triggering the contempt citation
93
was constitutionally protected.

87.
See generally EDWARD J. iMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.2.1, at 447-53 (Richard D. Frieelman gen. eel., 2002) (assessing
"instrumental" and "humanistic" rationales for the spousal privilege); id. § 6.2.4, at 471-77 (same regarding
the attomey-client privilege); § 6.2.6, at 490--502 (same regarding the physician-patient privilege).
88.
RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also Republican Party v. White, 536
U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny); T umer Broad. Sys. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (same).
89.
Conso\. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980).
90.
Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
91.
Alexander v. Uniteel States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984)).
92.
See, e.g., Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 927-29 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a contempt citation
for violation of evidentiary rulings as consistent with the First Amendment).
93.
See Walker v. City of Binningham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). This principle is known as the
"collateral bar rule." See CHEMERlNSKY, supra note 20, § 11.2.3.2, at 922-23.

Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment

2.

729

Decisions

Given that evidentiary rules are content-based prior restraints on what
looks a lot like political speech, one would expect many of them not to exist-to
have been invalidated by a court pursuant to strict scrutiny, or at least to have
been challenged in a court under the First Amendment. But, so far as my
research reveals, none of these things have occurred with respect to any provision
of the FRE or of state rules of evidence. In the cases that have come closest to
such a challenge, courts invariably, and usually summarily, have declared that
adjudicative speech simply is not entitled to the same quantum of First
Amendment protection as political speech.
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Zal v. Steppe94 denied the habeas petition
of Zal, an attorney who had been cited for contempt for violating a state trial
court's orders not to present certain defenses or use certain inflammatory words
during trial. Zal had represented abortion protestors charged with criminal
trespass. He was ordered not to use words like "baby killers," "holocaust," and
"Hitler" before the jury. Asserting an obligation to obey only "higher law," Zal
apparently used many of the words on the court's off-limits list. "In sum, Zal was
held in contempt twenty times.,,95 Zal contended that the trial judge's orders in
96
limine were prior restraints that violated his First Amendment rights.
Over the partial dissent of one judge, the Ninth Circuit panel rejected Zal's
free speech claim on the ground that "the trial judge is charged with preserving
the decorum that permits a reasoned resolution of issues. Zealous counsel cannot
flout that authority behind the shield of the First Amendment.,,97 The court
addressed only the issue of whether Zal could be held in contempt for violating
the trial court's evidentiary orders---not the underlying question of whether the
98
orders themselves contravened the First Amendment. In a separate concurrence, however, Judge Trott did address that question:
I believe neither a defendant nor his attorney has a right to present to
a jury evidence that is irrelevant to a legal defense to, or an element of, the
crime charged .... If society deems important certain "explanations," those
explanations explicitly can become part of the law....

94.

968 F.2d at 924.

95.
96.

Id. at 926.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 929.

97.

98.
The court should have addressed this question. As the court acknowledged, California, the
state of Zal's conviction, does not have a collateral bar rule. See id. at 927 (citing In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273,
281 (Cal. 1968) (en bane)). Thus the question of whether Zal had a constitutional right to present the
excluded evidence was relevant to the question of whether his contempt citation was constitutionally
permissible.
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Traditional First Amendment analysis also supports the idea that
lawyers {and others} have no First Amendment right to speak freely in a
courtroom: a courtroom is not a public forum in the technical sense that
this terminology is used in free-speech analysis .... Although courtrooms
have always been devoted to debate, they have never been devoted to free
debate, but only to debate within the confines set by the trial judge and
the rule of law. The First Amendment does not allow an attorney to speak
beyond those confines.
Nor am I convinced by [the] argument that the trial court's order
violated Zal's clients' First Amendment rights.... If a plaintiff or defendant
has no trial right to present evidence or testimony, then the evidence or
testimony may not be presented. In a courtroom, during a judicial
proceeding, the First Amendment simply does not protect speech which
exceeds the speaker's trial rights. Until today, I would have thought this
99
proposition too obvious for comment.

What is striking about these excerpts from Judge Trott's opinion is how
much they take for granted. Zal's (and his clients') freedom of adjudicative
speech extends only as far as their "trial rights"-that is, their right to present
evidence that "society deems important." O:)Urtrooms simply are not public
forums. But why not? What are the grounds of distinction between the tightly
constrained "debate" that "traditionally" takes place in a courtroom and the
largely unconstrained-indeed, constitutionally protected---debate that takes
place in other government decisionmaking contexts? Why should a judge be
able to prohibit Zal from saying to a jury what he has a clear First Amendment
right to say to those same twelve people, in their capacity as voting citizens, from
a soapbox on a street comer?
Similar question begging can be found in several Supreme Court opinions
dealing with the contempt power and attorney disciplinary proceedings. The
Court has held that a lawyer may be cited for contempt if, following an adverse
ruling, he "resist[s] it or ... insult[s] the judge" rather than merely "respectfully ... preserve[s] his point for appeal."lOO At the same time, the Court has
held that vehement language alone is not enough to justify a contempt citation;
the language "must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the
administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it
must immediately imperil."lol The former holding suggests a broad judicial
license to censor adjudicative speech; the latter suggests something akin to the

99.
968 F.2d at 930-32 (Trott, ]., concurring).
100.
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,9 (1952).
In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
101.
376 (1947».
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lo2
"clear and present danger" test fonnerly applied to subversive political speech.
But none of these contempt cases was a First Amendment case, at least not
expressly so; the cases involved either the interpretation of the federal criminal
lOJ
rule providing for criminal contempt citations or some rather vague notions of
104
due process.
Nor did any of these decisions actually assess the validity of the
underlying evidentiary rules or rulings whose violation produced the contempt
citation.
The Supreme Court, however, has used the First Amendment to overturn
the punishment of an attorney for out-of-court speech about a pending case
lOs
that violated a state's rules of professional conduct. Gentile v. State Bar
involved restrictions on speech that were somewhat analogous to evidentiary
rules or rulings but that-rather crucially, in light of the Court's contempt
precedent-applied to speech that took place outside the courtroom. Gentile, an
attorney, held a press conference following the indictment of his client at
which he proclaimed his client an innocent "scapegoat" and blamed the crime
on "crooked COpS.,,106 The State Bar of Nevada later reprimanded Gentile for
violating a state supreme court rule prohibiting an attorney from making "an
extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated
by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."lo7 Five Justices on a fractured Court held the state rule void
for vagueness;lOB but a different alignment of five Justices held that the rule
survived what appeared to be strict (or at least heightened) scrutiny, although the
lo9
Court never expressly labeled it as such.
Despite applying heightened scrutiny, the Gentile Court drew an expansive
general distinction between (less-protected) adjudicative speech and (more protected) political speech. Gentile argued that his speech was shielded by the
"clear and present danger" standard applied by the Court in cases involving
judicial attempts to prohibit or punish newspapers and others for reporting or
102.
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The "clear and present danger"
fonnulation has been supplanted by the test laid out in Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.s. 444,447-48 (1969).
103.
SeeSacher,343 U.S. at 6-14.
The per curiam opinion in In re Uttle, which reversed a conviction in a state court, is
104.
astoundingly unclear about its supposed basis in federal law. But the First Amendment is never
mentioned, and the general tenor of the brief opinion suggests a grounding in due process. See In re
Uttle, 404 U.S. at 553-56.
105.
501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
106.
Id. at 1034.
107.
Id. at 1033; see NEVADA S. Cr. R. 177.
108.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1048-50 (Kennedy, ]., for the Court).
109.
Id. at 1065-76 (Rehnquist, C.]., for the Court). The Court held that the rule served Nevada's
"legitimate interest" in "protect[ing] the integrity and fairness of[its] judicial system," id. at 1075, and that it
was "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest, id. at 1076.
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110

commenting on pending court cases.
In rejecting that argument, the amrt
began with the "unquestionable" premise that "in the courtroom itself, during a
judicial proceeding, whatever right to 'free speech' an attorney has is extremely
circumscribed.,,111 After all, '''[t]he very word 'trial' connotes decisions on the
evidence and arguments properly advanced in open court. Legal trials are not
like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the
newspaper.",ll2 The very "theory upon which 'our criminal justice system is
founded" holds that "[t]he outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by
impartial jurors, who know as little as possible of the case, based on material
admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding."II3
From these premises the Court reasoned that, in the interest of protecting
"the integrity and fairness of a State's judicial system," attorney speech outside
1I4
the courtroom may be circumscribed as well.
The Nevada rule in question
was "narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives" because it "applie[d] only
to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it
[was] neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating
in a pending case; and it merely postpone[d] the attorneys' comments until after
the trial.,,115
Gentile involved rules of professional conduct aimed at extrajudicial attorney speech, not rules of evidence applied in the courtroom. But it is not difficult
to extrapolate from the Gentile Court's reasoning to a result in a hypothetical
First Amendment challenge to evidentiary rules. The rule at issue in Gentile was
in fact a sort of evidentiary rule: It prohibited attorneys from making statements
likely to "prejudice" the jury in a pending case, much as rules against, say, the
admission of irrelevant evidence are designed to do. If the state's interest in
protecting the "integrity and fairness" of its judicial system is adequate to sustain
the rule challenged in Gentile (or at least a sufficiently clear version of that rule),
it must be adequate to sustain evidentiary rules that apply to attorney (or litigant)
speech within the courtroom. Like the "gag rule" upheld in Gentile, evidentiary
rules are intended to preserve the "integrity and fairness" of adjudication by
confining the jury's decision to grounds that, in the words of Judge Trott in Za1
. d
d'
I as to
v. Steppe, "
soclety
eerns'lmportant. ,,116 E
Vl ' entlary
ru Ies too are "
neutra
points of view, applying equally to all attorneys [and litigants] participating in a

110.
See id. at 1069 (citing Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.s. 539 (1976)); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941)). I discuss the Stuart and Bridges cases infra notes 309-324 and accompanying text.
11 LId. at 1071.
112.
Id. at 1070 (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 271).
113.
114.
115.

Id.
ld. at 1075.
Id. at 1076.

116.

968 F,2d 924, 930 (9th Cir. 1992) (Trott, J., concurring).
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pending case," and they too "merely postpone[] the attorneys' [or litigants']
comments until after the trial.,,117
But this analysis simply begs the important questions. Why is the preservation of the "integrity and fairness" of the process a sufficiently strong state interest
in the context of adjudication but not in the broader context of politics?"8
(What, in fact, does "the integrity and fairness of [the] judicial system" really
mean?) Why does society have the authority to decide-indeed, to overrule the
participants' decisions about-which facts and arguments are "important"
enough to influence ("prejudice"?) decisions of courts but not of legislatures or
of voters? Why can attorneys' and litigants' adjudicative speech legitimately
be "postpone[d] ... until after the trial"-at which point, of course, it has become
irrelevant to its purpose of influencing the court's decision-while citizens' and
legislators' political speech cannot be "merely postponed" until after the election
is held or the statute is enacted?
Why, in short, is adjudication so different from politics that stringent
restrictions on participants' speech are justified, even required, in the former
but not in the latter?

3.

Velazquez

Comparing Gentile and Zal to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez1l9 complicates things even further. In Velazquez, the
Court (in a 5-4 decision) struck down, as violative of the First Amendment, a
federal statutory provision "prohibit[ing] legal representation funded by recipients
of [Legal Services Corporation] moneys if the representation involves an effort to
amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law."120 The Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) is a federal agency created by Congress "for the purpose of
providing financial support for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or
matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance.,,121 The restriction
at issue was among the many conditions imposed by Congress over the years on
the use of LSC funds;122 none of the others was at issue in the case, and arguably
117.
118.

Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the

"governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome
of elections serves to justifY" limits on campaign expenditures).
119.
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
120.
Id. at 536-37.
121.
Id. at 536 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 2996b(a) (2000)).
122.
See id. at 537-38. The Court described the situation as follows:
From the inception of the LSC, Congress has placed restrictions on its use of funds. For
instance, the LSC Act prohibits recipients from making available LSC funds, program personnel,
or equipment to any political parry, to any political campaign, or for use in "advocating or
opposing any ballot measures." 42 U.s.c. § 2996e(d)(4). See § 2996e(d)(3). The Act further
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none of them applied as broadly as the challenged restriction, which had been
interpreted by the LSC to require its funded attorneys to withdraw "[e]ven in
cases where constitutional or statutory challenges [to existing welfare laws]
became apparent after representation was well under way."m Thus the
challenged restriction acted as a sort of evidentiary rule, prohibiting LSC~
supported attorneys from making certain arguments on behalf of their clients in
court cases.
In contrast to Gentile, in which the Court approved of restrictions on attor~
ney speech as necessary to preserve the judicial function, the Velazquez Court
invalidated these speech restrictions on the ground that they actually impaired
the judicial function:
Interpretation of the law and the Constitution is the primary mission of
the judiciary when it acts within the sphere of its authority to resolve a
case or controversy. Marbury v. Madison ("It is emphatically the province
and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"). An
informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent
bar. Under [the challenged statutory provision], however, cases would
be presented by LSC attorneys who could not advise the courts of serious
questions of statutory validity. The disability is inconsistent with the
proposition that attorneys should present all the reasonable and wellgrounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case. By seeking
to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation
to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression
upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial
124
power.

The Velazquez Court thus expressly recognized the connection between attorney
(and, implicitly, litigant) speech and the legitimacy of adjudication: The
"analysis of certain legal issues" and their "presentation to the courts" is "speech
and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the
judicial power.,,125 By seeking to "prohibit" that analysis and to "truncate" that
presentation in cases litigated by LSC-funded attorneys, Congress had violated

proscribes use of funds in most criminal proceedings and in litigation involving nontherapeutic
abonions, secondary school desegregation, military desenion, or violations of the Selective
Service statute. §§ 2996f(b)(8)-(1O} (1994 ed. and Supp. IV). Fund recipients are barred from
bringing class-action suits unless express approval is obtained from LSC. § 2996e(d)(5}.

Id.

123.

Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 539.

124.

Id. at 545 (citations omitted).

See Laura K. Abel & David S. Udell, If You Gag the Lawyers, Do You Choke the Courts? Some
Implications for Jw1ges \\'ihen Ftmding Restrictions Curb Advocacy by Lawyers on Behalf of the Poor, 29
R::lRDHAM URB. LJ. 873, 899 (2002) ("In Velazquez, the Coun's holding ultimately rested on a recognition
125.

that the opponunity
judiciary.").

to

advance all relevant legal arguments is essential to the proper functioning of the
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"the proposltlOn that attorneys should present all the reasonable and well~
grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case."
But why is it that Congress may not, consistent with the First
Amendment, "prohibit" or "truncate" attorneys' ability to present proofs and
arguments to the court in Velazquez, while the Nevada Supreme Court may do
so in Gentile (and while Congress, through delegation t<;> the U.S. Supreme
Court,126 apparently may do so by means of the FRE)? The key distinction must
lurk behind the Velazquez Court's understated qualification that arguments
must be "reasonable," "well~grounded," and "necessary for proper resolution of
the case" in order to be the type of "speech ... upon which courts ... depend
for the proper exercise of the judicial power." Perhaps arguments about the
constitutionality of welfare laws are "reasonable," "well-grounded," and "neces~
sary for proper resolution of the case" in litigation involving welfare benefits,
while arguments about the morality of abortion in a prosecution of trespassing
pro-lifers, or extrajudicial speech about police and prosecutorial misconduct in
a criminal case, simply are not "reasonable," "well~grounded," or "necessary for
proper resolution" of those cases.
Such assumptions are necessary to reconcile Velazquez with Gentile, with
Zal, and with the complete absence of any First Amendment challenges to
evidentiary rules. But they are assumptions, not justifications. The Court has
not explained why certain legal arguments are "reasonable" and others are not;
more to the point, it has not explained why the government may, consistent with
the First Amendment, determine which legal arguments are reasonable and
which are not,127 given the near~truism that the government may not make such
12S
determinations in the political context.

126.
127.

See infra note 201 (outlining the procedure for adoption of the Federal Rules).
Cf. Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and rlIe Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST.

COMMENT. 71,73 (1996). Alexander writes:
The general view reflected in both the theories of freedom of speech and the Supreme Court's
first amendment jurisprudence is that it is better to let false or pernicious ideas compete in the
marketplace of ideas, where they are unlikely to prevail in the long run, than to trust government
to distinguish the false from the true and the pernicious from the beneficial.

Id.
128.
This justification gap is made all the more salient by the Velazquez Court's conceptualization of
constitutional litigation as a type of political speech. 531 U.S. at 548 ("It is fundamental that the First
Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.' There can be little doubt that the LSC Act funds constitutionally
protected expression .... ") (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). See also Robert L Tsai, ConceptuaiizingConsticutional Utigation
as Anti-Government Expression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L REv. 835 (2002)
(arguing that constitutional litigation is a type of dissident or antigovernment speech).
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II.

SOME UNSATISFACfORY JUSTIFICATIONS

The unanswered theoretical question, then, is why extensive contentbased restriction of adjudicative speech is permissible, even desirable, while
extensive content-based restriction of political speech is not. I have been
able to think of six reasonable-sounding answers to this question. Five
of them-the five discussed in this part---do not end up working very well,
although some of them provide hints of a more satisfactory sixth answer,
which I offer in Part III.
A.

The Argument From Relative Importance

Perhaps the most obvious justification of the differential First
Amendment treatment of adjudicative and political speech is simply that adjudication is less important than politics. If adjudication is less important than
politics, then adjudicative speech might be less important than political
speech; this fact in tum might justify restricting adjudicative speech to a
greater degree than political speech, on roughly the same theory that other
kinds of relatively "low-value" speech-fighting words,129 obscenity ,130
132
£
.
131
. 1
. d.
delamatlOn,
commercia
speec h --can be restncte
The trouble is that adjudication is not obviously less important than
politics in any way that seems to matter; or if it is, it is not less important
enough to justify the vastly discrepant treatment of speech in the two
contexts. This is true on two levels.
First, to the parties most immediately affected-the litigants
themselves-adjudication is likely to be tremendously important, perhaps
more important than politics ever will be. Courts can order people to jail, to
pay large amounts of damages, to perform onerous injunctions-things that
will affect their lives more acutely and directly than most political decisions
can. Equally to the point, adjudicative speech is likely to be proportionally
more effective than political speech, for the reason I suggested earlier: The
ability of a single litigant to influence a court's decision that will bind her is
likely to be much greater than the ability of a single citizen, acting as a voter
or a political speaker, to influence executive or legislative decisions that bind
her.
129.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
130.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth, 354 U.S. at 476.
131.
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
132.
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comrn'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Va.
State Bd. ofPhannacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Tocqueville's famous dictum-almost a truism, really-is apropos
here: "There is hardly a political question in the United States which does
not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."ll3 Political issues often become
judicial issues; political decisions frequently rely for their ultimate content
and validity on judicial decisions. The effect of my vote for a ballot initiative
may ultimately be determined by a court decision interpreting that initiative
or assessing it for constitutionality.I34 The same goes, of course, for the effect
of my representative's vote for a statute or my state governor's endorse~
ment, or enforcement, of a statute. It may even be true of my vote for
135
President. So political participation, including political speech, often ends
up depending upon adjudicative participation and adjudicative speech for its
efficacy.
This leads to the second level at which the attempt to prioritize politics
over adjudication falters: the level of impact on society generally. Much
public policy is in effect determined by adjudication, which can implement,
supplement, and even overrule the results of politics. Courts can overrule
political decisions by declaring them unconstitutional. They can imple~
ment political decisions---constitutional provisions, statutes, administrative
rules-by interpreting them in particular ways, thus requiring their
enforcement in a manner consistent with those interpretations. They can
supplement political decisions by developing common law doctrines that
profoundly affect private behavior.I36 And, mostly in the former two

TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 45, at 248.
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding invalid, under the Equal
Protection Clause, a state ballot referendum prohibiting the state or its subdivisions from
extending "protected status" based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation); Washington
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding invalid, under the Equal Protection
Clause, a state ballot initiative prohibiting mandatory busing for the purpose of racial
integration).
135.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding invalid, under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Florida Supreme Court's order of a partial recount of Floridians' votes for President
during the 2000 election, with the result that George W. Bush carried Florida and won enough
electoral votes to defeat Al Gore).
136.
Consider the impact of damages awards in mass tort contexts like asbestos litigation:
At least fifty-six [asbestos-related] companies have filed for bankruptcy. There are
currently hundreds of thousands of claims pending against thousands of solvent
defendants. Eventually, between one and three million claims will be filed in total,
according to historically low projections. An estimated $54 billion in asbestos-related
liabilities have been incurred to date, and an additional $200 to $265 billion are likely to
be incurred in the future.
Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (2002)
(citations omitted).
133.

134.
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contexts, courts can order sweeping injunctive relief (school desegregation,IJ7
prison reform/ 38 education reform,Il9 etc.) that directly dictates public policy.
On both the microcosmic and the macrocosmic levels, then, it simply is not
accurate to say that adjudication is generally less important than politics. Which
means that the argument from relative importance cannot provide a satisfying
justification for our comparative lack of concern for adjudicative speech, at least
not by itself.
As I explain in Part III, there is a meaningful sense in which adjudication
can in fact be considered "less important" than politics, a sense that ties in with a
more satisfactory explanation of our treatment of adjudicative speech. The point
here is simply that adjudication is not generally any less important than politics
with respect to its actual effects on those who are bound by it.
B.

The Argument From the "Search for Truth"

Perhaps adjudicative speech can be restricted to a greater extent than
political speech because adjudication involves a "search for truth," or for "right
answers," in a sense (or to a degree) that politics does not. If, for example, a principal goal of a judicial trial is to find the "truth" about what happened-about
the facts underlying the dispute at hand-then evidentiary rules designed to
elicit that truth and to weed out erroneous information would seem justifi140
able.
And if Ronald Dworkin is correct that every court case has a "right
answer,,,141 then restrictions not only on proofs but on the content of legal

137.
See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (reversing a district court's refusal to
order system-wide relief for de facto school segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirming a district court order requiring the gerrymandering of school districts and the
busing of students).
138.
See The Prison Utigation Reform Act and the Antiterrorism and Effective Dearh Penalty Act: Implications for Federal District Judges, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1846, 1847-52 (2002) (briefly surveying the history of
prison reform litigation in the United States).
139.
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (affirming a district court order requiring
expenditure of state funds for remedial education, counseling, and career guidance in order to remedy segregation); Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 710 A2d 450 (N.]. 1998) (ordering a comprehensive state school
reform plan to redress funding inequities).
140.
The FRE purport to be based on the premise that truth seeking is a primary function
of adjudication. FRE 102 reads: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence w the end dUll the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EVID. 102
(emphasis added). But note that "just determination" of the proceedings is enumerated alongside ttuth
seeking as a principal goal of the Rules, and that "fairness in administration" and the "elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay" are listed as subservient goals.
See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 82-90 (1978)
141.
(explaining his "rights thesis").
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arguments, like those contained in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) ,142 can be explained as tools for discovering that answer.
The "search for truth" possibility also founders, however, because
neither side of the comparison it supposes matches our actual practice. It is
pretty clear that American adjudication involves much more than the search
for truth or for right answers, and indeed it is clear that truth often plays a
subordinate role in adjudication. It also is clear that the pursuit of truth or right
answers--or at least better as opposed to worse answers--plays a significant and
often motivating role in American politics.
On the adjudication side, even a cursory survey of procedural and evidentiary rules, and structural features of adjudication more generally, reveals many
that are designed to promote goals other than, and often at the expense of,
the search for truth. Some rules of evidence, for example, can only be explained
as mechanisms for promoting independent social policies that have nothing to
l43
do with truth seeking at trial. FRE 407's prohibition on admitting evidence
of subsequent remedial measures, for example, actually impedes the search for
truth; fixing a dangerous condition or a product defect implies both the existence
of that condition or defect and the defendant's knowledge of it, both facts that
seem relevant in a tort lawsuit. In fact the rule promotes the entirely distinct
144
goal of encouraging the remediation of dangerous conditions and products.
FRE 408 (excluding evidence of civil settlement offers), 409 (excluding evidence
that a defendant has paid a plaintiffs medical expenses), 410 (excluding evidence
of criminal plea bargaining), and arguably 411 (excluding evidence of a defendant's liability insurance) all serve similarly independent policies that have
nothing to do with, and indeed often stand opposed to, the pursuit of truth in a
145
particular dispute.
And most of the law of evidentiary privilege excludes
potentially truth-promoting evidence in the service of the extrinsic goals of
encouraging or discouraging certain kinds of out-of-court behavior.146
142.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(b)(2) (requiring attorneys and unrepresented parries to cerrify to the
court that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions" in papers presented "are warranted by existing
law or by a nonmvolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law").
143.
I discuss this phenomenon in more detail infra Parr IlI.C.2.c.
144.
"The exclusionary principle [of FRE 407) rests in large parr upon an extrinsic policy-one of
encouraging persons to take subsequent precautionary measures." Q-\RlSTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 127, at 26 (2d ed. 1994).
145.
See id. § 134, at 79--86 (regarding FRE 408); id. § 129, at 113-14 (regarding FRE 409); id.
§ 142, at 120-31 (regarding FRE41O); id. § 152, at 175-76 (regarding FRE 411).
The classic statement of the "instrumental" rationale for evidentiary privileges is Wigmore's.
146.
See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2285 Oohn T. McNaughton
ed., 1961); see also IMWINKELRlED, supra note 87, § 5.11, at 257-59 (describing Wigmore's view). Professor
Imwinkelried offers a "humanistic" rationale that he believes better explains many rules of privilege. See
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 87, §§ 5.1-.5, at 256-438 (distinguishing between instrumental and humanistic
rationales, critiquing the former, and defending the latter). For my purposes, however, Imwinkelried's
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Procedural rules, too, often-perhaps most often-promote values other
than truth seeking. The stated purposes of the FRCP are not only "the
just . .. determination of every action,,147 (which might incorporate the pursuit of
truth), but also the "speedy" and "inexpensive determination of every action"148
(which might, and surely often does, stand against the pursuit of truth). The
concerns for speed and avoiding expense flow prominently through almost all of
the FRCP. Rule 8 requires "short and plain" statements of claims and defenses,
149
not exhaustive and comprehensive ones.
Rule 9{b) imposes special pleading
requirements for allegations of fraud or mistake,lso with the result that many
truthful claims will be dismissed or not brought at all, thus promoting speed and
reducing expense. lSI Rule 11 forbids even truthful papers from being presented to
the court "for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."lsz Rule 12 mandates the
waiver of potentially truthful defenses of certain types when not made at an early
stage in a lawsuit.!53 The discovery rules limit discovery of even relevant material
that "is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive," or when "the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit";ls4 they
allow for protective orders "to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,,;ISS and they restrict the
56
discoverability of attorney work produd and of facts and opinions held by
IS7
retained experts. One could go on and on.

"humanistic" rationale---"that it is desirable to create certain privileges out of respect for personal rights
such as autonomy or privacy," IMWlNKELRIED, supra note 87, § 5.1.2, at 259---serves just as well, for it too
demonstrates that values extrinsic to truth seeking playa large role in evidentiary privileges.
FED. R. CIv. P.1 (emphasis added).
147.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
Id.8(a),(b).
149.
150.
Id.9(b).
151. See, e.g., Olsen v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 136 FJd 273 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing fraud
claims for failure to meet Rule 9(b)'s "particularity" requirement). The special pleading requirement for
garden-variety fraud may be simply a remnant of the fact that "[f]raud was a so-called 'disfavored action'
at common law because it raised questions of defendant's morality." JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.9, at 257 (2d ed. 1993). Courts, however, have given it teeth in securities fraud
class actions, and Congress recently bolstered special pleading requirements for such cases. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737; JAMES IT AL., supra note
74, § 3.19, at 223-24.
152.
FED.R.CIv. P. l1(b)(1).
153.
See id. 12(h)(l) (mandating waiver of defenses based upon lack of jurisdiction or insufficient
service when omitted from a pre-answer motion or responsive pleading).
154.
Id. 26(b)(2).
155. ld. 26(c).
156.
See id. 26(b)(3).
157.
See id. 26(b)(4).
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Consider also some of the general structural features of American adjudication. Court cases are initiated by disputing parties, not by the court itself, and
158
usually can be terminated by the parties without the court's permission. While
a case is going on, the court relies on the litigants' truth-seeking efforts-however
self-interested or even incompetent they may be-rather than conducting its
159
own investigation into the facts. A system devoted primady to the function of
truth seeking might be structured to, well, seek the truth, regardless of whether the
directly affected parties care (or are able) to do so; it might allow for the initiation
and investigation of cases by the court itself and for their continuation at the
court's, not the litigants', discretion.
And consider the fact that standards of proof shift depending upon the
. . I cases, 160 " prepond ernature 0 f t h e case: "beyond a reasonable db'"
ou t m cnmma
ance of the evidence" or, sometimes, "clear and convincing evidence" in civil
161
cases.
Surely it is not the nature of truth itself, or even the difficulty in discovering it, that differs so comprehensively and dramatically across different
types of cases; it is rather the strength of society's interest in discovering the truth
that differs when balanced against competing values in different kinds of cases.
Society wants courts to get it right in the vast majority of cases in which
someone is sent to jail or worse; but in resolving private disputes, society is
content if courts get it right somewhat more often than not.
If one were to encapsulate the idea that other values besides truth seeking
playa prominent, sometimes even a dominant, role in adjudication, one might
use the phrase "dispute resolution." American adjudication, and particularly civil
adjudication, is concerned at least as much with resolving disputes peacefully,
reasonably, speedily, and inexpensively as with finding the truth. Obviously
there is a relationship between the two categories of values: Litigants, and thus
society as a whole, are not likely to be satisfied if they perceive that court judgments typically have little or no relationship to something that looks like the
"truth." Ripping a coin is not enough; dispute resolution must be reasonable. But
as long as truth seeking plays some role in the mix---even if that role is primarily
a hortatory one-the speedy and inexpensive judicial resolution of disputes is
likely to satisfy the litigants and society.
From the perspective of the "search for truth," then, adjudication actually
looks a lot like politics. Politics is often conceptualized as a form of dispute
158.
159.
160.

See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

in a criminal trial is a requirement of due process).
161.
"mhe normal burden of proof in a civil case is measured by a 'preponderance of the evidence.'"
21 CHARLES AlAN WRIGHT IT AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 557-58, § 5122 (1977)
(citations omitted). "Some civil cases also involve heavier burdens; for example, in most states fraud must
be proved by 'clear and convincing evidence.'" Id. at 557 (citations omitted).
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resolution-a method of allocating resources among competing groups
in society.162 But while there is certainly much of value in this "pluralist,,16J
story, it is nonetheless fairly obvious that it does not accurately describe all
there is to American politics.
As Cass Sunstein has persuasively shown, the American constitutional
system is designed in large measure to be "deliberative" rather than pluralist: A
central point of the system is to promote reasoned deliberation about "the public
good" or "public values" rather than simply to divvy up resources among competing groupS.164 Many of the Constitution's most important provisions-the Equal
Protection Clause, the "dormant" Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clauses,
and of course the Free Speech Clause-have been interpreted by the courts
(albeit not entirely consistently) to serve this function. 165 As a matter of
constitutional design, American politics is about the pursuit of (political)
"truth"-the common good, or at least the "best" policy according to some
standard-and not simply, or even primarily, the "resolution of disputes" among
competing interest groups.
This is true at ground level as well. Political science research suggests that
legislators often act according to their notions of good policy, despite being
166
influenced by special interests, constituent pressures, and other factors. That is,
legislators often pursue political "truth" rather than simply acting on behalf of
competing groups or mediating disputes among them. And certainly legislators
often declare, at least, that they are pursuing political truth. I trust I don't need to
provide citable examples of this phenomenon; one can open any issue of the New
Yark Times and find instances of legislators or other public officials advocating or
opposing some measure because it either is or isn't "in the public interest" and the

162.
See generally, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); ARTi-iUR F. BENnEY, THE
PROCESS OF GoVERNMENT (Peter H. Odegard ed.,John Harvard Library 1967) (1908); ROBERT A. DAHL,
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GoVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLmCAL INTERESTS AND PuBLIC OPINION (1951).
163.
I use the term "pluralism" in the same sense as Cass Sunstein does. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION; RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 137
(1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1542-43 (1988) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Republican Revivaa; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 54, at 32-33.
See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 17-39; see also SUNSTEIN, FREE
164.
SPEECH, supra note 48, at 241-50; Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 163, at 1558--64; Sunstein,
Interest Groups, supra note 54; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 54.
165.
See SUNSTEIN, PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 32-37; SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH,
supra note 48, at 249; Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 54.
166.
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The ]urispnulen.ce of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv.
873, 883-901 (1987) (summarizing such research and concluding: "Our best picture of the political
process ... is a mixed model in which constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all influence
legislative conduct").
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like. '6l (One would be hard pressed to open the same newspaper and find
examples of public officials explaining their actions on the grounds that "a
special interest group made me to do it" or "I did it because I want to get reelected.") And of course even "special interest legislation is ... often drafted
with a public-regarding gloss.,,'68 The public-regarding rheroric of American
politics suggests that, whatever its failings may be in practice, everyone understands that its purpose, or at least a large part of its purpose, is to pursue good
policy-political "truth."
I should address here a potential confusion between two different connotations of the word "truth." Arguably, when a politician speaks in terms of "the
public interest" and so on, she is referring to what we might think of as normative
truth: the correct, or at least the best, policy choice from among a number of
alternatives. In contrast, evidentiary rules in adjudication seem mostly to be
about empirical truth: the factually correct version of "what happened.,,'69 Thus
politics and adjudication might seem to be about different kinds of "truth," one
normative and one empirical; perhaps this justifies the differential treatment of
speech in the two contexts.
But of course both kinds of "truth" play important roles in both contexts.
In adjudication, getting the facts right is important so that the judge or jury
can make the best normative decision about the legal consequences of those
facts-Dworkin's "right answer.,,110 (And indeed it is not just speech about
facts that is restricted in adjudication, but also speech about norms: Litigants are
prohibited from bringing "unwarranted" or "frivolous" claims,I7I from making
certain arguments to the jury,I72 and so on.) Likewise, in politics, choosing the
normatively best policy obviously depends on getting the facts right, as the
167.
All right, here are two pretty good examples from a single story on a recent New York Times
front page, which happened to be the first article I looked at in search of evidence:
"'Our approach is to maximize the quality of life for America,' said James L. Connaughton, chairman
of (president] Bush's Council on Environmental Quality .... " IX>uglas Jehl, On Environmental Rules, Bush
Sees a Balance, Critics a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 1, at I.
'''We are managing our lands for the needs of the American public ... " Gale A. Norton, the
interior secretary, said in a recent interview.... 'We ... need to look for those things that serve the
American public.'" Id.
168.
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 223, 251 (1986).
169.
Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 18-19 (distinguishing between the truth of "factual" and of
"normative statements").
170.
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 141. Dworkin's theory holds not that there is always a single
"best" or "right" answer to the empirical questions presented in a case, but rather that, assuming a given set
of facts, there will be a single best answer to the normative question of what legal consequences should
obtain. See id.
171.
See, e.g., FED. R. CN. P. 11 (b)(2) (requiring "claims, defenses, and other legal contentions" to
be "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument" for a change in the law).
1
See, e.g., Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a contempt citation for, inter
alia, making impermissible arguments to the jury).

n.
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Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized in protecting not just the communication of opinions but also the communication of facts under the First
l73
Amendment.
So the idea that adjudication involves the "search for truth" in a way that
politics does not fails to convincingly justify our comparative disregard for adjudicative speech. As it turns out, I think there is a germ of promise in the "truthseeking" argument, and particularly in the distinction between normative and
empirical truth that I discuss above, but only when those points are considered in
the context of a more satisfying differentiation between adjudication and politics.
I explain that differentiation in Part III.

C.

The Argument From Subservience

Maybe our comparative disregard for adjudicative speech can be justified by
understanding adjudication as subservient to politics, in the sense that the procedural conditions of adjudication can be determined and altered by the political
173.
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (protecting a person from civil liability for
disclosure of the contents of illegally intercepted cellular phone conversations); Butterworth v. Smith, 494
U.S. 624 (1990) (protecting a grand jury witness from punishment for the disclosure of testimony); Fla. Star
v. B.].F., 491 U.s. 524 (1989) (protecting a reporter from a damages action based upon publication of a
rape victim's name); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (invalidating the punishment of a
newspaper based upon the publication of the name and photograph of a juvenile offender); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting any person
from divulging information regarding confidential matters pending before the state's judicial review
commission); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (invalidating a court order restraining a
reporter from disclosing the name of a juvenile offender); Neb. Press Alis'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(invalidating a state ttial court order restraining the press from publishing accounts of supposed confessions
made by a criminal defendant); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 524 (1975) (protecting a broadcaster
from a damages action based upon the publication of a rape victim's name).
Of course, the communication of incorrect facts is not subject to full First Amendment protection in
the political or social contexts. Such communication may incur damages for defamation, see, e.g., Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (upholding a damages award for defamation by a nonmedia defendant against a nonpublic figure in the absence of a public issue); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (upholding a damages award for defamation by a media
defendant against a nonpublic figure despite the existence of a public issue), and it may be regulated if it
constitutes "commercial speech," see, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the advertisement of drug prices but
noting in dictum that "false or misleading" commercial speech may be forbidden). As the Court has said,
"[ulnttuthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Va. Srnte &m-d
of Phannacy, 425 U.S. at 771. But untruthful political speech has been protected for the sake of preserving
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open," N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), on the theory "[tlhat
erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive,"' id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963». In contrast, false adjudicative speech is virtually unprotected-it may be
punished, for example, via FRCP 11 (or a state-coun analogue) and, if it is sworn testimony, via perjury
laws----and even ttue adjudicative speech is restricted by means of evidentiary rules.
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process. On this view, so long as we allow unfettered participation in the
political arena, we can justifiably restrict it in subservient contexts like adjudication, or the legislative chamber (which has its own procedural rules), or the
workplace, etc. Everything (including adjudication) is subject to politics; and if
we end up thinking that restrictions on speech in these subservient contexts
are unjust, or unfair, or ineffective, or bad in some other way, we can simply use
the political process-with its unrestricted speech-to change them. Adjudicative speech really is "free," in the sense that we are free to relax or eliminate
restrictions on it through politiCS.
One problem with this argument is that its premise of judicial subservience
is potentially vulnerable. Article III or the Due Process Clauses might limit the
174
ability of the political process to modify traditional court procedures {and of
course courts ultimately would decide what such limits are).175 If, say, admission
only of relevant evidence is deemed a due process requirement, then the same
Constitution that restricts speech in the adjudicative context also {through the
First Amendment} generally prohibits restrictions on speech in the political
context. We are left with the normative question of why our Constitution
should make this distinction-and not only make it, but insulate both sides of it
from political alteration.
A more serious problem is that the argument might prove too much. If an
activity's subservience to politics means that speech within it can be restricted
by politics, then politics can restrict a whole lot of speech-not just in
174.
The OJurt has stated that, in criminal cases, "[dlue process requires that the accused receive a
trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
Read broadly, this dictum suggests that at least some evidentiary tules are required by the Due Process
Clause in criminal prosecutions (although that was not the holding of Sheppard, which involved out-ofcourt publicity). Of course, the OJnstitution prescribes certain specific procedural protections in criminal
cases. See U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring that federal crimes be tried by jury in the state of
commission); id. art. 1II, § 3 cl. 1 (prohibiting convictions for treason without the testimony of two
witnesses or a confession in open court); id. amend. V (requiring a grand jury indictment for "capital" or
"infamous" crimes and prohibiting compelled self-incrimination); id. amend. Vl (conferring rights to a
"speedy and public trial" by an impartial jury in the state and district of the crime, to information of the
"nature and cause of the accusation," to confrontation of witnesses, to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel). The Seventh Amendment also preserves the right to a jury
trial in many civil cases in federal court, see U.S. CONST. amend. VlI; Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), "and nearly every state constitution contains a similar
guaranty," JAMES IT AL., supra note 74, § 8.1, at 49l.
More generally, the OJurt has assessed claimed deprivations of "procedural" due process according to
the three-part balancing test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), which weighs the
private interest affected, the risk of error combined with the probable benefits of additional procedural
protections, and the governmental interest. See generolly CHEMERlNSKY, supra note 20, §§ 7.4.1-7.4.3, at
556-79.
175.

See, e.g., Cleveland &I. of Educ. v. Loudennill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause must be detennined by the judiciary rather than the political
branches); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that the federal courts must decide
whether the jurisdiction given them by OJngress exceeds the bounds of Article III).
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adjudication, but in commerce, employment, art and literature, private relationships, and on and on. All of these areas of activity are subservient to politics
in some sense; as with adjudication, the political process is capable of regulating
what happens in them.
Of course it is true that the courts have allowed restrictions on speech in
some of these contexts that would not be allowed in politics: with respect to
commercial speech,176 for example, and in the employment context. 177 But the
restrictions that have been allowed are different both in degree and in kind from
the restrictions imposed by evidentiary rules.
They are different in degree because they tend not to be as severe as restrictions on adjudicative speech; regulations of commercial speech, for instance,
cannot be "more extensive than is necessary" to serve a "substantial" government
interest,178 in contrast to evidentiary rules, which completely exclude certain
categories of speech from the courtroom.
And they are different in kind because they do not restrict speech to the
government. Unlike other activities that are subservient to politics, adjudication
is, again, a form of participatory government decisionmaking with the authority
to legally coerce people. Comparison to political restrictions on, say, commercial
speech thus seems somewhat beside the point; while both commerce and
adjudication are subservient to politics in some way, adjudication is much more
like politics than is commerce. Restricting speech in the latter does not justify
restricting speech in the former.
All of which is to say that using the idea of subservience to politics, by itself,
as an explanation of restrictions on adjudicative speech seems insufficient.
l79
And then there is the Velazquez problem. The Velazquez decision
illustrates an important sense in which adjudication is not subservient to
politics: Adjudication can determine, or change, the results of politics. Courts
can interpret statutes and other political decisions and can even declare them
unconstitutional. Political control of adjudicative speech, then, has the sinister
potential to insulate politics from assessment according to legal standards.
(This potential was an important factor behind the Court's invalidation of the
176.
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) (holding that "[r)he Constitution ... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression" and articulating a four -part test for assessing regulations of
commercial speech).
177. See RAY. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (distinguishing Title VII's prohibition
on workplace sexual harassment from a law prohibiting racially motivated cross burning on the ground that
the fonner is "directed not against speech but against conduct"); see also Fallon, supra note 21; Cynthia L.
Estlund, Freedom of ExtJression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminawry Harassment, 75 TEx. L. REv.
687 (1997); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 OHIO Sr. L.J. 481 (1991).
178.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
179.
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); see supra Part 1.0.3.
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speech restriction in Velazquez. ISO) It is hard to justify politically imposed
restrictions on speech that are designed to prevent political change; "clearing
the channels of political change," in John Hart Ely's phrase, is precisely the
function of unrestricted political speech. lSI Indeed, viewed this way, adjudicative
speech is a farm of "pure" political speech-making its casual treatment, through
evidentiary rules and the like, all that much harder to justify.
Adjudication, then, is not entirely subservient to politics; and the sense
in which it is subservient is not enough to justify the differential treatment of
adjudicative and "pure" political speech. That said, the relationship of
subservience, if we can call it that, that does exist between adjudication and
politics will play an important role in the justification I offer in Part III.

D.

The Argument From the Need for Closure

We might attempt to justify restrictions on adjudicative speech by reference
to the fact that adjudication is a decisionmaking procedure; not just an opportunity for discussion. Courts must render decisions, and perhaps restrictions on
adjudicative speech are justifiable as mechanisms for bringing debate to a close
and allowing those decisions to be made. Evidentiary and procedural rules are,
on this view, akin to the rules (and related precedents and informal traditions)
that govern procedure in legislatures: Both are legitimate means of bringing
closure to the decisionmaking process and producing an actual decision.
One difficulty with this view is that, as a general matter, evidentiary rules
in a courtroom look quite different from procedural rules in a legislature. As
we have seen, evidentiary rules are mostly content based; but rules of legislative
procedure are mostly content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. The
ls2
rules of the two houses of the u.s. Congress, for example, primarily dictate who
See Velazquez, at 545 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178}. The Court stated:
Congtess cannot wrest the law from the Constitution which is its source. "Those, then, who
controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law,
are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution,
and see only the law."

180.

ld.

181.
ELY, supra note 57, at 105-34. Ely explains the connection between unfettered political speech
and political change. ld. at 105-16. The Supreme Court has often justified protection of political speech
in these tenns. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)) ("The constitutional safeguard [of freedom of speech) ... 'was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."'}; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (Freedom of speech serves "the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means.").
182.
The conglomeration of formal rules, precedents, and informal traditions and practices that
governs procedure in each house of Congtess is extremely complicated and bewildering to the non-expert.
Most of what I know about the subject I have learned from two informative and well-written overviews
published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS): CRS Report No. 95-563, The Legislative Process on
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may speak, when, and for how long; only occasionally do they dictate what may
18
be said. ) The mostly content-neutral rules of legislative procedure really are
designed primarily to facilitate closurel 84 (or, by their absence, to facilitate
I85
deliberation, as in the Senate ). But the mostly content-based evidentiary
rules of adjudication are designed to influence the substance of the resulting
decision, not simply to facilitate a decision being made.
A related difficulty is that rules of legislative procedure, quite unlike rules
of evidence, typically can be altered or suspended on an ad hoc basis by the
participants in the process themselves. The House of Representatives, for
.
d the rul"
instance,
may "
suspen
es by a two- tholrcIs vote. 186 The Senate may "agree
by unanimous consent to operate outside of its standing rules" and frequently
does 80;187 "[g]enerally also, Senators insist that the rules be enforced strictly only
when the questions before [the body] are divisive and controversial.,,188 And of
course each legislative body is free to amend or replace its standing rules by
resolution, although in actual practice amendments to the rules typically are

t11e House Floor: An IntrOOuction, by Elizabeth Rybicki & Stanley Bach, updated on November 8, 2002,
available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/95-563.pdf [hereinafter Rybicki & Bach, The
House Legislative Process), and CRS Report No. 96-548, The Legislative Process on t11e Senate Floor: An
Introduction, by Thomas P. Cart and Stanley Bach, updated on November 8, 2002, available at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/96-548.pdf [hereinafter Carr & Bach, The Senate Legislative
Process). I will cite to these reports here rather than to particular rules or precedents.
Perhaps the most important exceptions are the germaneness requirements in the House, which
183.
generally mandate that both debate and offered amendments be germane to the bill or resolution being
debated. See Rybicki & Bach, The House Legislative Process, supra note 182, at 3,6. More quaintly (and less
functionally), "all debate on the [House) floor must be consistent with certain rules of courtesy and
decorum. For example, a Member should not question or criticize the motives of a colleague." Id. at 3.
184.
Rybicki and Bach note:
[U)nderlying most of the rules that Representatives may invoke and the procedures the House
may follow is a fundamentally important premise-that a majority of Members ultimately should
be able to work their will on the floor. While House rules generally do recognize the importance
of pennitting any minority, partisan or bipartisan, to present its views and sometimes to propose
its alternatives, the rules do not enable that minority to filibuster or use other devices to prevent
the majority from prevailing without undue delay.
Id. at 1 (citation omitted).
185.
According to Carr and Bach:
The essential characteristic of the Senate's rules, and the characteristic that most clearly
distinguishes its procedures from those of the House of Representatives, is their emphasis on the
rights and prerogatives of individual Senators. Like any legislative institution, the Senate is both
a deliberative and a decision-making body; its procedures must embody some balance between
the opportunity to deliberate or debate and the need to decide. Characteristically, the Senate's
rules give greater weight to the value of full and free deliberation than they give to the value of
expeditious decisions.
Carr & Bach, The Senate Legislative Process, supra note 182, at 1.
186.
See Rybicki & Bach, The House Legislative Process, supra note 182, at 3-4.
187.
Carr & Bach, The Senate Legislative Process, supra note 182, at 2.

188.

Id.
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minor. 189 Rules of legislative procedure, then, really are voluntary--created,
maintained, altered, and enforced by the consent of those who are bound by
190
them-in a way that rules of evidence clearly are not.
And there is a third, even more salient distinction between evidentiary
rules and rules of legislative procedure that undermines the comparison altogether. Rules of legislative procedure apply only inside the legislative chamber;
they do not, and are not designed to, restrict legislators' extralegislative public
speech on issues the legislature will consider, even when that extralegislative
speech clearly is intended, or likely, to influence the outcome of the legislative
process. Representative Smith may be constrained in the subject matter of his
speech on the House floor, but no one would suggest that the same
Representative Smith cannot appear on the Sunday morning news-talk shows
and say whatever he likes about whatever he pleases, even (especially!) if his
efforts are intended to influence his fellow representatives to vote a certain
way, or his fellow citizens to pressure their representatives to vote a certain way.
As we've seen, though, the same is not necessarily true for Litigant Jones or
Attorney Gentile. The rules of evidence themselves don't apply outside the
courtroom, but the power of the court, or of the bar as defender of "the integrity
and fairness of the judicial system," do so apply. Litigant Jones or Attorney
Gentile might be punished (held in contempt or disbarred, for example) for
speaking publicly about their pending cases outside the courtroom, even (especially!) if their efforts are intended to influence the jury or the judge to decide a
certain way.
What this means is that, while rules of legislative procedure really do look
simply like mechanisms for facilitating the legislature's function as a decisionmaking body, evidentiary rules-and the larger web of potential restrictions on
189.

The O:mstitution provides that "[elach House may detennine the Rules of its Proceedings."

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, d. 2. Each house adopts its standing rules by resolution at the beginning of the
legislative session. Changes from previous versions of the rules typically are minor. See, e.g.,
CONSTITLmON, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REpRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS, H.R. r:x:x::. No. 107-284, at v (2003) (referencing
the adoption by resolution of the House Rules and describing the changes from the Rules of the previous
session), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hnnlbrowse_108.html.
190.
There are some complexities here. Litigants have, in a sense, a role in creating and
changing rules of evidence, in that they can make legal and factual arguments about how those rules
should be applied in the circumstances of a particular case; a judge's rulings on such issues then may
serve as precedents influencing the application of the rules in future similar cases. A litigant also
might consent, in a way, to a change in an evidentiary rule by simply failing to object to her opponent's
violation of that rule, or by behaving in some other way that is deemed a waiver of the rule (as when a
criminal defendant offers character evidence in her defense, thus opening the door for the prosecution
to offer rebuttal character evidence under FRE 404(a)(1)). Both of these phenomena also exist, of
course, with respect to rules of legislative procedure. But particular litigants cannot enact wholesale
repeals or amendments of evidentiary rules in the way that particular legislatures can with respect to
legislative rules.
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adjudicative speech of which they are a part-look like something quite different. Evidentiary rules look like mechanisms for promoting court decisions that
have a certain content, or perhaps a certain type of content: content, if you will,
that has "integrity" and is "fair." They are much more than, and on the whole
very different from, mere means of bringing closure to a decisionmaking process.!9! So if they (and the general speech-restrictive ethos in adjudication) are to
be justified, it is not by understanding them in those terms.
E.

The Argument From Illusoriness

But it might tum out that the comparatively hostile treatment of adjudicative speech need not be justified at all, because that hostility is illusory or
mostly so. In fact adjudicative speech might be protected as much as, if not more
than, political speech. It is true that evidentiary rules and other restrictions on
adjudicative speech are mostly content based and often rather draconian in form;
but in practice they might not be so bad, for two reasons.
First, the typical consequences of restrictions on adjudicative speech
might not be so severe compared to the consequences of restrictions on political
speech. If you are prohibited from presenting certain evidence, testimony, or
argument in the courtroom, you can always step outside the courtroom and
engage in the same speech in another forum.!92 (Perhaps your spouse or coworkers will be interested in hearing about the excluded evidence.) But if you are
prohibited from engaging in certain political speech because of its content, no
alternative forum exists; if you are barred from advocating, say, the violent overthrow of the government, you cannot step "outside" of politics to do it, because
there is no "outside" of politics. And, as if the lack of any alternative forum for
political speech weren't enough, engaging in unlawful political speech is likely
191.
On the other hand, procedural rules in adjudication can in fact be understood largely (if not
entirely) as content-neutral means of making the decisionmaking process more efficient. See, e.g., supra
notes 147-157 and accompanying text.
192.
On occasion judges, even highly regarded ones, have actually made this or similar
arguments. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991) (Rehnquist, c.J.) ("The
regulation of attorneys' speech [in question] is limited ... it merely postpones the attorneys' comments
until after the tria!."); Patterson v. O:llorado ex reI. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (Holmes, J.)
("When a case is finished, courts are subject to the same criticism as other people, but the propriety and
necessity of preventing interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument or intimidation hardly can be denied.") (emphasis added); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 666-68 (1959) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). Justice Frankfutter implicitly adopted this position:
Of course, a lawyer is a person and he too has a constitutional freedom of utterance and may
exercise it to castigate courts and their administration of justice. But a lawyer actively participating in a trial ... is not merely a person and not even merely a lawyer. ... He is an intimate and
trusted and essential part of the machinery of justice, an "officer of the court" in the most
compelling sense.
Id.
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193

to land you in jaiL
So (the argument might go), while content-based restrictions on political speech might be relatively few and far between these days, their
consequences are considerably more severe than those of content-based restrictions on adjudicative speech.
Second, in adjudication, the question of what speech is permissible is typically decided by the participation of the affected parties. The litigants (usually
through their lawyers) can argue to the judge about whether, for example, a
194
particular item of evidence is relevant or is more prejudicial than probative. In
this sense restrictions on adjudicative speech are quasi-voluntary in nature; they
prohibit speech, yes, but they do so only after the affected party has had the
opportunity to demonstrate (without being subject to the rules of evidence in
doing S0195) that his or her speech should not be prohibited. 196 Thus restrictions
on adjudicative speech, on this argument, are not as severe as they may at first
appear.
197
For
These points seem so weak to me that I hesitate even to raise them.
one thing, the consequences of restrictions on adjudicative speech really are
every bit as bad as the consequences of restrictions on political speech, for reasons
that should be apparent by now. There is no alternative forum for adjudicative
speech any more than there is for political speech: Once speech is confined to a
time and place where it cannot influence the judge's or the jury's decision, the
entire purpose of that speech is defeated. Revealing excluded evidence or
presenting barred arguments to one's spouse or coworkers-Dr even on national
television, once the trial and the appeal are over-is not adjudicative speech at
all, because it cannot affect the government decisionmaking process to which
193.
For example, the fIrst three defendants whose convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917
were upheld by the Supreme Court pursuant to the nascent "clear and present danger" standard "all
ended up going to prison for quite tame and ineffectual expression. In fact they went to prison far ten
years." ELY, supra note 57, at 107 (footnote omitted). See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919);
see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
The FRE require that evidentiary questions "be determined by the court." FED. R. EVlD.
194.
104(a}. A court's general obligation to consider the arguments of the litigants on such questions is
implied rather than stated expressly by the rules. See, e.g., id. 103(a} (requiring parties who wish to appeal
evidentiary rulings either to object to the admission of evidence or to make an offer of proof that the
evidence should be admitted); id. 104(a} (proViding that a court "is not bound by the rules of evidence"
in making evidentiary rulings); id. 104(c} (requiring that "lh]earings on preliminary matters [be]
conducted" outside the hearing of the jury "when the interests of justice require").
195.
See id. 104(a} (a court is not bound by rules of evidence in making evidentiary rulings); id.
1101 (d) (rules of evidence are not applicable to a court's determination of questions of fact necessary for
evidentiary rulings).
196.
But see supra note 190.
197.
But, again, reputedly smart judges occasionally have done so. See supra note 192. To be fair,
the judges in two of the instances I cited were opining in the context of attorneys' in-court criticism of
judges or the judicial process; such criticism might in fact be effective even outside the courtroom (that
is, it might have a true alternative forum), as I explain infra notes 309-324 and accompanying text.
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the speech is ostensibly relevant. Barring adjudicative speech from the hearing of
judge or jury, then, is the functional equivalent of barring political speech
altogether: It eliminates the content of that speech as a potential factor in the
process of decisionmaking. (And if that isn't enough, violating restrictions on
adjudicative speech can land you in jail,198 or affiict you with other nasty
consequences,199 just as violating restrictions on political speech can.)
Nor can adjudicative speech be distinguished from political speech by the
fact that litigants and their attorneys typically can participate in deciding exactly
which of their intended speech will be restricted. The same is true, in essentially
the same ways, of restrictions on political speech. Prior restraints against political
speech, the Supreme Court has held, cannot be imposed without the opportunity
for prompt judicial review by means of a full and fair adversary hearing. zoo Ex post
criminal punishments for violations of political speech restrictions must, of
course, follow only from the fully safeguarded process of a criminal prosecution.
And the rules themselves pursuant to which political speech might be restrained
and punished come from a political process that is at least as participatory as the
' ru 1es. ~
one that prad uces eVl' d
entlary
In other words, the comparatively harsh treatment afforded adjudicative
speech in our system is far from illusory. Restrictions on adjudicative speech can
impact the affected parties' ability to influence government decisionmaking as
profoundly as restrictions on political speech can, and violation of those restrictions can result in punishments or disabilities no less severe. Nor is the process
198.
See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,9 (1952) (upholding contempt citations and
jail tenns for attorneys who disobeyed trial judges' speech restrictions); Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th
Cir. 1992) (upholding a contempt citation and a jail term for an attorney's violation of evidentiary
rulings); see also Schauer, supra note 14, at 689. As Frederick Schauer notes:
Those who persist in saying ittelevant things after a ruling by the judge risk punishment for
contempt, and thus it is no exaggeration to describe a trial as a place in which people run the risk
of imprisonment for saying things that a government official, a judge, believes to be unrelated to
the matter at hand.

Id.
199.
See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (upholding a reprimand by the state bar of
an attorney who violated the rule against extrajudicial statements that might influence court proceedings).
200.
See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (requiring the opportunity for prompt
judicial review of an adverse licensing decision); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne
County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (holding an ex parte court order insufficient for a prior restraint).
201.
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, recommendations for changes ro the evidentiary and
procedural rules for the federal courts are made by a standing committee of the Judicial Conference
(typically following the recommendation of an ad hoc committee) to the Judicial Conference itself. See 28
U.S.c. § 2073 (2ooo). The Judicial Conference then makes recommendations to the Supreme O:JUrt, see
id. § 331, which has the authority to implement changes to the rules, see id. § 1072 (2ooo), subject to
intervention by Congress, see id. § 2074{a) (2ooo). Rules affecting an evidentiary privilege must be enacted
into law by Congress itself. See id. § 2074{b).
Of course, U[r)he rules of evidence have evolved over centuries through the familiar common-law
processes," lARRy L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIvIL PROCEDURE 858 (2d ed. 2000); the FRE largely
constitute a codification of this body of evolved principles.
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of implementing speech restrictions any more participatory in the adjudicative
than in the political context. And yet the quality and quantity of speech
restrictions permitted in adjudication are, as we've seen, orders of magnitude
greater than the quality and quantity of speech restrictions permitted in
politics. The question remains: why?

III. A MORE SATISFAcrORY JUSTIRCATION
fu I've attempted to demonstrate, it turns out to be harder than one might
think to justify the apparent lack of First Amendment attention paid to evidentiary rules and other content-based restrictions on adjudicative speech. Hard
as it is to justify, though, it is even harder to believe that it can't be justified.
Restrictions on the freedom of adjudicative speech are long-standing and
generally accepted features of our judicial system. The question is not so much
whether they can be justified as how; and answering that question requires more
than the question-begging mantras about "protect[ing] the integrity and fairness
202
What is
of [the] judicial system" and the like that courts tend to intone.
needed is an understanding of what "the integrity and fairness of the judicial
system" might mean and of how those qualities might rationalize imposing rather
severe restrictions on the speech of participants in that system. I outline such an
understanding in this part.

A.

Two Kinds of Adjudicative Legitimacy

We can begin by distinguishing between two complementary ways in which
a court decision might be assessed for political legitimacy.

1.

Direct Legitimacy

The first way is to ask whether the decision is legitimate with respect to
203
those who will be bound by it -primarily the litigants themselves, but also
similarly situated subsequent litigants and potential litigants who will be bound
through stare decisis. We might call this the question of direct legitimacy.
I explained above how this question of direct legitimacy might be partially
answered by focusing on the participatory nature of Anglo-American

202.
See. e.g .• Gentile. 501 U.S. at 1076.
203.
I leave open here the question of exactly what it might mean to be bound by a court
decision. For a bit more on that issue. see Peters. Adjudication. supra note 24. at 360-74.401-30; Peters.
Participation. supra note 24. at 204-11. The most extensive discussion of this question of which I am aware
appears in Robert G. Bone. Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion. 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 193.265-69 (1992).
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adjudication. Because the litigants can shape the decision that will bind them
by participating in the process of making it, that decision has significant democratic legitimacy with respect to those litigants.
Understanding the participatory nature of adjudication only provides a
partial answer to the question of direct legitimacy, however, because it alone
cannot explain the legitimacy of binding subsequent litigants to a court decision
through stare decisis. Subsequent litigants--as well as conforming nonlitigants
who alter their behavior to avoid becoming litigants--are in a meaningful sense
coerced by earlier court decisions that will serve as precedents in their cases,
constraining their ability to argue for certain results. Precedents thus are
20S
But
sources of prospectively binding norms, in many respects like statutes.
subsequent litigants and conforming nonlitigants, unlike the litigants in the
precedent-setting cases by which they now are bound, have not had the opportunity to participate directly in creating those norms. Participation theory
alone, then, cannot justify binding these subsequent parties to decisions
reached through the efforts of previous litigants in previous court cases. It cannot alone answer the question of the direct legitimacy of adjudication.
As I have argued at length elsewhere, that question can be answered by
understanding judicial precedent as essentially a form of representative govern206
ment.
The interests of subsequently bound litigants and conforming
nonlitigants are represented by the litigants who directly participate in deciding
a precedential case; the common law method generally ensures that the
interests of the precedent-setting and subsequently bound litigants will be
materially similar because the facts of the respective cases must be materially
similar in order for stare decisis to operate. The more binding a precedential
decision, the more closely the facts of that case resemble the facts of the
subsequent case in which the precedent will apply; and the more closely the facts
of the precedential case resemble those of the subsequent case, the more closely
aligned the interests of the litigants in the precedential case are likely to be to
those of the corresponding litigants in the subsequent case. The common law
method thus creates a relationship of interest representation between precedentsetting and subsequently bound litigants. In so doing, it promotes adequate
204.

See supra Pan I.C
205.
But in many respects different from statutes. Statutes typically embody "if and only if' rules:
They command that result R should obtain if and only if facts F, through FN are present. Common law
"rules," on the other hand, typically allow for the possibility that result R might obtain even if not all of
facts F, through FNare present. Statutory rules also typically close the universe of relevant facts, commanding that no facts other than F, through FN may be considered in determining whether result R should
obtain; in contrast, common law "rules" typically allow for the possibility that other facts (for example,
fact FN) may be considered in determining whether result Rshould obtain. For a more complete
discussion of these distinctions, see Peters, AdjuJicarion, supra note 24, at 361-66.
206.
The foundation of this approach is set out in Peters, AdjuJicarion, supra note 24.
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representation in court decisionmaking, much as the device of frequent elections
promotes adequate representation in political decisionmaking. Understood this
way, court decisions can possess direct political legitimacy not only with respect
to the litigants immediately bound by those decisions, but also with respect to
litigants and conforming nonlitigants who are subsequently bound by stare
decisis.
We might interpret the "fairness" component of the Supreme Court's
concern, expressed in Gentile, for "the integrity and fairness of a ... judicial system,,207 as a concern for the direct legitimacy of court decisions. A court decision
is "fair" to the litigants if it is meaningfully the product of their participatory
efforts; it is "fair" to subsequently bound litigants if it binds them only to the
extent that their interests were meaningfully represented by the participation of
the litigants in the precedential case.

2.

Derivative Legitimacy

But the question of direct legitimacy, or fairness, is not the only question
we can ask about the legitimacy of court decisions. Suppose a court must interpret and apply some provision of a statute to decide a case. Suppose further
that the process of interpreting the statutory provision is entirely participatory,
resulting in a judicial decision that meaningfully responds to the arguments
made by all the litigants. That decision then would possess considerable direct
legitimacy with respect to the litigants bound by it. Finally, suppose that subsequent courts apply this decision as precedent only in cases involving facts (and
thus litigants) that are materially similar to the facts and litigants of the precedential case. These subsequent decisions, too, would possess a good deal of direct
20B
legitimacy with respect to the litigants bound by them.
But the precedential decision, and therefore the subsequent decisions, still
might be illegitimate in another sense. Suppose that the precedential decision,
despite being the product of meaningful litigant participation, was bad as a piece
of statutory interpretation-it did not accurately implement the purposes of the
209
statutory provision that it was attempting to interpret. We might then think
that the decision is illegitimate, not from the perspective of the particular
207.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075; see supra text accompanying note 114.
208.
This conclusion might be strengthened if we make the fairly safe assumption that, consistent
with the participatory nature of American adjudication, the subsequent litigants themselves have
meaningfully participated in the process of deciding their case-including the process of deciding
whether and to what extent the prior decision is precedentially binding.
209.
I don't mean to make a "purposivist" approach to statutory interpretation crucial to my
analysis here. The same point can be made if we substitute the words "text" or "original intent" for the
word "purposes" in the above sentence. The idea is simply to imagine a court decision that is, by whatever
methodology, an erroneous interpretation of a statute.
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litigants and others who will be directly bound by it, but from the perspective of
legislative supremacy or the separation of powers. That is, we might think the
decision is illegitimate because it frustrates the ability of the political
branches--the legislature that voted for the statute and the chief executive
who signed it-to make effective policy.
Why might we think this? Well, suppose we have a conception of the
separation of powers by which, broadly speaking, the political branches are
charged with making general policy and the courts are charged with applying
2lO
that general policy in particular cases.
On such a conception, it would be
problematic for the political branches, by enacting a statute, to make policy X,
only to have a court, in deciding a particular case, interpret the statute in a way
that frustrates policy X.211 If we believe in a concept of "legislative supremacy,"
by which legislative (or, more generally, political-branch) policymaking is superior in authority to judicial policymaking, then we are likely to think that there
is some political illegitimacy in allowing courts to frustrate legislative policy
when they decide cases.
We might call this the question of the derivative political legitimacy of
court decisions. If we assume a conception of the separation of powers by which
the political branches legitimately make general policy, and the courts must
attempt to faithfully apply that general policy in particular cases, then a judicial
decision is politically legitimate only if it correctly applies the policy made by the
political branches. In this sense its legitimacy is derivative of the legitimacy of
212
the general policy it is correctly applying.
We might interpret the "integrity" component of the Gentile Court's concern for "the integrity and fairness of a ... judicial system" as a concern about the
derivative legitimacy of court decisions. Court decisions have "integrity," with
respect to the proper democratic hierarchy of legitimate policymaking, if they
are consistent with the general policies, paradigmatically those created by the
political branches, that they are supposed to interpret and apply.213
My thesis here is that evidentiary rules, and other restrictions on adjudicative speech, can be understood and justified as means of promoting both the
210.
211.

I will defend such a conception in Part IlI.e., infra.
I put aside here, for the sake of argument, exactly what it means for the political branches to

"make" policy X and to embody it in a statute. Here again, debates will center on the importance of
original intent, of statutory text, and so on.
212.
As I will contend in Part III.e.3. infra, the concern for derivative legitimacy is not limited to
cases involving the interpretation of statutes.
213.
This understanding of "integrity" echoes Ronald Dworkin's use of the term "political integrity"
to describe a moral norm "requir[ing) government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled and
coherent manner toward all its citizens." RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 165 (1986). But my use
of it here, or rather my reading of the Gentile Court's use of it, relates specifically to a requirement of judicial
allegiance to norms created by politically legitimate processes, not to the more general requirement of
holistic decisionmaking consistency that Dworkin means to invoke.
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direct legitimacy (the "fairness") and the derivative legitimacy (the "integrity")
of court decisions. Sometimes such restrictions promote direct legitimacy by
preventing one litigant from skewing a court's decisionmaking process in her
favor, without a meaningful opportunity for participation by the opposing litigant. I explain this function in Part IIl.B. More often the restrictions promote
derivative legitimacy by limiting the capacity of a judge or a jury to misapply or
ignore the general policies they are supposed to be implementing. I explain this
function in Part lIl.e.
B.

Adjudicative Speech Restrictions and Direct Legitimacy

Some common types of restriction on adjudicative speech can be justified
as means of preserving the direct legitimacy of court decisions-their "fairness,"
in the terminology of the Gentile Court. Gentile itself involved one such restriction. Recall that in that case, Nevada attempted to prohibit attorneys from
making extrajudicial statements having "a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding";Zl4 while invalidating Nevada's rule for
vagueness, the Court upheld the "material prejudice" standard for restrictions
on extrajudicial attorney speech.215
The Nevada rule can be understood in part as an attempt to preserve the
direct legitimacy of court decisions by preventing one litigant, through its attorney, from influencing an adjudicative decisionmaker-the eventual jury-without giving the other party an opportunity to fully and fairly respond. A verdict
reached after the jury has been preconditioned to accept one party's version
of events lacks the kind of fairness that we would expect from a legitimate
government decision, because one of the parties bound by the decision has
not had a fully meaningful opportunity to participate in that decision. As in the
case of a preexisting judicial bias against one of the litigants,Z16 the decision
therefore is tainted from a democratic perspective.
In this sense, we can understand the Nevada rule in Gentile to serve a sort
of "representation-reinforcing" function analogous to that assigned by John Hart
217
Ely to constitutional rights.
The rule attempts to ensure that one party to a
government decisionmaking procedure (here, adjudication) does not obtain an
unfair advantage over other parties, thus risking a skewed outcome. The Nevada
rule also evokes the related notion, recently articulated most vigorously by Cass

214.
215.
216.
217.

Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
See supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
This will be discussed infra Pan IV.B.
See ELY, supra note 57.
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Sunstein, that institutional rules should promote government decisionmaking
21B
that is deliberative rather than biased or irrationa1.
Other common restrictions on adjudicative speech serve similar participation-reinforcing functions. Consider rules limiting the admissibility of hearsay
evidence,219 which can be understood as preventing a litigant from presenting
evidence to which its opponent has no full and fair opportunity to respond. 220
Consider also rules against the admission of character evidence and evidence of
other crimes;221 such rules serve to prevent the jury from developing and acting
upon an irrational bias against a litigant, much as the Equal Protection Clause
serves, in Ely's view, to mitigate irrational bias in the political process against
m
"discrete and insular" minorities.
Indeed many, perhaps most, rules of evidence carry a tinge of this concern
for direct legitimacy through procedural fairness, in the following sense. As I
argue in the next subpart, rules of evidence and other restrictions on adjudicative
speech often can be understood primarily as means of promoting derivative
legitimacy-that is, as means of ensuring the accurate judicial implementation
of general legislative policies. But there is a close connection between the goals
of derivative and direct legitimacy. Considerations of fair notice make it problematic to decide cases according to norms that one or more of the litigants
could not have expected might be applied. This is less a problem with outcomes-the actual decisions resulting from adjudication-than with inputs.
As long as the litigants have had a full and fair opportunity to participate in the
adjudicative process, the outcome (like those of democmtic politics) can be seen
as legitimate, even if it could not have been predicted at the start of the process.
218.
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME CoURT 24-45 (1999).
219.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801--D7.
220.
In criminal cases, the prohibition of hearsay has a constitutional basis: the defendant's right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him" conferred by the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CoNST.
amend. VI; see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); White v. Illinois, 502 U.s. 346 (1992); Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). But that fact doesn't eliminate the need to justify hearsay rules under the First
Amendment. For one thing, the Confrontation Clause applies against the government in criminal cases,
and the government itself has no free speech rights. Nor does the Confrontation Clause explain the
applicability of hearsay rules in the context of civil cases.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404,405.
221.
222.
See ELY, supra note 57, chs. 4, 6. Some restrictions on adjudicative speech also mitigate the
effects of economic inequality among litigants, thereby increasing the direct legitimacy of court decisions.
"Gag rules" like the one upheld in Gentile can prevent wealthier litigants from using the media to
influence a jury's or judge's deliberations. More generally, the relatively level playing field imposed
within a courtroom by evidentiary rules, and by a judge's traditional authority to limit the number of
witnesses presented, the amount of time for examination and cross-examination, the length of oral
arguments, and the like, see, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(15) (allowing judges to enter orders, inter alia,
"establishing a reasonable limit on the time allowed for presenting evidence"), diminishes some of the
advantage that a wealthier litigant might otherwise possess. But of course much potential for economic
inequality, and thus for crises of direct legitimacy, remains in American litigation.

Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment

759

But this reasoning supposes the opportunity for full and fair participation; and
that in tum relies to some extent upon advance notice regarding what the
grounds of participation will be.
Imagine, for example, an adjudicative system that has no requirement of
relevance-that is, a system that lacks a rule that evidence must meet some
standard of relevance in order to be admissible. In such a system, each litigant
would have little basis for predicting what kind of evidence and arguments her
opponent will present in court. In a personal injury lawsuit, for example, the
plaintiff, free of relevancy requirements, could present evidence regarding the
defendant's insurance policy, its pattern of political contributions, its propensity
for polluting the environment, its political affiliations--anything that might
influence the jury to decide in the plaintiffs favor. (The defendant, of course,
could reciprocate in kind). But there would be no good way of knowing ahead of
time exactly (or even roughly) what types of evidence and arguments the other
side is likely to present. The result would be akin to a game played by no fixed
rules; outcomes would be arbitrary, less the product of proofs and reasoned
arguments than of hit-and-run guerilla tactics.
Of course, an arbitrary, no-holds-barred game might be fine if that's what
the players have signed up to play. (Some might describe democratic politics
as such a "game.") But because of the need for derivative legitimacy-because
adjudication, in our tradition, is a process of giving concrete meaning in specific
cases to general legislative norms, as I explain in the next section-American
litigants reasonably expect that the game of adjudication will be played by
certain rules. They expect that adjudication will in fact be a process of
attempting to give contextual meaning to general norms, rather than
an anything-goes contest of name calling and mudslinging. A litigant who
shows up expecting to play one game and finds herself forced to play another
has, in some sense, been deprived of the full and fair opportunity to participate,
because the terms on which she justifiably expects to participate have
suddenly been changed.
So the connection between the goals of derivative and direct legitimacy in
adjudication stems from the fact that litigants generally expect adjudication to
aspire toward the former goal. If that aspiration proves illusory, the resulting
frustration of the litigants' expectations also threatens the latter goal. As such,
restrictions that promote derivative legitimacy by constraining the court to the
accurate implementation of general policies also promote direct legitimacy by
fulfilling the litigants' expectations of such constraint.
Which means that the First Amendment legitimacy of evidentiary rules
and other restrictions on adjudicative speech relies significantly on the extent to
which they promote derivative legitimacy-"integrity," in the words of the
Gentile Court. I now tum to that question.
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C.

Adjudicative Speech Restrictions and Derivative Legitimacy

While preserving direct legitimacy is the primary function of some restrictions on adjudicative speech, most such restrictions can be understood as concerned chiefly with the preservation of derivative legitimacy. Derivative
legitimacy, again, is the political legitimacy that adjudicative decisions derive
from consistency with the general policies they are supposed to implement. In
this subpart, I first explain in more detail what I mean by derivative legitimacy
and defend the premise that derivative legitimacy does in fact matter in
American adjudication. Then I contend that many common restrictions on
adjudicative speech serve the purpose of ptomoting derivative legitimacy.

1.

The Concern With Derivative Legitimacy

Government, of course, usually has the power, and almost always claims
the authority, to act coercively. Perhaps the central question of political theory
is the question of the conditions under which government may legitimately
exercise that power and claim that authority. As I've argued, the "democratic"
answer to that question, in its best interpretation, holds that government
generally may coerce to the extent that those being coerced have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the process of deciding how the power to
coerce will be used.223 In a democratic system, those coerced can participate
directly, by means of political speech and voting,Z24 and indirectly, through the
representatives and officials who presumably are influenced by their political
speech and voting.
A democratic government, then, may legitimately make policy-in Ronald
Dworkin's terms, a decision or set of decisions designed to "advance[] or
protect[] some collective goal of the community as a whole"225-that is binding
on (coercive of) the "community as a whole," because the members of the
community as a whole have had the opportunity meaningfully to participate in
the making of that policy. So, for example, the U.S. Congress can legitimately
pass statutes binding on all U.S. citizens, because those citizens have had the
opportunity to participate in the making of the statute through their political
speech and their voting (and the incentive for legislators created by their ability to vote in the future).226 For the same reason, the President and others in
223.
224.

See supra Pan I.A.
See generally ELY, supra note 57, at 105-25.
DwORKIN, supra note 141, at 82.

225.
What about noncitizens who are nonetheless bound by laws passed by Congress? The
226.
legitimacy of binding them is a potentially perplexing issue, see, e.g., ELY, supra note 57, at 148-50, 161-62;
ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs 119-31 (1989), that is beyond my scope here. We
might get a stan at it by asking whether the fact that most aliens are voluntary residents of the United
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the executive branch can legitimately make decisions that bind all of us. Officials in our state governments can legitimately coerce citizens of their respective
states, and so on. In short, the making of binding general policy by the political
branches is politically legitimate because those bound have (or could have)
participated (if only by proxy) in the policymaking.
Adjudication, as I have argued, is a participatory process too. 227 Litigants
can legitimately (democratically) be bound by judicial decisions because those
decisions, at least ideally, are products of their meaningful participatory efforts.
And future litigants, along with those who alter their behavior to avoid becoming future litigants, are legitimately (democratically) bound by judicial decisions
through stare decisis; their interests and those of the precedent-setting litigants
must be materially similar in order for stare decisis to operate, and thus the
precedent-setting litigants have a strong incentive to represent those interests.
But note who cannot, on a participation-based theory, be bound
legitimately by most judicial decisions: members of "the community as a whole."
Members of the community as a whole (future litigants and conforming nonlitigants aside) typically do not have the ability to participate meaningfully in the
making of court decisions, either directly or through interest representation.
To the extent a court decision is binding on the community as a whole, then, it
is democratically illegitimate, or at least less democratically legitimate than
228
policy made by the politically accountable branches of govemment.
Participation theory, therefore, is one way to explain the traditional
understanding of the policymaking hierarchy within our constitutional system
of separation of powers. Policymaking by the politically accountable branches
is superior in authority to policymaking by relatively unaccountable courts
because the former follows from the broad participation of the entire community, while the latter follows only from the relatively narrow participation of the
litigants to a particular court case. This hierarchy of legitimacy is preserved

States allows us to get around restrictions on their political participation by means of some sort of
consent theory, and by noting that many constitutional protections, particularly those of equal protection
and freedom of speech, apply to aliens. See ELY, supra note 57, at 161--62.
22 7 .
See supra Part I.e.
228.
Here again we are dealing in ideals. Obviously court decisions often are binding on the
community as a whole in various ways. See, e.g., Peters, Adjudication, supra note 24, at 412-14; Peters,
Participation, supra note 24, at 209-11; Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the NewJUllicial Minimalism, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1454, 1487-90 (2000) [hereinafter Peters, Minimalisml. One point of evidentiary rules
and similar restrictions, I will argue, is to limit the occasions on which, and the extent to which, this is
true.
AI; I have written elsewhere, there are other means besides restrictions on adjudicative speech of
imposing such limits, including narrowing the scope of judicial decisions, see Peters, Adjudication, supra note
24, at 401-11; Peters, Minimalism, supra, at 1513-21, and of making such limits less necessary, including
broadening participation in important public law cases, see Peters, Adjudicatian, supra note 24, at 417-19;
Peters, Partici/XUion, supra note 24, at 210; Peters, Minimalism, supra, at 1488--90.
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when a court accurately interprets and applies general policy made by the
politically accountable branches. It is frustrated, however, when a court interprets and applies that general policy inaccurately, or when a court rejects that
general policy in favor of policy created by the (less accountable) court itself.
In order to preserve their policymaking superiority, then, the political
branches must have the legitimate authority not only to make policy, but also to
exert some control over how that policy is applied (and to ensure that the policy
is applied rather than rejected or changed). The authority to make policy is not
worth much if the policy one makes is changed by those (the courts) that are
supposed to apply it, or is applied in ways that are inconsistent with the policy.
A word of caution here. A classic understanding of the separation of
powers holds that policymakers and policy-appliers must be distinct from each
229
other.
The idea is that a combined policymaker/policy-applier could make
seemingly neutral policies (say, a tax on everyone's income) and then apply those
policies in nonneutral ways (say, by exempting the policymakers themselves
and their friends, family, and campaign contributors). This would undercut
one of the safeguards supposedly applicable to policymaking in a representative
democracy: the fact that our representatives "can make no law which will not
have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great
. ,,230
mass 0 fh
t e soclety.
To say that policymakers should not, for this reason, also be policy-appliers,
though, is not to say that policymakers should not be able to ensure that their
policies will be applied in ways that are consistent with (not contradictory of) the
policies themselves. It is not to say, for example, that the legislature that enacts
an income tax should not be able to ensure that the courts who interpret it (and,
for that matter, the executive who enforces it) cannot exempt their oom friends,
23I
family, and campaign contributors.
229.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 51 (James Madison); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
230.
THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison).
231.
True, Montesquieu worries that "[wlhen the legislative power is united with the executive
power ... there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical
laws will execute them tyrannically." MONTESQUIEU, supra note 229, at 157; see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 47 Games Madison) (quoting Montesquieu to this effect). This suggests a concern not for tyranny
through inconsistency between policymaking and policy applying, but rather for tyranny through consistency between those two functions. The idea here seems to be that a separate executive can temper,
through moderate enforcement, unduly harsh laws enacted by the legislature; as such, it resonates with the
argument made by Madison in Federalist No. 51 that the separation of powers helps protect individual
rights. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Montesquieu's argument for separating the judicial
from the legislative power, however, is different: "If [the judicial power] were joined to the legislative power,
the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator."
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 229, at 157. This argument seems to support the notion that courts should
not be policymake~t they should faithfully apply, not independently create, general policy in order to
avoid "arbitrariness." Of course, Hamilton complicates matters in Federalist No. 78 when he suggests
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My thesis in this part of the Article, which I defend below, is that many or
most content-based restrictions on adjudicative speech can best be understood as
means by which the legitimate policymaking branches of government control
the case-by-case application of that policy by the courts. To put it a bit
differently, restrictions on adjudicative speech are mechanisms for effectuating
the policymaking role of the political branches (and, as I will argue, of the common law and the constitutional Framers) and for confining the role of the judicial branch to policy-applying. As such, they legitimately constrain the speech
of participants in adjudicative decisionmaking-Iegitimately because the process
is one of applying policy made elsewhere, not of creating or changing it. 232
There are some readily apparent complications of this general idea which
flow from the fact that much adjudication does not involve the application of
general legislative policy in the form of statutes. Common law cases involve the
application of norms derived from prior court decisions; constitutional cases
involve the application of norms derived from a source of law that trumps ordinary statutes. I deal with these complications below. First, however, let me
explain how restrictions on adjudicative speech serve the function I have
described here, that of promoting derivative legitimacy.
2.

Adjudicative Speech Restrictions as Means of Preserving
Derivative Legitimacy

In order for a court decision to possess derivative legitimacy, it must meet
the requirement of accuracy, meaning that it must be a reasonably correct
implementation of the applicable legislative policy or policies. It must also
meet the corollary requirement of faithfulness, meaning that it must not involve
the rejection of applicable legislative policies in favor of new policies created by
the court (including the jury). In this subpart, I explain how evidentiary rules,

that the judiciary might "operate[ I as a check upon the legislative lxxIy" by "mitigating the severity and
confining the operation of [unjust and partialllaws." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
232.
This sentence is likely to raise a red flag for the reader attuned to jurisprudential debates about
whether courts, in deciding cases, "create" new law or merely "discover" or "apply" existing law. I am something of a Dworkinian on this question; I believe that judges exercise a creative function in determining
the most justifiable way to apply existing general norms to specific facts. See generally DwORKIN, supra
note 141; DwORKIN, supra note 213. That is, judges combine creativity with discovery. But I don't think
the particular contours of my jurisprudential understanding matter much to the point I'm trying to make in
the text. What is important is the idea that the ptoper role of judges (or rather courts, including not only
juries but also litigants and their lawyers) within a constitutional democracy like ours is to implement (or
apply, or translate, or whatever particular term one prefers) generally applicable norms ("policies") created
by the other branches in specific cases, and to do so in a way that is consistent with the norms being
implemented. Clearly this will almost always involve some creativity on the part of the judge and the other
participants, because there will almost always be room for debate about exactly which implementation is
most consistent with the guiding norms (or about what the guiding norms themselves are),
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and other restrictions on adjudicative speech, can be justified as means of preserving these requirements of accuracy and faithfulness.
Restrictions on adjudicative speech can be roughly broken down into three
different categories, according to the way in which they constrain courts' application of legislative policy. As we shall see, the categories bleed into one another
somewhat. I call the categories, respectively, fact-constraining restrictions (which
are concerned with preserving the accurate application of legislative policy),
norm-constraining restrictions (which are concerned with preserving the faithful
application of legislative policy), and extrinsic restrictions (which are concerned
with the accurate and faithful implementation of legislative policies that cut
across different types of claims). I describe each category and explain its legitimating function below.
a.

Fact-Constraining Restrictions

Many evidentiary rules, and related restrictions on adjudicative speech,
can be understood as safeguards against empirically inaccurate applications of
legislative policy. Suppose, for example, that the legislature enacts a statute
establishing a policy that people who knowingly make material misrepresentations in securities transactions should pay damages to those who purchased
or sold securities in reliance on the misrepresentations. Empirically accurate
implementation of that policy requires making sure that, for example, the defendant made false representations and did so knowingly, and that the plaintiff
relied on those representations. If a defendant is found liable for securities
fraud despite, say, not having actually made the representations alleged, the
legislative policy has not been accurately applied.
Evidentiary rules, and other speech restrictions, that serve the function of
promoting the empirically accurate application of general legislative policies
might be described as fact-constraining restrictions: They limit the universe of
facts upon which courts may rely in their decisionmaking to those facts, or types
of facts, that the legislature (or other policymaker) considers sufficiently relevant
to the application of its general policies in specific cases. So, for instance, courts
(including juries) deciding lawsuits for securities fraud might be restricted to
relying on those facts that, in the legislative judgment, are likely to be relevant
to whether the defendant actually committed the acts for which she is being
sued. And if courts may be restricted in the facts upon which they rely in
deciding a case, then the litigants (and their attorneys) may be restricted in the
facts they present in seeking a court decision. That is where evidentiary rules and
the like come in.
Notice that the same justification of speech restrictions doesn't work in the
context of democratic politics. The political branches need not be constrained
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to accurately applying policy, because they can make policy that is legitimately
binding on the community as a whole. That is, they can make policy that is
legitimately binding so long as the community as a whole-including all its
members2}}-has the opportunity to participate in making it. Imposing factconstraining restrictions, or norm-constraining restrictions like I describe below,
on political debate would deprive those members of the community who think
certain facts or norms are relevant and important of the opportunity to participate in policymaking. And, unlike in adjudication, in politics there is no
limiting principle, based in the legitimate purpose of the enterprise, for imposing
such constraints.
In adjudication, many rules of evidence serve an obvious fact-constraining
function. Rules restricting admissible evidence to what is "relevant" are salient
..
examp1es, 234 as are ru1es governmg
wltness competency, 235 h earsay, 2}6 and the
authenticity of documentary and physical evidence.237 Some other restrictions on
adjudicative speech (besides evidentiary rules proper) also fit into this category.
For instance, "gag orders" preventing attorneys or litigants from public discussion
of a pending case,238 and rules of professional conduct to the same effect (as in
Gentile 239 ) , serve to prevent juries from being exposed to (and thus potentially
basing their decisions upon) "facts" that have not been tested for their relevance
to the accurate decision of a pending case, that is, to the accurate judicial
application of legislative policy.
Note in this connection that some restrictions on adjudicative speech
appear to serve the goals of both derivative and direct legitimacy in fairly salient
ways. The conduct rule at issue in Gentile, for example, protects against both a
jury's departure from applying applicable legislative policies to the facts of a
233.
Of course, there will be definitional issues here. See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 226, at 119-31.
E.g., FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
234.
235.
E.g., id. 602,606,702,704.
236.
E.g., id. 801-07.
E.g., id. 901,1002.
237.
238.
Such orders "are increasingly common, and there are lower court cases both invalidating
and upholding [them)," although "[t)he Supreme Court has never addressed the question of when it is
permissible for courts to impose gag orders on attorneys and other trial participants." Q-\EMERINSKY,
supra note 20, § 11.2.3.3, at 931. Chemerinsky notes:
mhe law in this area is in "significant disarray" and ... "[a)ppellate courts tend to reverse such
gag orders when [the speech they prohibit does) not pose serious and imminent threats to the
fairness of the proceedings. When the order is narrowly tailored to eliminate serious and
imminent threats, however, appellate courts are inclined to sustain such orders."
Id. (quoting RODNEY SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 8-67 (1994».
Thus, court-imposed gag orders typically have been subjected to roughly the same test of validity as the
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard adopted by the rule of profeSSional conduct
upheld by the Supreme Court in the Gentile case. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1065-76
(1991); see also supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
239.
See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
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particular case (that is, derivative illegitimacy) and the jury's formation of an
anterior bias against one of the parties (that is, direct illegitimacy). 240
b.

Norm-Constraining Restrictions

Fact-constraining restrictions can be distinguished conceptually from normconstraining restrictions, although the line sometimes will be tricky to draw
in practice and although some restrictions might serve both functions. Normconstraining restrictions are designed to ensure that courts, in "applying" general
legislative policies, do so faithfully-that is, do not in fact apply some other
policy of the court's (including potentially the jury's) own creation. They are
designed, that is, to restrict courts as much as possible to the implementation of
legislatively created norms. In slightly different terms, norm-constraining
restrictions are designed to ensure that courts get "the law" right. HI
So, for example, the legislature that provides liability for securities fraud
might have the purposes of deterring knowing misrepresentations, punishing
them when they occur, and making whole those who are injured by them. It
might then want to prohibit a court (including a jury) from deciding to hold
liable for securities fraud a defendant who did not actually know her representations were false or misleading, or to award damages to a plaintiff who did not
242
actually rely on the defendant's representations. An obvious way to enforce
such a prohibition is to prohibit the litigants from trying to persuade the jury to
decide the case on such inappropriate grounds. Fact-constraining restrictions
serve to prevent the court from mistakenly holding the innocent or harmless
defendant liable for securities fraud; norm-constraining restrictions serve to prevent the court (including the jury) from intentionaUy holding the innocent or
harmless defendant liable for securities fraud.
Norm-constraining restrictions are nearly as common as fact-constraining
restrictions. Rules against the admission of character evidence or evidence of
243
past crimes can be understood as norm-constraining restrictions: They prohibit
the litigants from arguing, say, that the accused murderer should (or should not)
be punished because she is (or is not) a "good person," or because she did (or did
240.
I discuss this latter aspect of the Gentile rule supra Part III.B.
241.
I want to be careful not to give the impression, by the language I use, that all restrictions on
adjudicative speech have been intentionally and consciously "designed" to serve these purposes; I argue
only that these restrictions can be understood to serve, and can be normatively justified as serving, these
functions. I am not contending that when courts and legislative bodies promulgate the restrictions, or when
courts apply them, they always (or even often, or even ever} are self-consciously attempting to serve these
functions. Thus I use the terminology of "design" in the text to indicate function rather than intention.
242.
Juries might be tempted to reward particularly sympathetic plaintiffs, regardless oflegislative
policy, or to punish particularly wealthy or arrogant corporate defendants.
243.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (presumption against admission of evidence of character and other
crimes).
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not do} something bad in the past, rather than because she is (or is not) actually
a murderer. Rules against admitting evidence that a tort defendant carries
144
145
liability insurance or made a settlement offer prevent the plaintiff from
arguing that the defendant should be found liable not because he actually committed a tort, but because he can afford to or offered to pay for the plaintiffs
injuries. Even the requirement of relevance can be understood to serve normconstraining purposes as well as fact-constraining ones: It prevents judges and
juries from relying on irrelevant facts intentionally as well as mistakenly. Rules
excluding evidence that is more "prejudicial" than "probative,,146 are perhaps best
understood as norm-constraining restrictions. And judicial gag orders, and rules
of professional conduct to the same effect, serve the norm-constraining function
of preventing not only the confusion of juries but also the temptation of juries to
decide cases according to policies of their own, or of the litigants' own, devising.
c.

Extrinsic Restrictions

Some restrictions on adjudicative speech, particularly certain evidentiary
rules, do not fit comfortably into either the fact-constraining or the norm-constraining category. Consider, for example, FRE 407, which excludes evidence
of "subsequent remedial measures" offered for the purpose of proving "negligence,
culpable conduct, a defect in a product, ... or a need for a warning or instruction.,,147 Rule 407 does not seem like a fact-constraining rule, because exclusion
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures typically will make a court less
rather than more likely to accurately apply the legislative policy at issue in a case.
(This is another way of saying that the rule excludes obviously relevant
evidence.) If the defendant in, say, a premises liability case took steps to fence
in the huge pit in his yard the day after the plaintiff fell into it, surely that fact
is relevant to whether the pit should have been fenced in the day before-that
is, to whether the defendant was negligent pursuant to the general policy of
negligence the court is supposed to apply.
But Rule 407 does not seem like a proper norm-constraining rule, either: It
does not serve to avoid tempting the jury (or, conceivably, the judge) to
change rather than apply the general legislative policy. The general legislative
148
policy, after all, is to hold negligent parties liable for the injuries they cause.

244.
245.
246.

See, e.g., id. 411.
See, e.g., id. 408.
See, e.g., id. 403.
Id.407.

247.
248.
Of course, as this example suggests, courts often will be applying common law, rather than
legislative, policy. I address below the complications presented by this fact. See infra Part 1II.C.3.a.
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Admitting fairly powerful evidence that a party has acted negligently only
encourages a judge and jury to enforce that policy, not to circumvent or alter it.
I think FRE 407, and similar rules that exclude seemingly probative and
nonprejudicial evidence,z49 are examples of a special type of norm-constraining
rule: one designed to prohibit courts from frustrating legislative policies that are
extrinsic to the primary policy being applied in a case. Thus I call them extrinsic
restrictions on adjudicative speech (although the term is somewhat misleading, as
I explain below). The obvious policy behind FRE 407 is to encourage remediation of unsafe conditions, products, etc., even (or perhaps especially) when those
conditions or products already have caused injury. The obvious policy behind
the attorney-client privilege is to encourage the uninhibited solicitation and
provision of legal advice; and so on. These "extrinsic" policies are so important
that the legislature (or the common law) is willing to pursue them even to the
detriment of the "primary" policies being applied in a given case--even at the
cost of allowing a tortfeasor to avoid liability or a guilty criminal to go free.
Restrictions on adjudicative speech like FRE 407 and the attorney-client
privilege serve the function of ensuring that courts apply the extrinsic policy
rather than the primary policy when the two conflict.
In fact, it is probably better to think of the extrinsic and primary policies
as parts of a holistic policy package rather than as separate and potentially conflicting policies. (This is the sense in which it is misleading to speak of "extrinsic" policies.) The legislative policy in tort cases, taken as a whole, is to hold
negligent parties liable except when doing so would discourage them from taking
reasonable remedial measures; the legislative policy in criminal cases is to punish
guilty parties except when doing so would discourage them from seeking legal
2SO
advice; and so on. Viewed against this understanding, extrinsic restrictions like
FRE 407 are in fact norm-constraining rules designed to prevent courts from

249.
Many or most evidentiary privileges are examples of such rules. The attorney-client
privilege, for instance, excludes obviously probative evidence that is not likely to be "prejudicial" in the
sense of creating factual confusion or nonnative temptation, as does the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Other examples include FRE 412 (which generally excludes evidence of a
victim's past sexual behavior) and, arguably, FRE 409 (which excludes evidence that a defendant paid
or offered to pay a victim's medical expenses). I say "arguably" with respect to FRE 409 because that rule
might also be considered a norm-constraining rule akin to the exclusion of evidence of liability
insurance and settlement offers----one designed to prevent the jury ftom punishing the defendant solely
because of his ability to pay.
250.
There are likely to be multiple "except" clauses applicable in any given case, because there
are likely to be multiple extrinsic restrictions on speech that apply or potentially apply in any case. For
instance, the plaintiff in a ton case is prohibited from presenting evidence of the defendant's subsequent
remedial measures and from presenting evidence of the defendant's privileged communications with her
attorney.

Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment

769

applying only part of the relevant policy-for example, the (primary) liability25I
imposing part but not the (extrinsic) remediation-encouraging part.
3.

Complications

To this point, my argument connecting adjudicative speech restrictions
to derivative legitimacy has focused on the paradigm case in which a court is
assigned the task of applying legislatively created-that is, statutory-policy. It
is easy to see that the argument applies also to cases involving the application
of administrative rules, executive orders, and other nonstatutory products of the
political branches. But cases involving statutes, administrative rules, and the like
do not make up all of adjudication; in fact, historically they have comprised a
minority of court cases. Does my analysis hold also in cases involving common
law-that is, court-created-norms? In cases involving norms that derive not
from ordinary legislation, but from a constitution? I think it does hold in both
types of cases, and I explain why in this subpart.
a.

The Common Law

Restrictions on adjudicative speech, including rules of evidence, apply in
common law cases as well as in statutory cases. Indeed, despite recent codifications,252 most evidentiary rules have evolved over time through decisions made
by the courts themselves.253 So if it is true that most evidentiary rules and other
adjudicative speech restrictions can be justified as means of preserving derivative
legitimacy-the supremacy of policymaking by the political branches-how can
the use of such restrictions be justified in common law cases, in which courts
apply law that has been made not by the legislature, but by other courts?
We can take a step toward answering that question by appreciating the
fairly obvious fact that the common law can be overridden by legislation; it exists
at the sufferance of the legislature. Where it continues to exist, the common law
reflects a de facto legislative policy to leave certain fields of the law unplowed by
2si
legislation. (The policy need not be the product of a considered judgment by
251.
Indeed, there often will be a particular danger that couns, especially juries, will shortchange the
full legislative policy in this way: Plaintiffs in tort cases are likely to emphasize liability-imposition (which,
after all, will get them paid) over remediation-encouragement (which won't), and defendants might prefer
to stay away from the subject of "remediation" altogether.
252.
The FRE, for instance, were not promulgated until 1975. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note
201, at 858 n.l67.
253.
See id. at 858.
254.
Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
Found. Press 1994) (1958) ("[I]n relation to the body of general directive arrangements which govern
private activity in the society [the legislature's] responsibility is ... accurately described as secondary in
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the legislature that certain areas are best left to the common law; it might simply
be an implication of a series of ad hoc legislative judgments that the legislature's
limited resources should be devoted to legislating in other areas.) In making
and developing the common law, then, courts are in a sense applying legislative
policy: They are applying the general policy that specific norms in particular
areas should be adjudicatively developed.
The idea that the common law is a sort of delegated legislation, however,
doesn't provide a completely satisfactory justification for the application of evidentiary rules and other speech restrictions in common law cases. For one
thing, as an historical matter, extensive legislation is a relatively recent development in Anglo-American law. The status of legislation as a source of legal
norms didn't begin to rival that of the common law until the late nineteenth
or early twentieth century,255 but of course rules of evidence and other speech
restrictions had been applied in common law cases from a much earlier date. So,
even if such restrictions might now be justified on the theory that courts are
doing the legislature's work when they decide common law cases, their historical
development can't be explained in that way.
Moreover, even if we can satisfactorily conceptualize common law-making
as a type of delegated legislation, participation theory does not necessarily require
the presence of adjudicative speech restrictions in common law cases. Even if
common law norms exist at the sufferance of the political branches, it wouldn't
be accurate to say that their content has been determined by means of a broad
participatory process. The fact that the legislature has not chosen to replace a
common law rule does not mean that the rule itself has the same democratic
legitimacy that a statute has. The process of generating a statute is more broadly
participatory than the process of creating a common law rule. It would be a bit
strange, then, to equate the function of speech restrictions in statutory cases,
which is to maintain the court's faithfulness to broadly participatory, politically
generated policy, with their function in common law cases, which is to maintain
the court's faithfulness to policy generated by other (narrowly participatory)
courts.
Of course, while court decisions are more narrowly participatory, as a general matter, than political decisions, they also are more narrowly binding. Most
political decisions-statutes serve as the paradigm example here-set out a
general rule that applies in a broad range of specific cases. Common law court
decisions, however, produce only decisions of specific cases and, through stare
decisis, of future materially similar cases; their binding effect, therefore, is not
the sense of second-line. The legislature characteristically functions in this relation as an intennittently
intervening, trouble-shooting, back-sropping agency.").

255.

See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATlITES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF

STAnrrORY INTERPRETAnON 59-63, 88-96 (1999).
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usually as broad as a statute's. Thus the participation that is required in order for
a typical common law decision to be legitimate is the participation of a relatively
narrow segment of the community: the parties to a particular case (who partici~
pate directly) and future similar litigants and conforming nonlitigants (who are
represented by the parties to the precedential case). In this sense, as I suggested
in Parts II.C. and IV.A, it is inaccurate to say that a common law court decision
is "less legitimate," from a democratic perspective, than a statute or other political
decision. Common law decisionmaking is less broadly participatory than politics,
but it also is less broadly binding.
The problem for evidentiary rules and other adjudicative speech restrictions, however, remains. If it is the participation of the litigants we care about
in assessing the legitimacy of common law court decisions, why should the
terms of that participation be circumscribed by things like evidentiary rules?
Here the notion of a policymaking hierarchy doesn't supply the answer: While
courts may be bound to faithfully apply politically generated policy, it is hard to
see why, from the perspective of participatory legitimacy, a court should be bound
to faithfully apply the judicially (or, as I prefer, the adjudicatively) generated policy
from a previous case. The legislature may have the authority to control how its
general policies are applied in specific cases, but what authority does a court have
to control how its decisions are applied by subsequent courts? A court decision is
intended to bind only the parties before the court, not society at large. (If it is
intended to bind society at large, it is illegitimate, because society at large has not
had the opportunity to participate in the process of making it.) So subsequent
courts should be under no duty to follow the decisions of previous courts; the
litigants in subsequent cases should be free to participate in an unfettered process
of creating the decision that will bind them. And if so, the application of evidentiary rules and other speech restrictions in subsequent cases seems unjustifiable.
This line of reasoning shows, I think, that participation theory alone can't
justify speech restrictions in common law cases. What is needed is another rea~
son why courts should be bound, at least to some extent, to faithfully implement
norms generated by earlier courts. In other words, what is needed is a justification for the practice of stare decisis.
This is not the forum in which to provide such a justification at any length.
Elsewhere I have argued against two popular justifications for stare decisis: the
"egalitarian" idea that likes should be treated alike merely because of their likeness,Z56 and Ronald Dworkin's theory that a norm of political consistency called
"integrity" requires adherence to precedent. Z57 By default, the only remaining
256.
See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis,
105 YALEL.J. 2031, 2033-73 (1996) [hereinafter Peters, Foolish Consistency]; Christopher J. Peters, Equality
Revisited, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1210, 1215-56 (1997).
257.
See Peters, Foolish Consistency, supra note 256, at 2073-112.
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reasonable justifications for stare decisis are consequentialist, or strategic, justifications: the ideas, for example, that stare decisis promotes legal predictability and
thus social stability, or that it serves judicial economy, or that it protects justified
reliance interests, or that it fulfills a sort of Burkean function of developing rules
2ss
that can stand the test of time. It isn't necessary here to reject or defend particular explanations for stare decisis, though, because of the salient fact that
stare decisis is, for whatever reasons, a central feature of Anglo-American legal
practice. Our entrenched practice of respecting precedent serves as a reason to
constrain the ability of courts to depart from precedent, just as our practice of
assigning democratic legitimacy to processes of participatory decisionmaking
provides a reason to constrain the ability of courts to depart from politically
259
generated norms.
Thus evidentiary rules, and other restrictions on adjudicative speech, can
be justified in common law cases as means of promoting adjudicative faithfulness to norms generated by earlier courts. As I explained earlier, such restrictions encourage courts to apply common law norms accurately and discourage
courts from creating new common law norms sub silentio.
Now is perhaps a good time to take overdue notice of the elephant standing
in the corner of the room. It is a salient fact that most rules of evidence are
targeted at juries rather than judges; they are designed primarily to constrain the
facts and arguments that can be made to juries, and thus to limit the grounds
260
upon which a jury can base its verdict. This suggests that the primary threat
to the authority of stare decisis-whatever the justifications for that
authority-historically has been thought to come from juries. Perhaps juries
are less likely than judges to respect the need for consistency and more likely to
be moved by the exigencies of particular cases, thus undermining whatever
values are served by adherence to a gradual and relatively predictable development of legal norms. There is an active debate about "jury nullification" that is
relevant to this question, although that debate focuses primarily on criminal
prosecutions {and thus on jury adherence, or lack thereof, to statutory rather
258.
On the distinction between such "consequentialist" justifications for stare decisis and
"deontological" justifications, the latter of which I reject, see id. at 2039-44; for some examples of each, see
id. at 2044-50.
259.
Which is not to say that strategic considerations of efficiency, stability, predictability, and the
like don't also playa role in justifying the courts' subservience to the political branches in our system.
260.
"It is an oft repeated bon mot among lawyers that jurors should be treated like mushrooms-kept in the dark and fed an ample supply of horse manure." Stephan Landsman, Of Mushrooms
and Nullifiers: Rules of Evidence and the American Jury, 21 Sr. LoUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 65, 69 (2002).
Landsman adds that "[ilf the state of affairs described in this witticism has any reality, it is in part
because, in certain circumstances, American evidence law purposely tries to blindfold jurors with respect to
information about the consequences following from certain of the factual decisions they reach." rd.
Landsman's article, by the way, offers a thought-provoking brief analysis of the relationship between the
role of the jury and evidentiaty tules.
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than common law nonns}.261 Generally speaking, rules of evidence and other
speech restrictions appear to make it more difficult for juries to engage in nullification, because they limit juries' exposure to information they can use to create
their own policy. AB such, while it can be argued that juries are sufficiently
"democratic" that they should be entitled to reject court-made norms--perhaps
even legislatively created norms--in particular cases, the continued existence of
evidentiary rules is itself strong evidence that such arguments historically have
not been persuasive.
But to return to the primary point here: Evidentiary rules and other adjudicative speech restrictions can be justified in common law cases as means of
preserving the faithfulness of courts-especially including juries-to nonns
developed over time through the common law process. The fact that our tradition accords significant legitimacy to common law-making is consistent with
the participation theory I have expounded here, because the creation of the
common law is a meaningfully participatory process, but it is not fully explained
by that theory. Whatever the reasons for the practice, however--efficiency,
predictability, stability, Burkean gradualism-it would be frustrated if any given
court, including any given jury, easily could reject or pervert the common law
nonns it is supposed to be applying. AB I have explained, evidentiary rules and
other adjudicative speech restrictions serve to reduce the possibility that this will
happen.
b.

Constitutional Adjudication

Evidentiary rules and other speech restrictions apply in constitutional
cases, too; but if it seems difficult to justify them in common law cases as means
of controlling the application of policy, it seems even more difficult to justify
them that way in constitutional litigation. Courts in constitutional cases do not
apply policy, but rather review policy for consistency with the Constitution.
How, then, can speech restrictions in constitutional cases be justified as means of
preserving accurate and faithful judicial adherence to policy?
This superficial conceptual problem can be solved quite easily by understanding constitutional law as simply another level of policy. While legislation
and the common law are levels of government-created policy typically designed
to constrain private activity, constitutional law is a level of meta-policy designed
to constrain government activity. Restrictions on adjudicative speech in constitutional cases are means of promoting the faithful and accurate judicial implementation of constitutional policy.
261.
See, e.g., landsman, supra note 260; Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the
Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 433 (1998). But see latS Noah, Civil Jury
Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601 (2001) (assessing the question of jury nullification in civil cases).
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There are, of course, many disputed questions about what exactly
constitutes constitutional policy, but we need not engage those questions here.
Disputes about the legitimate sources of constitutional law--original intent,
262
text, precedent, morality, tradition, consensus, and the like _have little if any
relevance to the kinds of restrictions on adjudicative speech that might be
imposed in constitutional cases. Such disputes are almost always played out in
the litigants' legal arguments, not in their proofs. For example, in the recent
case La'Wrence v. Texas,263 in which the Supreme Court ultimately invalidated
Texas's criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy, an amicus brief argued
that the Court should consider rulings of courts in other countries, including a
decision of the European Court of Human Rights, in determining whether the
264
Texas law was consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Whether such sources were relevant to the Court's decision became a point of
contention among the Justices, with Justice Kennedy's majority opinion partly
265
relying on them over Justice Scalia's strong objection. But even if a majority
of the Court had found decisions of foreign courts to be constitutionally irrelevant, there was no possibility that future litigants would somehow be prohibited
from basing their arguments upon such decisions, or from attempting to convince the Court to change its mind about their value. Precisely because the
proper sources of constitutional law are contested, litigants are never constrained in their ability to argue about them.
In other words, disputes about the legitimate sources of constitutional law
are disputes about what constitutional law is; in the parlance of this Article, they
are disputes about the content of policy. There is no legitimate reason to prevent
litigants from engaging in such disputes; indeed, the question of what constitutionallaw is is logically prior to the question of how it should be applied, which
is the central question for courts in constitutional cases. And so litigants in
constitutional cases remain free to argue about such questions, unfettered by
restrictions on their adjudicative speech.
As in other kinds of cases, actual restrictions on adjudicative speech in
constitutional cases almost always go to questions about the facts to which the
law-whatever it may be-must be applied. For example, in another recent
Supreme Court case, Grutter v. Bollinger,266 involving the University of Michigan
Law School's policy of affirmative action in admissions, the FRE applied to the

262.
A helpful survey of the popular alternatives can be found in ELY, sutyra note 57, at 1-72. Ely's
own preferred alternative, "representation-reinforcement," is defended in id. at 73-183.
263.
123 S. Ct. 2472,2484 (2003).
264.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Mary Robinson et al. at 10--13, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472
(U.S. 2(03) (No. 02-102).
265.
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2474, 2483, 2494-95; id. at 2494-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266.
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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trial court's process of factfinding about the nature and effects of the Law School's
policy. The restrictions imposed by the FRE were important in promoting the
accuracy of the Court's ultimate constitutional ruling. But those restrictions
constrained the litigants' arguments about facts-not their arguments about the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause or its proper application to those facts.
This observation about speech restrictions in constitutional adjudication
can be generalized as a deeper and more important point about adjudicative
speech restrictions. Regardless of the type of case, such restrictions as a rule
apply only to arguments about the application of the law, not about the content
of the law. Litigants almost always are permitted to argue about what the law
is; indeed, the infrequent exceptions to this rule are, in my view, illegitimate
267
restrictions on free speech. Actual restrictions on adjudicative speech-rules
of evidence are the paradigmatic example here-almost universally apply only
to arguments about the facts to which the law, whatever it is, will apply, or to
arguments that, like those of the abortion protestors in Za1 v. Steppe ,268
essentially amount to appeals for jury nullification of the law. They apply
to ensure accurate and faithful application of the law by courts and juries-not
to impose some uniform dogma about what the "law" that must be applied
really is.

D.

A Word About Lawyers

Thus far I have elided a fact about adjudication that might be seen as
significant, especially on a participation-based theory. That fact is simply that
litigants typically participate in adjudication indirectly, through the agency of
lawyers. What implications, if any, does this apparent attenuation of a litigant's
participation have for the connection between participation and adjudicative
legitimacy?
The short and probably obvious answer to this question is that law, like
many other disciplines, is a specialized field that usually cannot be navigated
successfully without the help of an expert. So long as the clients themselves call
the important shots, lawyers make their clients' participation more effective than
it otherwise would be. The presence of lawyers thus enhances, not undermines,
the legitimacy of adjudication.
There is a somewhat more nuanced way of understanding the lawyer-client
relationship, however, that relates closely to my themes in this Article, and it
seems worth articulating that understanding briefly here. As I've argued,
267.
In Part IV.A. infra, I make this argument with respect to two extant examples of such
restrictions-those invalidated in the Velazquez case and those embodied in court rules prohibiting
citation of unpublished opinions.
268.
See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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adjudication has direct legitimacy to the extent that it incorporates the full and
meaningful participation of the litigants. That participation, however, takes a
particular fonn, as my description of derivative legitimacy shows. The grounds of
the litigants' participation are defined and cabined by the courts' role as appliers
of general policies created elsewhere. Derivative legitimacy demands that the
litigants participate in a process, not of creating general norms, but of applying
general norms to specific facts.
And that is where lawyers come in. The process of applying general
nonns, or policies, to specific factual circumstances is a highly specialized task
that entails distinctive types of reasoning and of argument; as such, it is a job
that requires special expertise. To put the point as an overused law school cliche, the process of adjudication demands that its participants be able to "think
like lawyers." It is legal reasoning and argument, not just any type of reasoning or
argument, that are required in order for the derivative legitimacy of adjudication
to be preserved. And of course it is lawyers who are experts in legal reasoning
and argument.
As such, for a litigant's participation in the adjudicative process to be fully
effective, the litigant usually must have the help of an expert at applying general norms to specific facts: that is, a lawyer. Generally speaking, then, the
presence of lawyers actually increases the legitimacy of adjudication: It increases
derivative legitimacy by improving the accuracy of a court's application of
general policies to specific facts, and it increases direct legitimacy by giving
litigants access to the special kinds of reasoning and argument that derivative
legitimacy requires.
Understood on these terms, the mediating presence of lawyers shares a
justification with the existence of evidentiary rules: Both are necessary to effectuate and preserve the courts' limited and specialized role as appliers of general
policy.
IV. SOME TOPICAL IMPLICATIONS

My analysis so far suggests that evidentiary rules and other content-based
restrictions on adjudicative speech can be justified on one or both of two
grounds: as means of preserving the direct legitimacy of adjudication by ensuring that the litigants can participate fully and fairly, and as techniques of preserving the derivative legitimacy of adjudication by constraining courts to the
accurate and faithful application of general policy. In this part, I discuss a few
implications of this analysis for some current issues in adjudication and freespeech law.
First, the justification of adjudicative speech restrictions offered here has
a negative corollary: Such restrictions are unjustified if they fail to serve either
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of the legitimacy-promoting purposes described in the previous part. In Part
IV.A., below, I offer some topical illustrations.
Second, some types of speech that have been treated by the courts
as "political" are in fact better understood as examples of adjudicative speech,
which can be subjected to reasonable restrictions in order to promote direct or
derivative legitimacy. An important recent example is the canon of professional ethics struck down---erroneously, I will argue-by the Supreme Court
in Republican Party v. White,Z69 the case that served as the template for my Case 2
in the Introduction. I examine that case in subpart B, along with some contrasting examples of speech that, while it is about adjudication, is in fact true
political speech and thus cannot justifiably be restricted in order to preserve the
legitimacy of court decisions.
A.

Constitutional Limits on Evidentiary Rules

Some recent attempts to restrict adjudicative speech are not, in my view,
justified as protective of either direct or derivative legitimacy. I discuss two
timely examples here: the speech-restrictive conditions imposed by Congress
on attorneys who receive Legal Services Corporation funds, and the flurry of
court rules prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions.

1.

Velazquez Redux

Recall that in Velazquez,Z70 the Supreme Court invalidated certain
congressionally imposed funding restrictions and the rules implementing them,
which effectively prohibited attorneys who received LSC funds from challenging
existing welfare laws on statutory or constitutional grounds. This prohibition was
a sort of content-based evidentiary rule-a restriction on the kinds of proofs and
arguments that could be offered in certain cases. But the understanding of the
adjudicative role I've outlined here actually undermines, not justifies, the
prohibition at issue in Velazquez.
Rather than facilitating the application of policy by the courts, the prohibition in Velazquez frustrated the application of policy by excluding proofs and
arguments that were clearly relevant to that task. A court cannot accurately
determine whether welfare laws are being administered consistently with legislative policy if the litigants (or at least the only litigant inclined to do so) cannot
offer proofs and arguments relevant to that question. Nor can a court accurately
determine whether welfare laws or their administration are consistent with
constitutional policy if the litigants can't make arguments on that issue. The
269.
270.

536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); see supra Part 1.0.3.
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LSC funding restriction prevented the litigants not from making unfaithful or
erroneous arguments about how to apply the law, but from arguing about what
the law is in the first place; as such, it actually impeded the derivative legitimacy
of the cases it affected.
The restriction also impeded direct legitimacy in a fairly obvious way: It
tipped the balance of welfare litigation rather severely in favor of the government. The government's lawyers were free to argue, without penalty, that the
government's conduct was consistent with applicable statutory and constitutionallaw; but lawyers challenging the government's conduct were not free to
argue that it was inconsistent with the law. In this way the restrictions were
not only content based, but viewpoint based; they handicapped the participation
of one class of litigants, namely those who sought to challenge the legality of
government policy.
Thus the Court in Velazquez got it precisely right when it struck down the
restrictions as inconsistent with the judicial role. "Interpretation of the law and
the Constitution"-that is, in the idiom I've been using, application of general
legislative or constitutional policy to specific facts-"is the primary mission of
the judiciary when it acts within the sphere of its authority to resolve a case or
controversy.,,271 And, "[b]y seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues
and to truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review [in
Velazquez] prohibided] speech and expression upon which courts must depend for
the proper exercise of the judicial power."m The speech restrictions in Velazquez
worked to obstruct "the judicial power," not to preserve it.
Perhaps, though, we can justify the restrictions at issue in Velazquez by
understanding them as examples of what I call extrinsic restrictions--restrictions
designed to enforce policies independent from the policies that give rise to particular court cases. It may be that Congress's policy of providing welfare benefits
to those who deserve them-the policy LSC-funded attorneys are seeking to
vindicate when they bring benefits cases-is qualified by Congress's extrinsic
policy of preserving the structure of the existing welfare system. The speech
restrictions in Velazquez could then be justified as Congress's mechanism for
ensuring that courts apply the extrinsic rather than the primary policy when
the two conflict (or, if we prefer, for ensuring that courts apply the entire policy,
including the caveat about preserving the existing welfare system).
There are two reasons why we can't excuse the restrictions in Velazquez this
way. First, "[a]s interpreted by the LSC and by the Government, the restriction[s] prevended] an attorney from arguing to a court that a state [welfare] statute

271.
272.

Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545.
ld.
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conflicts with a federal [welfare] statute."m Even if it is Congress's policy that its
welfare statutes should not be enforced against conflicting state statutes, it may
not be any particular state's policy that its welfare statutes be enforced against
conflicting federal statutes. By preventing LSC attorneys from arguing that state
statutes conflict with federal ones, Congress was attempting to dictate state
policy-something Congress does not have authority to do274-rather than
simply to enforce its own policy.
Second, and more saliently, "the restriction[s] prevent[ed] an attorney from
arguing to a court ... that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its
application is violative of the United States Constitution."m Obviously
Congress cannot simply dictate constitutional policy; it cannot prevent a court
from applying constitutional policy to override inconsistent legislative policy.
So the speech restrictions in Velazquez cannot really be understood as extrinsic
restrictions along the lines of, say, the attorney-client privilege.
The Court in Velazquez was right, therefore, to strike down the restrictions
as attempts to obstruct, rather than preserve, the proper policy-applying function
of the judiciary. The interesting thing is the particular basis on which the Court
struck the restrictions down. The Court's own language suggests that the case
could have been decided pursuant to the Article III grant of "the judicial
power,,,Z76 which the Court in Velazquez essentially interpreted, following
Marbury v. Madison,177 to be the power of policy application ("interpretation of
the law") and to imply unfettered access to the information necessary to fully
exercise that power. (Understood this way, the Article III "judicial power"
includes a guarantee of derivative legitimacy-the "integrity" component of the
judicial process, by the Gentile formulation.) We might think the case also
could have been decided pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment,Z78 on the theory that the opportunity to fully present proofs and
arguments that are relevant to the application of policy is part of the "process"
that traditionally is "due" in a court of law. (The Due Process Clause thus protects direct legitimacy-the "fairness" component of Gentile.) But the case was

273.

274.

rd. at537 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.

144 (1992).

275.
276.
277.
(1803)).

Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537.
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1,2.
See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545 (citing Marbury v. Madison,S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177

278.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Presumably the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not
its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart, would apply in Velazquez, despite the fact that the restrictions at
issue there apparently applied in both federal and state courts, because their source was Congress rather
than the states.
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hought, litigated, and decided as a free speech case-a fact that seems fairly
significant.
Conceptualizing Velazquez as a free speech case rather than an Article III
or due process case emphasizes-and bespeaks an implicit recognition by the
Court of-the importance of participation to judicial legitimacy and the parallels
between adjudicative and political participation. Deciding the case on Article
III grounds would have implied a focus on the injury done by Congress to the
judicial branch as an institution-on the attempt to undermine "the judicial
power," which sounds like a garden-variety separation-of-powers problem. (As
it was, much of the Court's language adopted this tone.) Deciding the case on
due process grounds would have shifted the focus somewhat to the participation
279
of the litigants themselves, but the due process concern with tradition still
would have anchored the result in ideas about the judiciary's institutional role.
Deciding the case on free speech grounds, however, swung the spotlight squarely
around to focus on the litigants themselves and the importance of their
participation in the decisionmaking process. As a result, it is possible to understand the decision as being grounded not simply in the Court's self-protective
vision of the judicial role, but also, maybe even primarily, in an acknowledgement that participation is as important to legitimacy in the adjudicative as in the
political context. It is possible, that is, to read the decision as being primarily
about direct rather than derivative legitimacy, and as endorsing the notion that
direct legitimacy is intimately connected to meaningful litigant participation.
The Velazquez decision thus contributes to a fuller understanding of adjudicative legitimacy and, ultimately, to a fuller understanding of the Free Speech
Clause. It suggests that, while restrictions on adjudicative speech are justifiable
so long as they contain courts within their legitimate policy-applying role, they
are unjustifiable when they frustrate the ability of the litigants to meaningfully
participate in deciding what it means to properly apply policy. I expand on this
embryonic idea in Part IV.B. below.
2.

No-Citation Rules

Another example of what I believe are unjustifiable content-based restrictions on adjudicative speech is the recent phenomenon-now, hopefully, in
2so
decline-of court rules that prohibit citation of unpublished opinions.
279.
See, e.g., Int'I Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (relying in part on "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" to uphold the state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state corporation).
280.
Recent developments suggest that the tide has turned against no-citation rules. See Stephen R.
Barnen, From Anastasoff w Hart w West's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4
J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 1, 1-6 (2002) (surveying judicial opinions, bar association positions, rule
changes, and other developments to this effect). "Of the thirteen [federal) circuits, there remain only
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"Approximately 80% of the caseload of the federal appellate courts is resolved
by means of 'unpublished' opinions,,,281 meaning that "the court has designated
the opinion for exclusion from the bound volumes of the Federal Reporter, the
official reporter for the federal courts of appeals.,,282 Typically "no-citation rules
take the form of an outright prohibition on reference to unpublished opinions in
briefs and arguments,,,283 although sometimes they assume the more hortatory
284
form of "disfavoring" or otherwise discouraging citation.
No-citation rules, at least in their mandatory form, pretty clearly are
285
content-based restrictions on adjudicative speech: They prohibit lawyers and
litigants from making certain kinds of arguments, namely those based upon
286
unpublished opinions.
But no-citation rules probably cannot be justified as
attempts to preserve either derivative or direct legitimacy.
With respect to derivative legitimacy, no-citation rules seem to be neither
fact-constraining, norm-constraining, nor extrinsic restrictions on speech in the
senses in which I have defined those concepts. Judicial opinions, published or
not, are neither facts to which existing policy must be (or must not be) applied
nor norms that might be used, illegitimately, to change existing policy; they are
rather evidence of existing policy, means of determining what existing policy is.
five--the First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal-that ban citation of unpublished opinions .... "
Id. at 45 (citations omitted). The ABA House of Delegates has come out against no-citation rules, and one
federal judge has held them unconstitutional in the federal coutts as exceeding the Article III "judicial
power." See ill. at 1-2; Anastasoff v. United States, 223 FJd 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 FJd
1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Still, the use of no-citation rules remains prevalent in both federal and
state coutts. See David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Jtulidary, 35 u.c.
DAVIS L. REv. 1133, 1135 (2002) (surveying the use of no-citation rules in the federal circuits); Melissa
M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Note, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of
Opinions, 3 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 251 (2001) (surveying rules on the publication and citation of
opinions in all federal circuits and state appellate coutts).
281.
Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 280, at 1137.
282.
Id. But legal publishers, like nature, abhor a vacuum: "[T)he West Group in September
2001 launched its Federal Appendix[,l ... a new case-reporter series in West's National Reporter System
that consists entirely of 'unpublished' opinions from the federal circuit coutts of appeals (except, currently,
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits}." Barnett, supra note 280, at 2 (citation omitted).
283.
Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 280, at 1139.
284.
See ill. at 1140.
285.
Greenwald and Schwarz suggest that they can be analyzed either as content-neutral or as
content-based restrictions, but they don't explain the former possibility-indeed, they "think the better
view is" that no-citation rules are content-based--and frankly I can't think of a reasonable argument that
they are content-neutral. See ill. at 1162--64.
286.
And the dodge that those arguments can be made (or those opiniOns cited) outside the
courtroom will not do, for reasons we've rehearsed already. The whole point of citing unpublished cases is
to affect the resulting judicial decision; citing them outside the courtroom obviously defeats this purpose.
The obviousness of this conclusion did not srop one reputable federal judge from making the "alternative
forum" argument, however. See ill. at 1165 n.l27 (citing remarks by Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit: "You can publish an unpublished decision in the San Francisco Examiner. You can put it online
on a web page. You can tattoo it to your chest. You can write articles about it. You can't do it in a
brief .... But that is not a First Amendment issue.").
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An on-point judicial opinion applying a principle of the common law to a particular set of facts is evidence, in a later case, of how that common law principle
should be applied to a similar set of facts; it is evidence of what that principle
287
means when applied to those facts. The same is true of an on-point opinion
applying a constitutional or statutory policy. To deny litigants the ability to
build their arguments upon this evidence is to deny them the ability to fully
participate in deciding what the applicable principle is and how it should be
applied in their case. It has nothing to do with preventing courts from
erroneously misapplying policy or from intentionally changing policy.
No-citation rules, then, seem to present the same free speech problems
that the restrictions struck down in the Velazquez decision presented: The rules
deny litigants the ability to participate fully in the process of making a decision
that will bind them, and they do so without finding justification in the limits of
. d'lCia
. 1ro1e. 288
t he JU
Admittedly there is an argument-somewhat tenuous, in my view-that
such rules serve direct legitimacy by denying an advantage to litigants with
significantly greater resources than their opponents. The idea would be that
litigants who can afford to hire expensive lawyers, use electronic databases,
send messengers to courthouses, and the like would have better access to
unpublished opinions than their poorer counterparts, justifying a ban on citing
289
those opinions as a field-leveling mechanism. There is something to this point,
287.
I use the word "principle" here with caution, not wanting to beg questions about the difference,
asserted by Dworkin, between "principles" and "policies." See DWORKIN, supra note 141, at 82--84.
288.
What is apparently the only court decision to have invalidated no-citation rules on
constitutional grounds was based on Article III, not the First Amendment. See Anastasoff v. United
States, 223 FJd 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 FJd 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane). (Of
course, Article III is the other side of the First Amendment coin where adjudicative speech is concerned;
the two provisions protect judicial legitimacy from different angles. See supra notes 276-279 and
accompanying text.) In 1976, the Supreme O:lUrt rejected, without comment, a petition brought by a
litigant seeking a writ of mandamus against the Seventh Circuit's striking a reference to an unpublished
opinion in the litigant's brief. See Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States O:lUrt of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976). More recently the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a challenge to its
no-citation rule on standing grounds. See Schmier v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2001), afj'd, 279 FJd 817 (9th Cir. 2002). A number of commentators, though, have argued that no-citation rules are invalid under the First Amendment. See
Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 280, at 1161--&5; Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the
Common in the Law: A Proposal far the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished Decisions in
Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 155, 215-17 (1992); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V.
Chachkes, Constitutionality of"No-Citation" Rules, 3 j. App. PRAc. & PROCESS 287,297-300 (2001).
289.
Lauren Robel has argued that unpublished opinions disproportionately advantage frequent
litigants, such as government entities. See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished
Opinions and Government Utigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REv. 940, 959--62
(1989). She concludes not that no-citation rules are appropriate, however, but that the practice of issuing
unpublished opinions itself is suspect. See id.; Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff,
Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REv. 399, 404-09,
414-17 (2002).
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but not enough, I think, to outweigh the harm that no-citation rules do to
derivative legitimacy. The potential disadvantage to less-wealthy litigants posed
by unpublished opinions seems quite marginal-a drop in the bucket-in the
context of the much larger structural handicaps that such litigants face. Poorer
litigants often cannot afford to hire skilled attorneys (or, sometimes, any
attorneys) in the first place; they may not be able to conduct extensive discovery,
hire jury consultants, commission visually compelling trial exhibits, pay reputable
expert witnesses, or afford other valuable litigation tools. Prohibiting citation of
unpublished opinions seems unlikely to equalize the balance in any appreciable
way---especially now that most "unpublished" opinions have become widely
290
available, and easily accessible, in electronic and print form.
And of course
no-citation rules apply to both wealthy and poor litigants, regardless of which
litigant's case would be helped by the unpublished opinion she cannot cite.
There is no reason I can think of to suppose that this disadvantage will not harm
poor litigants as often as wealthy ones.
No-citation rules, then, clearly undermine the derivative legitimacy of court
decisions, and on balance there seems no reason to believe that they improve
their direct legitimacy. At the very least, such rules should be viewed with
considerable suspicion as restrictions on litigants' free speech rights.
B.

White and Political Versus Adjudicative Speech

In its 2002 decision in Republican Party v. White, the Supreme Court invalidated a canon of Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct that forbade a "candidate
for a judicial office" to "announce his or her views on disputed legal or political
issues.,,29I The Court treated the Minnesota canon as a paradigm example of a
restriction on political speech,292 subjecting it to strict scrutiny on the ground that
it "both prohibided] speech on the basis of its content and burden[edl a category
of speech that is 'at the core of our First Amendment freedoms'-speech about
the qualifications of candidates for public office.,,293 Not surprisingly, the Court
held that the canon did not survive strict scrutiny.294
Minnesota attempted to justify the canon at issue in White as a means of
"preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance
290.
See Barnett, supra note 280, at 1-7.
291.
536 U.S. at 765, 770 (2002) (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUer Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002». The operative provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct was made applicable ro
nonincumbent lawyers running for judicial office by Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(b)
(2002).
292.
See also White, 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The political speech of candidates is
at the heart of the First Amendment .... ").
293.
Id. at 774 (quoting Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 2001).
294.
Id. at 774-88.
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of the impartiality of the state judiciary."z95 The various opinions in the case thus
sparred about the meaning of judicial "impartiality" and whether preserving it,
whatever it might mean, qualified as a compelling state interest that the canon
was narrowly tailored to serve.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia distinguished three different senses
of judicial "impartiality" that the canon might be intended to promote. First,
Justice Scalia noted, "impartiality" might mean "the lack of bias for or against
either party to the proceeding."z96 But Justice Scalia rejected the notion that the
Minnesota canon was narrowly tailored to preserve this sense of impartiality
because it was directed not at "speech for or against particular parties, but rather
:·
.
Iar'ISSueS. "Z97
speech I
[or or
agamst parttcu
Justice Scalia also noted a second possible meaning of "impartiality" in
judging: "lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal vieW."Z98
"Impartiality" in this sense, Justice Scalia wrote, "would be concerned, not with
guaranteeing litigants equal application of the law, but rather with guaranteeing
them an equal chance to persuade the court on the legal points in their case."Z99
But Minnesota could not have a compelling interest· in preserving this kind of
impartiality, Justice Scalia concluded, because
[a] judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case
has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with
good reason. For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who
does not have preconceptions about the law.... Indeed, even if it were
possible to select judges who did not have preconceived views on legal
issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so. "Proof that a Justice's mind at
the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of

295.
296.

rd. at 775.
rd. at 775. The idea of a "patty to the proceeding" here is a bit slippery: A judge might be
biased with respect to particular litigants in particular cases (for example, she might favor Smith in Smith
v. Janes because she is Smith's business partner), or she might be biased with respect to certain categories
of litigants across multiple cases (for example, she might tend to favor employers over employees in
workplace disputes). Justice Scalia didn't distinguish between the two types of bias.
297.
rd. at 776. The problem with Justice Scalia's distinction is that speech about issues can have
implications for decisiOns about parties. A judicial candidate who complains during her campaign about
the shoddy way in which Minnesota's courts have treated employers is likely, if she remains true to her
campaign rhetoric, to hold something like a bias in favor of particular parries who happen to be employers
when they appear before her as a judge. Justice Stevens made this point in his White dissent:
Even when "impartialiry" is defined in its narrowest sense to embrace only "the lack of bias for or
against either party to the proceeding" ... the announce clause serves that interest. Expressions
that stress a candidate's unbroken record of affirming convictions for rape, for example, imply a
bias in favor of a particular litigant (the prosecutor) and against a class of litigants (defendants in
rape cases).
Id. at 8CJO-.Dl (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted).
298.
Id. at 777.

299.

Id.
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constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not
lack of bias. ,,300

Finally, Justice Scalia described a third, even broader potential meaning of
judicial "impartiality"-"open-mindedness":
This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on
legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose his
preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a
pending case. This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each litigant, not
an equal chance to win the legal points in the case, but at least some
.
30l
Chance a fd omg so.

Justice Scalia and the majority rejected this premise for the Minnesota canon,
not because it was insufficiently compelling, but because they did "not believe
the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose.,,302
The short of the matter is this: In Minnesota, a candidate for judicial office
may not say "I think it is constitutional for the legislature to prohibit samesex marriages." He may say the very same thing, however, up until the
very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly
(until litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing
the objective of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the
announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that
3D3
purpose a challenge to the credulous.

As I suggest in some of the foregoing footnotes, and as the dissents in
White do a pretty good job of showing, the details of Justice Scalia's application
of strict scrutiny to the Minnesota canon are vulnerable, to say the least. But
my criticism of White goes deeper than that: I think the Court in White was
mistaken to treat the Minnesota canon as a restriction on poUtical speech (and

300.
Id. at 777-78 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (mem.». Putting aside
the fact that Justice Scalia's conception of what is "desirable" in the selection of judges, and thus what
can serve as a "compelling" state interest, seems little more than a product of his personal views, Justice
Scalia simply identified the wrong interest here. The interest served by the Minnesota canon was not
the selection of judges who have no "preconceptions about the law," but rather the selection of judges
who do not make JYrecommitments about the law-who do not effectively announce ahead of time how
they will decide cases. Justice Scalia did address something like this interest in describing a third
possible conception of "impartiality." See infra notes 301-303 and accompanying text.
301.
White, 536 U.S. at 778.
302.
303.

Id.
Id. at 779--80. Of course, as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, a judge's statement of a

particular legal or political belief takes on a special character when made in the context of a judicial
election: It becomes "a reason to vote for" the candidate and is offered precisely as such a reason. Id. at 800
(Stevens, J., dissenting). A judicial candidate who advertises her views about law or policy is making a
campaign promise, not a contribution to academic debate. She is saying, in effect, "Vote for me because I
believe X, and I will judge cases accordingly." Id.
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thus, arguably, to subject it to strict scrutinl ) in the first place. The canon, I
believe, is better understood as a restriction on adjudicative speech, and is justifiable as such on one or both of two complementary arguments.
1.

The Canon as a Safeguard of Derivative Legitimacy

First, the Minnesota canon might be justified as a son of norm-constraining
restriction designed to promote faithful application of policy by judges. In Pan
Ill, I defined norm-constraining restrictions on adjudicative speech as restrictions
designed to limit courts to applying general policy made by the legislature (or the
Constitution, the common law, or an administrative agency) rather than policy
30s
of the courts' own creation. Minnesota's goal of preserving judicial "impaniality" can be understood in this sense: as a goal of preventing a judge's own "preconceptions on legal [or political] issues"-her own ideas of good policy-from
tainting her decisionmaking process. In other words, it can be understood as a
means of promoting derivative legitimacy in adjudication.
Suppose, for instance, that a judge is faced with a case affecting the interests
of employers in the state. The Minnesota canon might prevent the judge from
deciding the case not in accordance with legislative policy ("the law"), but
with the pro-employer statements she made during her last campaign. By
preventing the judge from making those pro-employer statements in the first
place, Minnesota is removing a temptation for the judge to act according to her
own (announced) conceptions of good policy rather than those of the legislature.
Thus the Minnesota canon operates analogously to judicial gag orders and rules
of professional conduct prohibiting litigants or attorneys from speaking publicly
about a pending case: The point is to avoid tempting the decisionmaker (here
the judge, elsewhere the jury) to rely on policy norms that have not been
sanctioned by the appropriate political process.
If this way of understanding the Minnesota canon is correct, then the Coun
was wrong to treat that canon as a restriction on political speech merely because
it regulated speech in something that looks like "politics.,,306 Threats, "fighting
words," or obsceniry would not deserve protection as political speech merely by
304.
I don't want ro take the position that restrictions on adjudicative speech (for example,
evidentiary rules) should not be subjected to strict scrutiny as a doctrinal matter; I'm not sure how I would
come out on that question. My position is simply that restrictions on adjudicative speech, properly
understood, are generally justifiable as a theoretical matter. Doctrinally, that conclusion might result from
application of a lower standard than strict scrutiny; or it might result because appropriate restrictions on
adjudicative speech will survive strict scrutiny.
305.
See supra Pan III.C.Z.b.
306.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, in their respective dissents in White, would have distinguished
between judicial elections and other kinds of elections for free speech purposes-in effect recognizing that
the Minnesota canon did not regulate true political speech. See 536 U.S. at 80Z (Stevens, J., dissenting); iii.
at 805-07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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virtue of having occurred during a political campaign--or even by virtue of
having been intended to influence people's votes. (My threat to break both
your legs if you don't vote for me is not political speech.) Those kinds of
speech can legitimately be regulated, even in a political context, to avoid the
(nonpolitical) harms they might cause. And the same should go for adjudicative
307
speech that happens to occur in the political arena. If the speech poses a real
threat to the impartiality-that is, the policy-applying function--of the
judiciary, then the state ought to be able to regulate it in the interest of avoiding
that threat.
We need to be careful here to distinguish adjudicative speech that has no
real political function from "adjudicative" speech that has. A judicial candidate's
statements of policy on the campaign trail do have a sort of "political" function,
in that they are designed to cause, and might succeed in causing, people to vote
for the candidate. But this is not the kind of political function I mean. Politics
ultimately is about the making of policy, and a judicial candidate's speech about
"disputed legal or political issues" is not intended to influence the making of
policy. It is intended to influence the applying of policy-the deciding, by the
judicial candidate if she is elected, of particular court cases. The judicial candidate who criticizes anti-employer court decisions is not calling for the legislature
to enact pro-employer legislation; she is hinting that, if she is elected judge, she
will decide cases in a pro-employer way. This is the sense in which her speech
is adjudicative speech and, I believe, may be regulated as such. It is not really
political speech (although the exact same speech would be political if the candidate were running for the state legislature).308
By the same token, there is some speech that looks "adjudicative" at first
blush but in fact turns out to be political-to be about (or at least partly about)
the making, not the applying, of policy. Consider the speech involved in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart309 (which I used as the template for Case 3
in the Introduction). The defendant in Stuart was on trial for a grisly multiple
murder; the Nebraska trial judge entered a "restrictive order" forbidding the press

Cf. Schauer, supra note 14, at 693-94. Schauer asserts:
[f]here is ... a serious question about ... why an argument that would be thought frivolous
quickly becomes a serious First Amendment claim just because the physical locus of the speech
is outside of the courthouse walls, given that the substance of the restriction and the motivations
behind it are virtually identical.

307.

Id.

308.
And speech by a judicial candidate that is intended to influence legislative policymaking-a
candidate's call for the legislature to enact more employer-friendly statutes, for instance-would be political
speech and probably should be protected as such. But arguably the state should be able to proscribe even
that kind of speech in the context of judicial campaigns, on the theory that it might serve as a veiled
promise to decide cases in a certain (for example, pro-employer) way.
309.

427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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310
from reporting certain facts about the case. On certiorari, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that failing to restrain the press might threaten the fairness of the
311
tria1. But still the Court unanimously overturned the restrictive order, reasoning that the cost of restraining speech about the judicial process outweighed, at
least in that case, the danger that the speech would taint that process:
The damage [caused by restraining speech] can be particularly great
when the prior restraint falls upon the communication of news and
commentary on current events. Truthful reports of public judicial proceedings have been afforded special protection against subsequent punishment. For the same reasons the protection against prior restraint should
have particular force as applied to reporting of criminal proceedings,
whether the crime in question is a single isolated act or a pattern of
criminal conduct.
"A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over
several centuries. The press does not simply publish infonnation about
trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny
and criticism.',J12

What the Court is saying here is, in essence, that the speech in Stuan must
be protected as political speech. It is true that media reporting of facts about a
high-profile court case has the potential to influence the case's outcome; and it
may even be true that media reporting (and other speech) about pending cases
313
sometimes is intended to influence the outcome. But speech like that in Stuan
also has the arguable intent, and the potential effect, of influencing public policy,
and it is on that basis that it is entitled to protection. The Court in Stuan
recognized this when it characterized the press "as the handmaiden of effective
judicial administration, ... guard[ing] against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism.,,314 The speech in Stuan was protected, despite its potential
to influence the decision of a particular court case, because of its potential to
influence the administration of justice more generally. How justice should be
administered generally is, ultimately, a question of policy for the political
branches; speech about that question, then, is protected political speech.

310.
See id. at 543--44. The Nebraska Supreme Court subsequently narrowed the order somewhat.
See id. at 545.
311.
See id. at 562-63.
312.
Id. at 559--60 (citations omiued) (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
313.
See, for example, the speech in Bridges v. Califamia, discussed infra notes 315-321.
314.
Stuart, 427 U.s. at 559--60 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
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The speech protected by the Court's decision in another case, Bridges v.
Caliiornia,315 also should be understood as political speech, despite the
adjudicative context in which it occurred. In Bridges, two separate California
state trial judges issued contempt citations against nonlitigants for extrajudicial speech about pending cases. In one instance the Los Angeles Times
published editorials proclaiming, among other things, that a trial judge would
"make a serious mistake" if he granted probation to two convicted criminal
defendants;1'6 in the other instance a union official sent a telegram to the
u.s. Secretary of Labor stating that enforcement of a judge's ruling against
the union "would tie up the port of Los Angeles and ... involve the entire
Pacific Coast."m
In an opinion by Justice Black, the Supreme Court overturned both contempt convictions as violative of the First Amendment. Although California
had an interest in avoiding the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice,,,lIB
that interest was outweighed by "how much, as a practical matter, [the contempt
convictions] would affect liberty of expression,,:J'9
It must be recognized that public interest is much more likely to be kindled
by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization, however
penetrating, of the historian or scientist. Since they punish utterances
made during the pendency of a case, the judgments below therefore
produce their restrictive results at the precise time when public interest
in the matters discussed would naturally be at its height. Moreover, the
ban is likely to fall not only at a crucial time but upon the most important
topics of discussion. Here, for example, labor controversies were the
topics of some of the publications. Experience shows that the more acute
labor controversies are, the more likely it is that in some aspect they will
get into court. It is therefore the controversies that command most
interest that the decisions below would remove from the arena of public
J20
discussion.

The speech in question was protected because of its capacity to generate "public
interest" in the "important topic[]" of "labor controversies." It was protected,
that is, because of its capacity to influence public policy with respect to labor
disputes, despite its concurrent potential (which the Court discounted in any
event)l2l to affect the results of pending court cases.
315.
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
316.
Id. at 271-72 (quoting Probation for Garillas?, L.A. TIMES, May 5,1938, at II4).
317.
Id.at275-76.
Id. at 271.
318.
319.
Id.at268.
320.
Id. at 268-69.
321.
See id. at 271-78 (concluding that the speech was not sufficiently likely to affect the fairness of
the pending court proceedings to justify punishment).
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Stuart and Bridges on one side, and Gentile on the other,322 can be seen as
recognizing a line, albeit a fuzzy one, between speech that is predominantly
political, with the intent and likely effect of influencing public policy, and
speech that is predominantly adjudicative, with the intent and likely effect of
influencing a court decision. The former kind of speech is subject to special
protection; the latter is not. And the decisions show that the nature of the
speech, adjudicative or political, does not depend entirely or even primarily on
where or when the speech occurs: Speech may be political even though it refers
to a pending court case (Stuart and Bridges)323-indeed, even if it takes place in
324
a courtroom -and speech may be adjudicative even though it occurs outside
the courthouse (Gentile). I would add that speech may be adjudicative even
though it occurs during an election campaign, and that White was wrongly
decided because the Court failed to recognize that fact.
2.

The Canon as a Safeguard of Direct Legitimacy

The second way to justify the Minnesota canon at issue in White, which
goes hand-in-hand with the first way, is to understand the canon as protective
rather than restrictive of speech-at least of the kind of speech that matters.
The canon, to be specific, can be justified as necessary to protect the adjudicative
speech of litigants in court cases, and thus to promote the direct legitimacy of
court decisions.
Court decisions, I have argued, are legitimately binding on litigants
because, and to the extent that, the litigants have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in making them. If a judge has pre-judged a case, however,
the litigants are denied this opportunity; they cannot contribute to a decision
that has already been made.325 Put another way, the litigants' presentation of

322.

See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991); supra notes 105-115 and accompanying

text.

323.

See Schauer, supra note 14, at 697-98 (citation omitted). Schauer writes:
[I)f one of the important purposes of the First Amendment is to ensure that government, its
officials, and its processes are subject to public criticism, then it would be wrong to give those
governmental officials who happen to wear black robes an immuniry from this otherwise
prevalent and vitally important principle.

Id.
One of the Court's most famous speech-protective decisions involved political speech that
324.
occurred in a courthouse. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning the conviction, for
disturbing the peace, of a Vietnam war protestor who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in
the Los Angeles Counry Courthouse).
325.
I discuss this particular point at greater length in Peters, Persuasion, supra note 24, at 25-26, and
in Peters, Participation, supra note 24, at 192-93.
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proofs and reasoned arguments-their adjudicative speech-is made worthless
326
by a judge's precommitment, or "partiality," with respect to a case.
The Minnesota canon can be seen, then, as a means to protect the efficacy
of litigants' speech, to safeguard litigants' right of participation in making
decisions that will bind them. It is a mechanism for ensuring that every
Minnesota judge will be "willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case."m
By limiting the adjudicative speech of judges, the canon effectuates, makes
meaningful, the adjudicative speech of litigants.
This is in fact precisely the argument at the center of Justice Ginsburg's
dissent in White---except that Justice Ginsburg characterized it as an argument
J28
As
about the litigants' rights of due process, not their rights of free speech.
we saw in analyzing the Velazquez decision, however, due process and free
speech-and indeed the Article III grant of "the judicial power"---effectively
329
Litigants have the free
merge in the context of adjudicative participation.
speech right to participate in creating the court decisions that will bind them.
But the scope of that speech may be limited by the boundaries of the judicial
power, which extend only to the application, and not to the creation, of policy,
and by the requirements of due process, which prohibit giving one litigant an
unfair participatory advantage over another. Each of these concepts-free
speech, due process oflaw, and the judicial power---emphasizes a different aspect
of the nature of participation in adjudication. And the value of participation
necessitates both freedom of speech and constraints on that freedom.
CONCLUSION: FREE SPEECH AT BOTH ENDS

Adjudication is one of those contexts, not tremendously uncommon, in
which the Free Speech Clause seems not to operate, or to operate with much
less than full force. Commercial advertising, employment, and labor relations
are a few other environments in which the First Amendment dog rarely barks
or, when it does, barks much more loudly than it bites. Adjudication,
though, is qualitatively different from these examples: It is a government
decisionmaking process with the capacity legally to coerce people, backed by
326.
In this sense, a judge's ideological precommitment to a particular result is akin to her
acceptance of a bribe to reach a particular result: Both render meaningless the litigants' efforts to influence
the result. See Peters, PersuasimJ, supra note 24, at 25; Peters, Participation, supra note 24, at 192.
327.
Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002).
328.
See id. at 803, 813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
242 (1980)) ("This judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the litigant's right, protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to 'an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both
civil and criminal cases .... m).
329.
See supra Part IV At.
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the force of the state. We thus need some special justification for our willingness
to squelch the free speech of participants in adjudication.
The justification I've offered here turns on the need to preserve the political
legitimacy of the adjudicative process. Freedom of speech is a component of
political legitimacy; it is a necessary means of self-governance, of citizen participation in government decisions. In adjudication, though, strong freedom
of speech would threaten legitimacy, in two senses. First, it would threaten the
direct legitimacy of the process, which relies on the opportunity for full and fair
participation, by opening the door to prejudgment of a case or to bias in favor
of one of the litigants. And second, it would threaten the derivative legitimacy
of the process, which relies on the accurate and faithful judicial application of
general policy, by inviting judges and, particularly, juries to incorrectly apply
policy or to reject applicable policy altogether.
Using adjudication as a laboratory, we thus can see that concerns for political legitimacy operate at both ends, so to speak, of free speech theory. Such
concerns animate freedom of speech in the first place, mandating it as a vital
element of citizen {or litigant} participation in government. But legitimacy
concerns also justify limitations on freedom of speech where unfettered speech
would serve to undermine participation or to invert the legitimate policymaking
hierarchy.
Let me conclude by suggesting, rather tentatively, a further implication that
flows from this understanding. I believe that the Janus-faced nature of free
speech, revealed in the adjudicative context, obtains in the pure political context
as well. Our willingness to restrict the freedom of adjudicative speech in the
name of legitimacy implies that even political speech may be restricted where
necessary to preserve the very legitimacy that free political speech is designed to
promote.
The justification for free political speech that I described in Part I holds
that free speech generally is necessary to allow for meaningful citizen participation in policymaking. But we've seen, in the context of adjudication, how
complete freedom of speech sometimes can frustrate participatory legitimacy.
Without fact-constraining speech restrictions, courts might inaccurately apply
policy, frustrating the participatory efforts of the community as a whole. Without
norm-constraining restrictions, courts might make up policy themselves---illegitimately, because court decisionmaking lacks full community participation. And
without restrictions on judicial speech like that invalidated in White, the participation of the litigants in the process of applying general policy to their specific
circumstances might be rendered meaningless.
Democratic politics does not need, and therefore cannot legitimately
impose, the kinds of fact-constraining and norm-constraining speech restrictions
that are acceptable in adjudication. This is because the process of democratic
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politics, unlike that of adjudication, can legitimately create generally binding
policy. There is no concern for derivative legitimacy, then, that can justify
limiting the empirical or normative inputs into democratic politics, and indeed
doing so would undermine direct legitimacy by frustrating the participatory
efforts of those who think that the prohibited facts or norms actually are relevant
to public policy.
But there is the persistent danger that the speech of some participants in the
political process, like the speech of judicial candidates in White, will effectively
render the speech of other participants meaningless, or at least less meaningful.
That is, there is the danger that unfettered political speech might itself, in certain
circumstances, undermine the direct legitimacy of democratic politics.
Consider, for instance, the fact that some in our society disproportionately
control, through money or political power, access to the mass media that are
the most effective platforms for political speech.3JO Large corporations, for
example, powerfully influence the content of everyday television programming,
including news programming, through the use of their advertising dollars or
331
through their ownership of the media outlets themselves.
Even more trou~
blingly, well~financed candidates, political action committees, and interest
groups can dominate debate about candidates and issues during political cam~
33l
paigns by purchasing large amounts of advertising.
Because the opportunity
for speech through the mass media is a marketable commodity, those with more
money can afford to purchase more of it-to engage in more, and more effective,
speech-than those with less money. The result, both in potential and in actual
practice, is that the contributions of some (richer and more powerful) members of
society to political debate effectively drown out the contributions of others.333
Many have argued that government has the power, under the First
Amendment, to regulate the "marketplace" of speech in order to mitigate or
prevent these kinds of free speech inequities. l34 Arguably the Supreme Court
has not been consistent in deciding whether, when, and to what extent
330.
Here I derive examples from, and reach conclusions generally consistent with, those offered in
SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48, particularly in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6. Sunstein's excellent
analysis is much more in-depth and much less tentative than the suggestions I make here.
331.
See id. at 62--66.
332.
This was the rationale behind the Michigan restriction on corporate political expenditures
challenged in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and behind the Court's
decision upholding that restriction: "Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections," id. at 660
(citations omitted). See also Fallon, supra note 21, at 37 (explaining the result in Austin as "reflectling)
the worry that political advertising achieves causal dominance, not rational persuasion"); CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 20, at 1043-44 (explaining the rationale behind Austin).
333.
See generally SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 48; John Rawls, Basic Liberties and Their
Priority, in THE TANNER LEClURES ON HUMAN VALUES III 76 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1982);
RAWLS, supra note 51, at 362--63.
334.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 333.
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government may do SO.335 My analysis in this Article suggests, quite generally,
that government may reasonably regulate speech in order to prevent the speech
of some from being rendered comparatively less meaningful. Doing so would be
analogous to preventing judicial precommitment-in the form of de facto
campaign "promises," as in White, or in the starker form of, say, a bribe-to a
particular result in a particular court case; it would restrict the speech of some
participants in government decisionmaking (the judge in adjudication, the rich
336
and powerful in politics) in order to preserve the speech of others. Such restrictions, if reasonable, might actually en}ul7lce the overall freedom of speech, and
337
political participation more generally, rather than impair them. They might, in
other words, increase the direct participatory legitimacy of the political process,
338
which is after all what justifies freedom of political speech in the first place.
Consider also examples of "hate speech," such as the racially motivated
339
cross burning held protected by the Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.
It is
debatable, first of all, whether hate speech directed at women or at racial, ethnic,
religious, or other minorities, at least in its most egregious forms, constitutes
political participation at all; does hate speech really contribute, or even attempt
335.
For example, the Coun has upheld the K:C's so-called "fairness doctrine" requiring broadcast
television stations to offer balanced discussions of public issues. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367,369-71,400-01 (1969). But the Coun also has invalidated a state law requiring newspapers to
accept and print letters by political candidates replying to criticism in the paper, see Miami Herald
Publ'g v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,243,258 (1974), and has held that intermediate scrutiny must be applied
to a federal statute requiring cable TV companies to carry local broadcast channels, see Turner Broad.
Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994). In the area of campaign finance regulation, the Coun has
invalidated federal restrictions on campaign expenditures by candidates and noncandidates alike but has
upheld restrictions on campaign contributions, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), and has invalidated some resttictions on corporate campaign expenditures but upheld others. Compare First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (invalidating a Massachusetts law prohibiting banks or businesses from
making contributions or expenditures in connection with ballot initiatives or referenda), with Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655, 669 (1990) (upholding a Michigan law prohibiting
corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with political campaigns). Shonly
before this Article went to press, the Coun issued a lengthy and fractured decision upholding provisions of
the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002), that
regulate the use of "soft money" (campaign related funds previously unregulated by federal law) and of "issue
ads" (advenisements intended to affect federal election results without ovenly advocating a panicular
candidate's election or defeat). See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
336.
It would, on the other hand, be foolish for government to attempt to make everyone's
speech, in adjudication or in politics, equally effective. Even if every panicipant who wants to speak, in
either context, is given an equal opponunity to do so, some people's arguments will simply be more
persuasive than others. The idea is to equalize--or at least to remove the most egregious forms of
inequality in-<>pponunity to meaningfully panicipate, not the results of participation.
337.
The Supreme Coun suggested as much in Red Uon. See Red Uon, 395 U.S. at 375 (FCC's
fairness doctrine would "enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press.").
338.
I am offering only a very general suggestion here and leaving many problems and details
unconsidered. For careful analysis of many of those problems and details, see SUNSTEIN, FREE SPEECH,
supra note 48.
339.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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to contribute, to anyone's understanding about good public policy?J4O But this

may be too narrow a conception of valuable political participation, and so let's
suppose that cross burning and other egregious forms of hate speech do amount
to true political speech. The possibility remains that protecting hate speech
actually impairs freedom of speech more than it enhances freedom of speech,
341
because hate speech might result in "silencing" the speech of its targets.
We might compare hate speech in this regard to a judge's campaign
promise to decide certain cases in certain ways.342 A judge's pre commitment
to a certain decision renders the litigants' participation ineffective; what is
more, a litigant's knowledge of a judge's pre commitment may deter the
litigant from attempting to meaningfully participate at all. The litigant
is essentially silenced by her knowledge that the judge will not take her
arguments seriously.
Hate speech may have a similar silencing effect: It tells its targets not only
that the speaker thinks poorly of them, but also that the speaker simply will not
take their arguments seriously. The hate speaker is telling his targets that,
because they are his "moral subordinates,,,J43 he need not listen or respond to
their moral (including their political) arguments--not even to their arguments
that they are not in fact his moral subordinates. This message matters to the
targets because the speaker, like the precommitting judge, is a government decisionmaker: He can influence government decisions with his speech and, assuming he is a citizen, with his vote. Like a judge's announcement of how he will
decide certain cases, then, hate speech might be understood as an attempt by a
government decisionmaker to preempt the meaningful participation of those
who will be bound by his decisions.
Understanding hate speech in this way allows us to distinguish (albeit only
roughly) between, on the one hand, garden-variety statements of opinion about
the abilities or worth (or lack thereof) of women, racial minorities, and the
like-which seems fully deserving of First Amendment protection as political
speech, however disagreeable most of us might find it to be-and, on the other

340.
341.

Perhaps only in that its existence suggests that good public policy would be to restrict it.
For descriptions of how racist hate speech can "silence" its victims, see Mari ). Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2335-41 (1989);
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-CaIling, 17
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 136--49 (1982).
The majority in White did not decide that this overt sort of promise is protected by the First
342.
Amendment; its decision applied only to judicial candidates' statements about "disputed legal or political
issues" that fell short of precommitments to particular decisions. Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S.
765,770 (2002).
343.
I take this phrasing from Larty Alexander, who takes it in turn from Andrew Altman. See
Alexander, supra note 127, at 87~9 (citing Andrew Altman, Uberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A
Philosophical Examination, 103 En-lIes 302, 310 (1993

».
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hand, true hate speech, which might not be so deserving. Consider an example
offered by Henry Louis Gates, Jr.:
Contrast the following two statements addressed to a black freshman at
Stanford: (A) LeVon, if you find yourself struggling in your classes here,
you should realize it isn't your fault. It's simply that you're the beneficiary
of a disruptive policy of affirmative action that places underqualified,
underprepared and often undertalented black students in demanding
educational environments like this one. The policy's egalitarian aims may
be well-intentioned, but given the fact that aptitude tests place African
Americans almost a full standard deviation below the mean, even controlling for socioeconomic disparities, they are also profoundly misguided.
The truth is, you probably don't belong here, and your college experience
will be a long downhill slide. (B) Out of my face, jungle bunny.344

Statement A is within the realm of moral or political argument; it is a statement
of opinion that allows for the possibility of disagreement, even of persuasion in
the other direction. If it is not exactly an invitation to reasoned debate, at least
it isn't an advertisement that the speaker has precommitted to a particular moral
or political judgment, debate be damned. But Statement B is precisely such an
advertisement: It tells the listener that none of his moral arguments, including
the argument that he is capable of moral argument, can possibly be effective
with respect to the speaker. It is one citizen telling another that he has, in
effect, prejudged the other's case. As such, it seems to me analogous to the
judge's precommitment to particular decisions of cases; it is speech that might be
345
justifiably restricted in the name of greater freedom of political expression.

344.
to Civil

ld. at 72 (quoting Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Uberties Pose No Threat
Rights, NEWREPUBLlC, Sept. 20 & 27,1993, at37, 45).

345.
Thus I lean towards disagreement with Larry Alexander's conclusion that bans on hate speech,
at least outside the context of public universities, cannot be justified under the First Amendment as
protections against subordination. See id. at 87-89. Alexander argues that hate speech cannot in fact
subordinate its targets because,
[~or one to be legally subordinated, he must have his legal rights and duties altered in a way that
brings about a subordinate legal status. Hate speech does not effect such an alteration. Nor does
it alter moral rights and duties. It leaves the target's moral status as it was. Of course, those who
engage in hate speech may often believe that the targets are moral subordinates. However, they
do not believe that uttering epithets is what makes them moral subordinates.
[d. at 88. I think that hate speakers do in fact believe that uttering epithets makes their targets into legal (or
perhaps political) subordinates by deterring the targets from offering reasoned moral and political arguments
(including arguments about the targets' moral and political status). The desire to subordinate in this way is,
at least in part, what motivates people to engage in hate speech rather than in reasoned argument about the
supposed inferiority of women, blacks, or whomever. Reasoned argument, after all, invites a reasoned
response; hate speech seeks to cut off a reasoned response before it can be offered.
It seems to me, then, that the only "value" hate speech adds to moral and political discussion is the
questionable one of silencing its targets; any moral or political ideas lurking beneath hate speech could be
expressed in the form of reasoned arguments rather than epithets. Thus the harm of silencing hate speech
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Of course there will be very difficult lines to draw in these and other kinds
of cases. My point here is only that, despite the Supreme Court's occasional
pronouncements to the contrary,346 the project of line drawing itself should not
be taboo in the context of political speech any more than in the context of adjudicative speech. Sometimes we must restrict speech in the name of democratic
legitimacy, which after all animates the freedom of speech in the first place. We
have been doing it in adjudication for centuries.

is not really a harm at all-the ideas it expresses can be conveyed effectively in other fonns---while the
"silencing" harm of hate speech seems to me quite real.
Of course, this leaves many line-drawing or "slippery slope" problems, see id. at 88-89, 91-96
(discussing the slippery slope problem with regulating hate speech), including the problem of distinguishing
hate speech from reasoned arguments. Perhaps those problems, and the risk of erroneous political or
judicial resolutions of them, outweigh the gains to true freedom of speech that could be obtained by a
perfectly drawn and perfectly administered ban on hate speech. I take no position here on that extremely
difficult and probably ultimately decisive question.
346.
See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980) ("To allow a
government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow the government control
over the search for political truth."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) ("[Ilhe
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ...."); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, ]., dissenting) ("mhe absolutely central truth of the First
Amendment [is] that government cannot be trusted to assure, through censorship, the 'fairness' of political
debate.").

***

